MISHNA: One who writes two letters on Shabbat during one lapse of awareness is liable. The following substances used as ink are explained in the Gemara. One is liable if he wrote with deyo, with sam, with sikra, with gum [komos], or with copper sulfate [kankantom] or with any substance that makes a mark. If one wrote on two walls of a house that form a corner, or on two parts of a writing tablet, and the two items are read together, he is liable. One who writes on his flesh on Shabbat is liable. If one unwittingly scratches letters on his flesh on Shabbat, Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable to bring a sin-offering and the Sages deem him exempt.
If one wrote with liquids or with fruit juice, or if one drew letters with road dust, with scribes’ dust that they use to dry the ink, or with any substance with which the writing does not endure, he is exempt. Similarly, if one wrote by holding the pen on the back of his hand, with his foot, with his mouth, or with his elbow; if one wrote only a single letter, even if it was adjacent to other preexisting writing; or if one wrote over other writing; if one meant to write the letter ḥet and instead wrote the two halves of the ḥet as two instances of the letter zayin; if one wrote one letter on the ground and one on a rafter; if one wrote one letter on two walls of a house, or on two parts of a writing tablet that are not read together, he is exempt. If one wrote one letter as an abbreviation representing an entire word, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Beteira deems him liable to bring a sin-offering, and the Rabbis deem him exempt.
GEMARA: The Gemara defines the terms used in the mishna. Deyo is deyota made from soot. Sam is samma, which is yellow-tinged arsenic. Sikra, Rabba bar bar Ḥana said: It is called sikreta in Aramaic and is a lead-based red paint. Komos is koma in Aramaic, and it is an ink made with gum Arabic from the sap of a tree. Kankantom, Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Shmuel said: This is the black substance used by cobblers, copper sulfate.
And we learned in the mishna that one who writes with any substance that makes a mark is liable. The Gemara asks: What does this statement come to include? The Gemara answers: It comes to include that which Rabbi Ḥananya taught with regard to writing a bill of divorce: If one wrote it with the juice of the fruit called teriya, or with gallnut juice instead of ink, it is valid. Similarly, Rabbi Ḥiyya taught: If one wrote a bill of divorce with lead, with soot (ge’onim), or with shoeblack, it is valid. Since those substances leave a permanent mark, one who writes with them on Shabbat is liable.
We learned in the mishna: If one unwittingly scratches letters on his flesh on Shabbat, Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable to bring a sin-offering and the Sages deem him exempt. It was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer said to the Rabbis: Didn’t the infamous ben Stada take magic spells out of Egypt in a scratch on his flesh? They said to him: He was a fool, and you cannot cite proof from a fool. That is not the way that most people write. Incidentally, the Gemara asks: Why did they call him ben Stada, when he was the son of Pandeira? Rav Ḥisda said: His mother’s husband, who acted as his father, was named Stada, but the one who had relations with his mother and fathered him was named Pandeira. The Gemara asks: Wasn’t his mother’s husband Pappos ben Yehuda? Rather, his mother was named Stada and he was named ben Stada after her. The Gemara asks: But wasn’t his mother Miriam, who braided women’s hair? The Gemara explains: That is not a contradiction. Rather, Stada was merely a nickname, as they say in Pumbedita: This one strayed [setat da] from her husband.
We learned in the mishna: If one wrote only a single letter, even if it was adjacent to other preexisting writing, he is exempt. The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna whose opinion is cited in the mishna? Rava bar Rav Huna said: This halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, as if it were in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, didn’t he say: One who adds a single thread to a previously woven fabric is liable for weaving? In his opinion, although a single thread or letter is insignificant in and of itself, one is liable because adding even a small measure to existing material is significant.
We learned in the mishna: If one wrote over other writing he is exempt. The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna whose opinion is cited in the mishna? Rav Ḥisda said: This halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as it was taught in a baraita: If one needed to write the Tetragrammaton, the name of God, in a Torah scroll, and became confused and intended instead to write the name Yehuda, and while intending to write Yehuda he erred and omitted the letter dalet, thereby writing the name of God, he should do the following. He passes a quill with more ink over the name and sanctifies it, i.e., he writes it with the intention required when writing a holy name. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. And the Rabbis say: Even if he adds ink over what he wrote, this writing of God’s name is not ideal. Apparently, according to Rabbi Yehuda, writing over other writing is considered writing anew.
A tanna taught in a baraita: If one wrote a single letter and thereby completed a book, or if one wove a single thread and thereby completed an entire garment, he is liable. The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna whose opinion is cited in the baraita? Rava bar Rav Huna said: It is the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who said: One who adds a single thread to a previously woven fabric is liable for weaving. Rav Ashi said: Even if you say that in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, one who does so to complete a garment is different. Even if he is not liable for weaving, he is liable at least for striking a blow with a hammer to complete the production process of a vessel.
Rabbi Ami said: If one wrote one letter on paper in Tiberias and one letter on paper in Tzippori, he is liable because he performed a full-fledged act of writing that is lacking only in proximity. When the two pieces of paper are brought together he will have written two associated letters. The Gemara asks: Didn’t we learn in the mishna: If one wrote one letter on two walls of a house, or on two parts of a writing tablet that are not read together, he is exempt? All the more so that this is the halakha with regard to one who wrote in two different cities. The Gemara answers: There, in the case of the parts of a tablet, there is the lack of an additional act of cutting or tearing to facilitate bringing the letters together. However, here, in the case of two cities, even though they are distant from one another, there is no lack of an additional act to facilitate bringing them together.
A tanna taught in the Tosefta: If one emended a single letter on Shabbat, he is liable. The Gemara wonders: Now, if one wrote a single letter on Shabbat he is exempt; is it possible that if one emends a single letter he is liable? Rav Sheshet said: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where one removed the roof of a ḥet and transformed it into two instances of the letter zayin, effectively writing two letters with a single correction. Rava said: It is not necessarily referring to that specific case. It could even be referring to a case where one removed the protrusion from the back of a dalet and transformed it into a reish, thereby emending the written text. One who did so is liable for performing the prohibited labor of striking a blow with a hammer to complete the production process of a vessel.
A tanna taught: If one intended to write one letter on Shabbat
and managed to write two letters, he is liable. The Gemara asks: Didn’t we learn in the mishna that one is exempt in that case? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult: That case where we learned that he is exempt is referring to a case where the letters require crowns. This is referring to a case where they do not require crowns, and he is liable. If the letters already had their requisite ornamentation and an individual separated them, it is as if he wrote two letters.
We learned in the mishna If one wrote one letter as an abbreviation [notarikon] representing an entire word, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Beteira deems him liable to bring a sin-offering, and the Rabbis deem him exempt. Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Yosei ben Zimra: From where is it derived that the language of abbreviation is employed in the Torah? As it is stated: “Neither shall your name any more be called Abram, but your name shall be Abraham; for the father of a multitude of nations [av hamon goyim] have I made you” (Genesis 17:5). The verse itself contracts av hamon into Abraham [Avraham]. The words av hamon themselves are interpreted as an abbreviation: I have made you a father [av] for the nations, I have made you chosen [baḥur] among the nations, I have made you beloved [ḥaviv] among the nations, I have made you king [melekh] for the nations, I have made you distinguished [vatik] for the nations, I have made you trusted [ne’eman] for the nations.
Rabbi Yoḥanan himself said that the word anokhi that begins the Ten Commandments is an abbreviation for: I myself wrote and gave [ana nafshi ketivat yehavit]. The Rabbis said it is an abbreviation for: A pleasant statement was written and given [amira ne’ima ketiva yehiva]. Some say the word anokhi can be interpreted backwards: It was written, it was given, its statements are faithful [yehiva ketiva ne’emanim amareha].
The school of Rabbi Natan said that there is another abbreviation in the Torah. In the verse: “And the angel of the Lord said to him: Why did you hit your donkey these three times? Behold I have come out as an adversary because your way is contrary [yarat] against me” (Numbers 22:32). Yarat is an abbreviation for: The donkey feared [yare’a], it saw [ra’ata], and it turned aside [nateta]. The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: The word karmel in the verse: “And bread, and toasted grain flour, and toasted grain [karmel]” (Leviticus 23:14) means: A full kernel [kar maleh], i.e., the seed fills the stalk. Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said in King David’s words: “And behold, with you is Shimi ben Gera from Benjamin, of Bahurim, who cursed me with a grievous [nimretzet] curse on the day that I went to Mahanaim” (I Kings 2:8). The word nimretzet is an abbreviation for: He is an adulterer [noef], he is a Moabite [Moavi], he is a murderer [rotze’aḥ], he is an oppressor [tzorer], he is an abomination [to’eva].
Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that there is another abbreviation in the Bible: “And Judah said: What can we say to my master, what can we speak, and how can we justify [nitztadak]” (Genesis 44:16), which stands for: We are honest [nekhonim], we are righteous [tzaddikim], we are pure [tehorim], we are innocent [dakkim], we are holy [kedoshim].
MISHNA: With regard to one who writes two letters on Shabbat in two separate lapses of awareness separated by a period of awareness that the day was Shabbat, writing one letter in the morning and one letter in the afternoon, Rabban Gamliel deems him liable to bring a sin-offering like someone who has unintentionally performed a full-fledged prohibited labor, and the Rabbis deem him exempt.
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: With regard to what do they disagree? Rabban Gamliel holds: There is no awareness for half a measure. One is not liable to bring a sacrifice for half a measure; therefore, the fact that he became aware between performance of the two halves of the prohibited labor is of no significance. His awareness does not demarcate between one act of writing a letter and the second act of writing a letter with regard to liability to bring a sin-offering. And the Rabbis hold: There is awareness for half a measure. If an individual became aware of his transgression between the two parts of the prohibited labor, each individual part is independent of the other, and the two halves of the prohibited labor do not join together to create liability.
MISHNA: Rabbi Eliezer says: One who weaves on Shabbat is liable to bring a sin-offering if he wove three threads at the beginning of something new, or if he adds one thread to a preexisting woven fabric. And the Rabbis say: Both at the beginning and at the end, its measure for liability is two threads. One who makes two meshes, i.e., ties the threads of the warp, attaching them to either the nirin or the keiros, which will be explained in the Gemara, in a winnow, sieve, or basket, is liable for making meshes. And one who sews is liable if he sews two stitches. And one who tears is liable if he tears enough fabric in order to sew two stitches to repair it.
GEMARA: When Rabbi Yitzḥak came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he taught that Rabbi Eliezer said: Two threads is the measure that determines liability for beginning a weave. The Gemara asks: Didn’t we learn three in the mishna? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, because this source is referring to thick threads and that source is referring to thin threads. Some say it this way, that one is liable when weaving two thick threads, and some say it that way, that one is liable when weaving two thin threads. The Gemara elaborates: Some say it this way: One who weaves thick threads, three threads will not unravel, but two will unravel. With regard to thin threads, two will also not unravel. And some say it this way: One who weaves thin threads, three threads are conspicuous, two are not conspicuous. With regard to thick threads, two are also conspicuous.
It was taught in a baraita: One who weaves three threads at the beginning or one thread onto a preexisting woven fabric is liable. And the Rabbis say: Both at the beginning and at the end, its measure for liability is two threads. And if one weaves a hem with a thread or color different from the original garment, he is liable for weaving two threads across a width of three meshes, i.e., three threads of the warp. Why is one liable in that case? To what is this similar? It is similar to weaving a small belt in which one weaves two threads across a width of three meshes, the width of the belt. And when it is taught in the baraita: One who weaves three threads at the beginning or one thread onto a preexisting woven fabric is liable, that unattributed baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.
It was taught in another baraita: One who weaves two threads onto a large fabric or onto the border of a fabric alongside the woof on Shabbat is liable. Rabbi Eliezer says: One is liable even if he weaves one thread. And along the edge of the warp, one who weaves two threads across a width of three meshes is liable. To what is this similar? It is similar to weaving a small belt in which one weaves two threads across a width of three meshes. The Gemara comments: When it was taught in the baraita: One who weaves two threads onto a large fabric or onto the border is liable, that unattributed baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.
We learned in the mishna that one who makes two meshes, attaching them to either the nirin or the keiros, is liable. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of to the nirin? Abaye said: One ties two to the meshes, the thread of the warp, and ties one to the crosspiece, the thread that extends from the weaving rod. We learned in the mishna that one is liable for attaching the meshes to the keiros, and the Gemara asks: What is a keiros? Rav said: It refers to the slips, the parts that go up and down on a stationary loom and are parallel to the pole.
And we also learned in the mishna that one who sews on Shabbat is liable if he sews two stitches. The Gemara asks: We already learned that on the list of primary categories of prohibited labor: And one who sews two stitches is liable. The Gemara answers: Since the mishna wanted to teach in the latter clause: And one who tears in order to sew two stitches, it also taught the halakha of one who sews. And one who tears, did we not also learn this in the mishna enumerating the list of primary categories of prohibited labor? Since the mishna wanted to teach a new halakha in the latter clause, namely: One who tears in his anger or for his dead relative, therefore, it also taught the halakha of one who sews two stitches.
With regard to what we learned in the mishna: And one who tears in order to sew two stitches, the Gemara asks: Where do you find that case where it is necessary to tear a garment in order to sew it?
The Gemara explains: It is found in a case where a pocketlike protrusion impedes sewing. Therefore, one tears the garment and tucks the protruding portion under the seam.
MISHNA: One who rends his garment in his anger or in anguish over his dead relative is exempt. And anyone else who performs labors destructively on Shabbat is exempt. And one who performs a labor destructively in order to repair is liable, and his measure for liability is equivalent to the measure for one who performs that labor constructively. The measure that determines liability for one who whitens, or one who combs, or one who dyes, or one who spins wool is the full width of a double sit, which is the distance between the forefinger and the middle finger. And for one who weaves two threads, the measure that determines liability is one sit.
GEMARA: We learned in the mishna: One who rends his garment in anger or in anguish over his dead relative is exempt. The Gemara raises a contradiction to this based on a baraita: One who rends his garment in his anger or in his mourning or in his anguish over his dead relative is liable for performing a prohibited labor on Shabbat. And even though he desecrates Shabbat by tearing his garment, he nevertheless fulfilled his obligation of rending his garment in mourning. Apparently, one is liable for rending his garment in anguish over the dead. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as this mishna, which states one is liable for rending his garment, is referring to his own dead relative for whom he is obligated to tear his garment. And that mishna, which states one is exempt for rending his garment, is referring to any unrelated dead person.
The Gemara asks: Didn’t we learn in the mishna: Over his dead relative? The Gemara answers: Actually, the mishna, which says that he is exempt, is referring to his own dead; however, it is referring to those relatives who are not subject to the obligation of mourning by Torah law. The Gemara asks: And even so, if the dead person is a Torah scholar, one is obligated to rend one’s garment in anguish over his death, as it was taught in a baraita: When a Torah scholar dies, everyone is his relative. The Gemara asks: Does it enter your mind that everyone is his relative? Rather, say: Everyone is considered to be like his relative, in the sense that everyone rends his garment in anguish over him, and everyone bares his shoulder over him in mourning, and everyone eats the mourner’s meal over him in the public square as mourners do. The death of a Torah scholar is a personal loss for every Jew. The Gemara answers: It was only necessary for the mishna to teach this halakha in a case where the dead person is not a Torah scholar.
The Gemara asks: And if he was an upright person, aren’t all those present at his death obligated to rend their garments over his death? As it was taught in a baraita: Why do a person’s sons and daughters die when they are young? They die so that he will cry and mourn over the death of an upright worthy person. The Gemara asks: They die so that he will cry? Is security taken from him in advance to ensure that he fulfills his obligation? Rather, emend the statement and say: It is because he did not cry or mourn over an upright person who died, as anyone who cries over an upright person who died, they forgive him for all his transgressions because of the honor he accorded to the deceased. Nevertheless, it is difficult, as one is required to rend his clothing over the death of an upright person. The Gemara answers: It was only necessary for the mishna to teach this halakha in a case where the deceased was not an upright person.
The Gemara asks: And if one is standing close to the deceased when the soul leaves the body, he is obligated to rend his garment, as it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: One who is standing over the deceased at the time of the departure of the soul is obligated to rend his garment. To what is this similar? It is similar to a Torah scroll that was burned. The Gemara answers: It was only necessary for the mishna to teach this halakha in a case where he is not standing there at the time of the departure of the soul.
The Gemara asks further: This works out well in terms of resolving the contradiction with regard to his dead relative. However, the contradiction between the ruling in the mishna that one who rends his garment in his anger is not liable, and the ruling in the baraita that one who rends his garment in his anger is liable, is still difficult. The mishna exempts one who rends garments in anger, while the baraita deems him liable. The Gemara answers: The contradiction between his anger in the mishna and his anger in the baraita is also not difficult, as this ruling in the baraita that deems him liable is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and that ruling in the mishna that exempts him is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. The Gemara elaborates: This ruling in the baraita follows Rabbi Yehuda, who said that one who performs a prohibited labor on Shabbat that is not needed for its own sake is liable for performing it. Therefore, one who rends his garment in anger is liable. That ruling in the mishna which exempts him is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said that one who performs a labor that is not needed for its own sake is exempt for performing it.
The Gemara asks: Say that you heard that Rabbi Yehuda rules that one is liable for performing a labor not needed for its own sake in the case of a constructive act; did you hear him deem one liable in the case of a destructive act? Rabbi Avin said: This case, where one rends his garment in anger, is also constructive, because in doing so he assuages his anger. Rending his garment calms him; therefore, it can be said that he derives benefit from the act of rending, and it is consequently a constructive act. The Gemara asks: And is it at all permitted to tear in that manner? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name of Ḥilfa bar Agra, who said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri: One who rends his garments in his anger, or who breaks his vessels in his anger, or who scatters his money in his anger, should be like an idol worshipper in your eyes, as that is the craft of the evil inclination. Today it tells him do this, and tomorrow it tells him do that, until eventually, when he no longer controls himself, it tells him worship idols and he goes and worships idols. Rabbi Avin said: What verse alludes to this? “There shall not be a strange god within you, and you shall not bow to a foreign god” (Psalms 81:10). What is the strange god that is within a person’s body? Say that it is the evil inclination. One may not rend his garments in anger, because in doing so he is deriving pleasure from satisfying the evil inclination.
The Gemara answers: It is only necessary to discuss this in a case where one does so to instill fear in the members of his household. In order to show them that he is very angry, he tears and breaks objects even though he is not that angry. In that case he maintains control of himself and is not in danger of succumbing to the evil inclination. It is like the incident where Rav Yehuda sought to display his anger and he pulled threads off his garment. Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov smashed broken vessels, Rav Sheshet threw small fish on his maidservant’s head, and Rabbi Abba broke the lid of a jug. All of these Sages caused minimal damage in creating the impression that they were angry.
Apropos the laws of mourning for an upright person and a Torah scholar, the Gemara cites that which Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi said that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said in the name of Bar Kappara: Anyone who sheds tears over an upright person, the Holy One, Blessed be He, counts his tears and places them in His treasury, as it is stated: “You have counted my wanderings, put my tears into your bottle, are they not in your book?” (Psalms 56:9). Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Anyone who is lazy in eulogizing a Torah scholar, it is fitting to bury him alive, as it is stated: “And they buried him in the border of his inheritance in Timnat-seraḥ, which is in the hill-country of Ephraim, on the north of the mountain of Ga’ash” (Joshua 24:30). This teaches that the mountain raged against them to kill them because they did not eulogize him appropriately. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Whoever is lazy in eulogizing a Sage does not live a long life, and his punishment is measure for measure. Since he was unconcerned with the death of the Sage, in the heavens they will be unconcerned with his death. The Holy One, Blessed be He, conducts Himself in this manner, as it is stated: “In full measure [besase’a], when You send her away You contend with her” (Isaiah 27:8), and the Sages derived that God punishes from the words: “You contend with her,” and He does so measure for measure, se’a for se’a, from the word sase’a in the verse above.
Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba raised an objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan: It is stated: “And the nation worshipped the Lord all the days of Joshua and all the days of the Elders, who lived many days after Joshua” (Judges 2:7), indicating that the Elders lived long lives even though they did not eulogize Joshua properly. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Babylonian, you should be more precise in your reading. They indeed lived many days; however, they did not live many years. In fact, they did not live to the end of that year. Again he asked: But then with regard to the verse “So that your days and the days of your children will multiply on the land which the Lord your God swore to give to your fathers, as the days of the heavens over the earth” (Deuteronomy 11:21), would you also say that here the reward is to live many days but not years? He answered him: A blessing is different and should be interpreted in its most expansive sense.
And Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If one of the brothers dies,
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