RECURSOS DE FORMACION: PARASHA MISHPATIM - 21:1

21:1

ואלה המשפטים, "And these are the ordinances, etc." The word ואלה needs analysis. We find a disagreement in the Mechilta between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva on this subject. The former holds that the reason for the linkage between the Ten Commandments and the ordinances is to tell us that just as the former are of Sinaitic i.e. Divine origin, so are the latter. Rabbi Akiva said the reason for the conjunctive letter ו is that we could have thought that Moses was to teach the ordinances to the Israelites and if they did not understand them all, he, Moses, did not have to repeat them; therefore the Torah speaks of תשים לפניהם "place them in front of them," as one lays a meal before people which is ready to be eaten. According to Rabbi Yishmael who holds that the ordinances are of Sinaitic origin it is obvious that the Torah speaks about the details of these various laws being of Divine origin seeing we already know that the outlines are of Divine origin. Rabbi Yishmael has said himself in Zevachim 115 that all the general rules of the commandments of the Torah were handed down from Sinai, whereas Moses was told the details when G'd used to speak to him in the Tabernacle. If so, the commandments referred to here were the general outline only and there would be no reason for adding the letter ו in front of אלה. According to Rabbi Akiva who claimed that both general outlines and details were revealed to Moses at Mount Sinai, the expression ואלה המשפטים is also unnecessary. We need to look a little closer at what Rashi has to say on our verse. In our verse he explains the expression in line with Rabbi Yishmael, whereas at the beginning of Leviticus 25,1 where the Torah speaks about what G'd said to Moses at Mount Sinai, Rashi explains the verse in terms of Rabbi Akiva's statement in the Mechilta we quoted earlier. Rabbi Akiva said that just as both the outline and the details of the Shmittah regulations originated at Sinai, so all the laws in the Torah originated at Sinai.

Why does Rashi give two separate interpretations instead of mentioning that Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva disagree in their understanding of our verse? Rashi could have more easily stated that the letter ו is to tell Moses how to teach the laws to the Jewish people, i.e. to set it before them like a table which is all laid out for the guests. He could have said that this rule applies both to the commandments regulating our relations with G'd as well as to those regulating our relations with each other.

I have seen that Rabbi Eliyah Mizrachi explains the statement of Rabbi Yishmael to mean that even the ordinances were also communicated to the Israelites amidst thunder and lightning, and that G'd spoke more than just the Ten Commandments at Mount Sinai. Even if Rabbi Yishmael had said so expressly, he would have had to substantiate this, all the more so since Rabbi Mizrachi only credits him with having meant this. According to the Mechilta all Rabbi Yishmael is quoted as saying is "just as the earlier statements were revealed at Sinai so the (later) ordinances were also revealed at Sinai." He did not say that "just as the earlier commandments were issued amidst thunder and lightning so were the ordinances revealed amidst thunder and lightning." There is no hint in this statement of the ordinances having been revealed amidst thunder and lightning. Furthermore, we have already answered the question we raised about Rabbi Yishmael's statement referring to the details of these ordinances not being revealed here because he has stated that when the Torah introduces the Shmittah legislation in Leviticus. It is posssible that Rabbi Yishmael thought that the example of the שמטה legislation was not enough to use it as a role model for all the commandments seeing that there are three other occasions in the Torah when a commandment is specifically mentioned as related to Mount Sinai. The principal reason, however, is the one we already mentioned. It might be best to leave the question against Rashi as a matter unresolved pending further study than to follow the path of Rabbi Mizrachi who put words into Rabbi Yishmael's mouth that he has not been able to support with evidence.

If Rabbi Mizrachi's intention was to say that whereas the Ten Commandments were handed down amidst both thunder and lightning, whereas the ordinances were handed down only amidst thunder, not exactly like the Ten Commandments, this would also not be acceptable as it would create a third category of commandments and the manner in which they were communicated to the Jewish people. The first category would be the way the Ten Commandments were communicated; the second category would be the way G'd communicated all the commandments to Moses during the forty days Moses spent on the Mountain; the third category would be the ordinances. Who would be prepared to even listen to such an explanation?! There is nothing anywhere in the Torah which could serve as a comparison for such an approach!

Another reason why the Torah wrote ואלה may well have to do with Sanhedrin 86, which stipulates that the judges of the Sanhedrin had to officiate near the Tabernacle or Temple. The expression ואלה then hints that just as there are other locations which are sacred, namely the altar and subsequently the Tabernacle, so the site where the judges pronounced G'd's law also had to be a site which was close by and had been sanctified.

אשר תשים לפניהם. "which you shall place before them." Whereas our sages have provided us with numerous homiletical explanations for this expression (Sanhedrin 7), we also need to know the plain meaning of these words. [I presume the author feels that one does not place words before a person. Ed.] Perhaps this is connected to the fact that some of the Torah's commandments are duties that a person's body has to perform, i.e. חובת גברא. In order to perform these commandments one needs to know what is involved. Unless a person performed such duties with his body he would not be considered part of the Holy Covenant between G'd and His people. For example, if a person did not know that it is forbidden to eat an animal which died from injuries he would consume both it and the blood and the fat parts which are forbidden. Similarly, when performing the positive commandment of the Passover he has to eat the lamb, the bitter herbs, the unleavened bread, keep the days holy, etc. In order to fulfil these commandments he has to be familiar with them. There are other categories of commandments of a more abstract nature, such as sanctifying the new moon, litigations, laws pertaining to which animal sacrifices are applicable and under what conditions, etc. The truth is that every Israelite ought to be familiar with all aspects of the Torah. However, as long as there are Torah scholars who are familiar with all the commandments and who can be consulted when the need arises all is under control. When G'd said תשים לפניהם, this means that everyone ought to be familiar with the laws listed here. How would a person making a purchase know if the purchase was legally valid unless he had first familiarised himself with the laws pertaining to acquisitions? The person who had been sold would not know of his rights to freedom after a certain number of years unless he had studied the relevant portion of the Torah. The reason the Torah continues in verse two with direct speech, i.e. "when you purchase a slave" instead of "when someone purchases a slave, etc." may underline the importance the Torah places on the purchaser being familiar with this legislation.

The words תשים לפניהם also contain a plea for the purchaser to accept the legislation wholeheartedly. While it is natural for someone who purchases a slave to consider such an acquisition permanent, the law which directs him not only to release such a slave after six years but to provide him with a stake so that he can re-establish himself economically may arouse some misgivings in the owner. The Torah wishes everyone to evaluate this legislation also from the standpoint of the slave. Since the reason the slave had to sell himself is that he was financially unlucky and/or had been found stealing, this is something which could happen to anyone, seeing money has a habit of "rolling" from one person or family to another. The owner is meant to reflect on the matter that if he himself were ever to find himself in the situation that his slave found himself in, the Torah's legislation holds out hope for such a person to achieve financial rehabilitation.

21:2

כי תקנה עבד עברי, "When you purchase a Jewish slave, etc." Perhaps the meaning is: "when you are about to buy a slave, buy a Jewish slave (rather than a Gentile)." You should not buy a Gentile because you know you can keep him indefinitely.

The reason the Torah refers to the slave as עבדי instead of ישראלי, may be that the Torah is sensitive about combining the words עבד and ישראל. The Torah also wants us to know that the term עבד when used as applicable to a Jew denotes a temporary status only, seeing that all Jews are permanently G'd's servants. This is one of the reasons such a Jewish servant must leave his master in the seventh year. The Torah also hints that unless a Jew had violated the Torah's commandments he would not find himself in the position of being a slave. Kiddushin 14 in particular states that the Torah speaks of a thief who was unable to make restitution and who has been "sold" by the court in order that the proceeds of the sale be used to compensate his victim. Even in a situation discussed by the Torah in Deut. 15,12 when the subject has sold himself, he did not find himself in such a desperate situation had he not previously violated Torah law. Rabbi Ami tells us in Shabbat 55 that afflictions have always been preceded by sins committed by the individual afflicted.

Another nuance in the words עבד עברי instead of עברי עבד, "a Jew as a slave," is a reminder to the purchaser that the individual in question was an עבד already before the present master had purchased him. The idea is that he was already guilty vis-a-vis Heaven. The court would not sell him until he had been convicted. As a result we need not have any misgivings about the term עבד עברי being used by the Torah in this instance as opposed to Deut. 15,12 where the Torah characterises the "slave" as אחיך העברי, "your brother the Jew."

The term עבד had to be used by the Torah to justify why he has to serve his master for six years and cannot leave his employer like ordinary employees.

שש שנים יעבוד, he shall serve for six years, etc. The Torah means that even if the slave escaped during these six years he has to complete the term remaining from the original six years. The reason the Torah does not write: "he has to serve you," (i.e. the purchaser) is to allow for the slave to complete the six years if the original master has died and he has now become the property of the son.

ובשביעית יצא לחפשי חנם, and in the seventh year he leaves to become free without payment. The Torah means that there are occasions when said slave has to serve also in the seventh year such as when he has been sold in the middle of a calendar year. The six years are counted as commencing the day he is sold. The Torah also indicates by this verse that if the "seventh year," i.e. the שמטה occurs during the six years the slave has to serve, his term of service remains unaffected by that fact. I have found this in the commentary of Maimonides on Kiddushin chapter 1, Mishnah 2.

21:3

אם בגפו יבא, If he enters the service as a single man, etc. Our sages in Kidushin 20 conclude from this wording that if the Jewish slave enters his period of slavery while unattached, his master is not allowed to asssign a Gentile slave-woman to cohabit with him. The legislation permitting this applies only if said slave is already married. I believe the reason they came to this conclusion is that the sages were bothered by an anomaly in the text. The Torah appears to repeat itself when it says that if the slave entered service married he shall leave in that state. Seeing the Torah had already said that if he entered service unmarried he will leave unmarried, this implies that if he had been married previously he could leave with his wife. Why did the Torah have to spell this out? You will find that the sages scrutinised the verse and said that the words "and his wife will leave" are quite inappropriate. His wife, after all, had never become a slave! Why does she need the Torah's permission to leave? The sages therefore interpreted these words to mean that while the slave was in the service of his master the master had to provide also for the needs of the slave's wife. Once the slave leaves, this obligation is at an end. If the Torah had meant that the slave-woman the master had assigned to the slave could leave with him, this would contradict the clear statement in verse four that any wife and children born by such a woman during these years will most certainly not be released with their husband/father. What then did the Torah mean when it said that the slave's wife may leave together with him? The sages therefore arrived at the conclusion that only a married slave may be assigned a slave-woman to cohabit with. Clearly the statement was intended to provide an additional halachah. The word בגפו means "if he has no Jewish wife." We know this because when the Torah speaks of a man married to a Jewish wife the man is called בעל אשה. The words בגפו יצא mean he is to leave unmarried, as single as he entered the service of his master. One may also understand this as a comparison to when he entered, i.e. "just as he entered service without wife and children, neither the kind that could depart with him nor the kind that had to remain behind with his master, he leaves as he came." If he had a wife but no children at the time he entered the service of his master, the latter cannot assign a Gentile slave-woman to him either as we would consider him as having entered service בגפו, alone. The same applies even more so if the slave had been the father of children at the time he entered the service of the master although he had not had a wife at that time.

I have seen that Rabbi Eliyahu Mizrachi feels that the reason for the legislation just mentioned is that otherwise the Torah should have written merely כן יצא instead of בגפו יצא. I do not agree with this. On the contrary, had the Torah written what Rabbi Mizrachi suggested as an alternative this would have reinforced the impression that the master could not give him a slave-woman and that he had to remain as single as when he entered the service. The truth is that the reason the Torah did not write כן יצא is because of other implications such an expression implies.

You may ask whence the sages derived the ruling in Kiddushin 20 that the master can assign to the slave a gentile slave-woman only if he entered his service while not only being married but also having children? It is, of course, true that the rulings are part of the oral Torah and not dependent on being spelled out in the written Torah. Nonetheless we may search for clues in the written Torah. Where are children mentioned in the Torah? The answer is that when a person is married without children he is to leave בגפו, in the same state as he entered the service seeing that if the master assigned a Gentile slave-woman to him and he had children by her the slave could no longer qualify under the heading as leaving בגפו, i.e. in the same state as he had entered his master's service. He entered the service without children whereas now he has children. Similarly, if at the time he entered the service he had children but no wife the master cannot assign a slave-woman to him as he would not then leave his service in the state he had entered it. He entered it being single and he would leave it being married, a state that cannot be described as "just as he was unmarried when he entered the service, so he has to be in the same state when he leaves." If the slave had a wife when he entered the service of his master but he did not have any children whereas by the time he leaves his master's service he has children by his Jewish wife, he may take these with him although one may describe his status as having changed seeing that when he entered service he was allowed to live with his wife. The Torah made everything dependent on his having a wife at the time he entered service as a slave, even if the children were born only later. From this it would follow that if the slave had entered his master's service while married to a Jewish woman and his wife had died, the master may then assign a slave- woman to him as the Torah was concerned only with the slave's status at the time he entered the master's service, i.e. בגפו יבא. If I did not have the words of the Talmud before me I would have derived that ruling from the words: "if he is the husband of a wife;" this wording suggests to me that in order for the master to have the right to assign a slave-woman to the husband he must have been married at that time.

אם בעל אשה הוא, If the slave is a married man, etc. We have to accept the Mechilta Acharite de Rabbi Shimon who says that the wording implies that the master has to supply the needs of the wife only if she is an appropriate wife for the slave. Should the slave be married to a woman forbidden to him under Jewish law even if the marriage was legal under Jewish law, his master has no obligation towards her. This raises the question why the master is allowed to assign a woman who is forbidden to this slave as stated specifically both in the Talmud and in chapter 3 section 4 of Maimonides' Hilchot Avadim. Maimonides distinguishes between the right to live with such a woman and the master's obligation to provide for such a woman when she is not his slave. The words אם בעל אשה הוא therefore have to be interpreted as applicable only to the law mentioned in this verse, i.e. provision of a Gentile slave-woman as partner for such a slave.

The Mechilta raises another aspect here in these words: "I might have thought the master will be obligated to provide for the needs of a woman merely betrothed to the slave, or to a woman who is the widow of his brother who died without children and who awaits the levirate union; the Torah speaks of אשתו to teach us that the betrothed, etc., is not included in the category of wife for whom the master has to care. On the other hand, if the slave was betrothed to a woman he is no longer characterised as בגפו, single, and the master is entitled to assign a slave-woman to him while he is in his service. According to the discussion in Kiddushin 20 the same applies if the slave had children from a wife who had died and in the meantime he had betrothed himself to another woman. He is then considered as fitting the definition of having both a wife and children so that the master can assign a slave-woman to him as marital partner.

ויצאה אשתו עמו, his wife leaves together with him. The letter ו in front of the word יצאה is appropriate seeing the master had also been responsible for the wife's maintenance.

21:4

אם אדוניו יתן לו אשה, If his master gave him a wife, etc. Why did the Torah switch to indirect speech when it had commenced the paragraph with direct speech i.e. "when you buy a Jewish slave, etc.?" The balance of the whole paragraph is in the third person. At the very least the Torah should have concluded the paragraph in the manner it began, by addressing the people concerned directly. Perhaps the reason is that we have a tradition that marriages are made in Heaven, i.e. that G'd personally involves Himself to match the right man to the woman appropriate for him (compare Bereshit Rabbah 68). At first glance one is tempted to interpret the words אם אדוניו as a reference to his true Master, i.e. G'd. The Torah would then tell us that if G'd to whom we are all servants assigns a wife to this man then both she and her children belong to her Master, i.e. G'd. This interpretation is untenable, however; this is why the Torah adds that the wife and her children belong to her master (terrestrial master) whereas the husband (the slave) leaves without them. We also need to know why the Torah repeats the words אמור יאמר העבד in verse five.

The true meaning of these verses is that G'd commands something which at first glance sounds irrational, i.e. that if the slave entered the employ of his master while single, he must remain so during the years of his service. His master cannot assign a female slave to him under circumstances other than those listed in Kiddushin 20. The average reader will question the meaning of this legislation asking what difference does it make if the slave had been married or not, seeeing the Torah permits his living together with a Gentile slave anyway? The Torah answers this question by writing: "if his master will give him a wife" (clearly a Gentile woman as one can see from the context) both she and her children will remain with the master, whereas the slave himself will leave as single as he entered the service of this master. This section of the verse speaks about a master who would (illegally) provide a single slave with a Gentile slave-woman as his partner. When such a situation arises it is natural that the slave will not want to leave the employ of his master ever, (after the six years have expired) for one of two reasons: 1) He loves his wife and children; 2) he will once again find himself unattached when leaving the employ of his master. In other words, leaving his master's employ will result in the slave suffering two blows of fate. In view of such considerations, nearly every slave will want to remain in the service of his master forever. The Torah wanted to head off such a situation. This is why the Torah forbade the master to assign a slave-woman to a slave who had entered his service as a single man. If the slave already had a Jewish wife, a free woman, he will find it much easier to abandon the woman assigned to him by his master while he was in such forced service. The conditional אם in verse four is merely a prelude to the word ואם in verse five in which the Torah describes the natural consequence of what would happen after the situation introduced by the first אם had become a reality.

The reason for the repeated אמר יאמר is that if the slave adds another dimension of service to his service over and above the fact that G'd has made him His servant and he expresses his wish to also remain a slave to his terrestrial master, etc. then the Torah commands that such a person needs to have his ear pierced, etc. There is another dimension to this whole paragraph, a moral/ethical one. The Torah commands man to constantly have before his mental eye the implications of this wole legislation (even if he never contemplates buying a slave, etc.). The words כי תקנה עבד עברי introduce a reminder that a human being is composed of two major components, his soul i.e. his spiritual self, and his body. The spiritual part is his major component, the body having been provided only so that the spiritual part can fulfil the commandments that he is obligated to fulfil as a servant of his Master (G'd). G'd calls the body עבד, whereas He calls man's soul אדם. Baba Metzia 114, quoting Ezekiel 34,31, explains that only the Jewish people are called אדם, as only they have this kind of soul. This is why the Torah commands us that כי תקנה עבד עברי, meaning if you acquire עברי עובר, someone whose stay on earth is temporary seeing every human being is bound to die (Psalms 144,4), he shall be with you שש שנים. The Talmud Moed Katan 28 basing itself on Job 5,26, considers that man is entitled to expect to live 60 years. It says in Job: תבא בכלח אלי קבר, "you will come to the grave in a ripe old age." The numerical value of the word "in a ripe old age," בכלח =60. While it is true that the Torah here speaks about six years, not sixty, this may be understood as correponding to what is known as מספר קטן, i.e. ignoring the digit zero. The six years are in reality sixty years then. The same applies to when the Torah speaks about said עברי עובר going free in the seventh year. The seventh decade is considered the period during which man exits this life. The word חפשי is an allusion to death, man becoming truly free only in death as we know from Psalms 88,6, במתים חפשי, "freedom is found amongst the dead." The word חנם suggests that this freedom is actually attained via the the angel of death, through Samael. The Zohar second volume page 128 phrases it thus: "during life on earth the forces of Samael feed man with worthless things." [חנם, "for free," in the sense of "without value" Ed.] Leaving this earth then is an escape from false values. The only thing that Samael has no control over are the commandments a Jew performs at great expense to himself. This is not something חנם, without value. The message is that anything which comes for free is intrinsically something impure, rooted in the סטרא אחרא. The opposite is true of דבר שבקדושה; it possesses real value.

When the Torah continues with אם בגפו יבא, we must examine this expression more closely. Why did the Torah choose this expression instead of the word לבדו normally used to describe someone as being alone, such as when the Torah describes Jacob as remaining alone (Genesis 32,25)?

We have to remember that if a person was successful in acquiring merits for himself through having performed G'd's commandments and having performed deeds of loving kindness while on earth, such a person has acquired the strength to rise from his grave when the day of resurrection arrives. Psalms 72,16 describes such a period as "men sprouting up in towns like country grass." Ketuvot 111 understands Solomon (the author of this Psalm) as speaking of the time of resurrection. When the Torah speaks of the slave leaving בגפו, the meaning of the word גף is similar to Proverbs 9,3 where the word describes "on the wings of high places." Man's good deeds lift him up to the spiritually high places. Shabbat 49 compares Israel to the dove, i.e. it is like a winged bird thanks to its good deeds. When the Torah writes יבא, the meaning is the same as Onkelos's translation of Genesis 28,11, that "the sun had set." The words בגפו יצא on the other hand, refer to the wing in question being able to rise once again from earth at the time of the resurrection. The reverse will be true of people who have not made the effort to accumulate the required merits during their time on earth. Ketuvot 111 spells this out in connection with Proverbs 3,18 "that Torah is the tree of life for those who uphold and grasp her." The non-observant will not take part in the resurrection of the bodies.

The Torah goes on to write אם בעל אשה הוא ויצאה אשתו עמו. The Torah alludes to a profound mystical element here. There are people who acquire their soul by dint of their good deeds so that such a person (personality) is transformed into the "owner" of its holy soul. In order to understand this concept one has to refer to the Zohar volume three page 91 on Leviticus 22,27 where the Torah discusses that when an ox or sheep is born it is to remain with its mother for seven days before it could be offered on the altar as a sacrifice. According to the Zohar animals acquire their intelligence at the moment of birth. [This is why the Torah refers to the ox as "ox" already at birth not as calf, for instance. The animal does not develop its personality, though it may develop its body. Ed.] Animals are different from human beings in this respect. Human beings acquire their souls only in ratio to the good deeds they have performed. The greater the number of good deeds performed by man the higher quality is his soul (or after having been alive at least for one Sabbath). The soul which such a מצוה -observant Jew acquires is called אשה in our context. Kabbalists such as the author of Tikkunyey Hazohar chapter 50 describe the soul as אשה. The Torah tells us here that if a person has acquired his "wife" i.e. soul, by reason of the performance of good deeds, his wife will remain with him also after death. Shabbat 152 tells an interesting story in this regard. There were certain grave-diggers who dug up the earth belonging to Rabbi Nachman. In the process they happened to disturb the grave of Rabbi Achai bar Yoshia. The latter protested that the diggers were disturbing his rest. The grave-diggers told Rabbi Nachman that they had been rebuked by a man. Rabbi Nachman went to investigate and asked the person in question who he was. He identified himself as Achai bar Yoshia. Thereupon Rabbi Nachman asked Rabbi Achai: "did not Rabbi Mori say that the truly righteous will turn to dust" [as opposed to decaying and becoming worm ridden Ed.], (so how come your body is intact)? Achai retorted: "Who is this Mori whom I have never heard of (that I should be concerned with his pronouncements)?" Thereupon Rabbi Nachman quoted a verse from Kohelet (inaccurately quoted and applied) according to which a body will return to the earth in the condition it had come from it. Rabbi Achai responded that whereas Rabbi Nachman appeared to be familiar with the verse composed by Solomon in Kohelet, he was apparently unfamiliar with a verse by the same Solomon in Proverbs 14,30 according to which "envy is like rottenness of the bones." The meaning of that verse is that people who harboured envy or jealousy in their hearts will experience that their bones decay and rot; those who did not harbour such feelings during their lives on earth will be spared this experience. Thereupon Rabbi Nachman touched Rabbi Achai and found that his body was indeed real. He suggested that Rabbi Achai get out of his grave and go home. Thereupon Rabbi Achai told Rabbi Nachman that he had just revealed that he had not even studied the Book of Prophets properly. We read in Ezekiel 37,13: "you will know that I am the Lord when I open your graves and cause you to come up out of your graves, O My people." Rabbi Nachman countered that it is written in Genesis 3,19: "dust you are and to dust you will return!" Upon hearing this Rabbi Achai explained that the verse in Genesis was meant to apply only one hour before the arrival of the final resurrection. At that time all the dead would return to dust. The gist of the story is that the righteous are called alive even when they are in their graves (Berachot 18).

Another lesson to be derived from the words אם בעל אשה הוא is that the only person who qualifies for the title בעל אשה is the one who makes sure that while on earth all his activities are performed for the spiritual advancement of his soul. Solomon alluded to this in Proverbs 13,25 where he described the eating of a צדיק as "the righteous man eats in order to satisfy his soul;" a person who strives to elevate his spiritual nature in such a way may truly be called a בעל אשה. After all, it is the duty of a husband to look after all the needs of his wife. If the soul is man's wife, it behooves the husband to look after its needs. When he has done so in the best manner he is capable of he can rest assured that the "wife" does not even abandon him in death.

The Torah goes on in verse four: אם אדוניו יתן לו אשה, this means that if the בעל אשה mentioned previously did not acquire his pure soul by means of performing good deeds but was fortunate to have been born with such a soul as a gift from G'd Himself, and such a wife had born children for him then both the wife and the children belong to his Master, i.e. to G'd. The Torah revealed here that some people are indeed fortunate to be born with a a righteous soul; this may be due to the fact that the father of such an individual lived a righteous life and "bequeathed" such an inheritance to his offspring. When the Torah speaks of the "children" of such people this is a reference to Bereshit Rabbah 30 which describes the principal offspring of the righteous as their meritorious deeds. Since we have a tradition that each good deed performed creates a good angel known as an advocate (Avot 4,13), such a good deed is a descendant of the צדיק. The Torah describes these "children" as being born "for him," i.e. the husband. The reason that the Torah distinguishes between בנים או בנות, sons or daughters is that the good deeds which required a great deal of effort are described as בנים, whereas good deeds which did not require a battle with the evil urge before one performed them are described as בנות, daughters.

The Torah says that the good deeds performed by such a person who had been endowed with all the advantages by G'd already at the time of birth, does not retain the "wife and her children." Rather, האשה וילדיה תהיה לאדוניה, the "wife and her children will belong to her Master (G'd) as distinct from the good deeds of the person who was not bequeathed a pure soul by his father, the צדיק. This son of the righteous father did not refine his body by means of his good deeds so that his soul will not depart from him after his death. As a result, his soul returns to G'd when his body dies. והוא יצא נגפו, whereas he leaves (dies) alone. Although such a person had been separated from "his wife and children" while in the grave, when the time comes for him to be resurrected, i.e. to leave his grave, he will find that those merits he had acquired during his lifetime on earth will once again stand him in good stead, i.e. he will recapture the status he enjoyed while he lived on earth. He will not forfeit resurrection because he had not been born without a pure soul.

ואם אמור יאמר העד, But if the slave keeps on saying, etc. The Torah here describes the eagerness of the Jew (slave) to serve his Master (G'd) even after his physical powers have diminished (after he has turned 60 as we mentioned earlier). This is why the Torah describes him as saying: "I love my Master, my wife and my children." The latter are his soul and the good deeds the "slave" has performed in this world. He does not wish to leave this world as it enables him to accumulate further merits. Seeing that death makes him חפשי, free, i.e. unable to accumulate more merits, he shuns death. The Torah promises this type of individual that he will indeed be called עבד השם, a true servant of the Lord. G'd will eventually fulfil his desire but not at this stage. ועבדו לעולם, he will be allowed to serve G'd in the Hereafter. When G'd will make a selection amongst the angels who will minister to Him, such individuals will be high on His list of priorities. We find that Moses was an example of such a person since he did not want to die prior to living in the Holy Land and performing there commandments which one cannot perform outside ארץ ישראל (compare Deut. 34,5 and Sotah 14). When the Torah speaks about this slave having his ear pierced with an awl, you will find that the word מרצע, awl, has a numerical value of 400. This is symbolic of the 400 worlds of aspirations mentioned in the Zohar volume 1 page 123. The words ועבדו לעולם may be perceived as the Torah considering such a slave as if he had served G'd for all the years the universe exists, as if he had been alive during all this time. The word לעולם has additional mystical connotations familiar to students of the Kabbalah.

21:7

וכי ימכר איש את בתה, When a man sells his daughter, etc. In this instance as opposed to verse 2, the Torah emphasises the seller instead of the buyer. The reason is that one does not purchase a Jewish maidservant from anyone other than her father. The girl does not sell herself, as does an impoverished male. The law of selling a thief in payment of what he has stolen from his victim also does not apply to female thieves (compare Mechilta). The additional letter ו in the word וכי, means that the father of the girl does not only have the right to marry her off, but also to sell her as a maidservant.

איש את בתו, a man his daughter, etc. We learned in Sotah 23 that the word איש, is used to exclude the right of a woman to sell her daughter. The word את is to tell us that whereas a man may sell himself, a woman may not (Mechilta). You have to read the verse thusly: "And a man may sell his daughter." If the Torah had not commenced the verse with the conjunctive letter ו, but had merely written: "A man may sell his daughter," I would have known only that he may sell his daughter but not that she could not sell herself.

לאמה, as a maidservant, etc. We have to interpret this expression by following the Talmud in Kidushin 4 that even if the daughter has displayed the marks of barrenness the father may still sell her. The emphasis of the Torah on לאמה, [something that is self-evident, for as what else would the father sell her? Ed.] teaches that although this girl is not marriage-material this does not diminish the father's right to sell her into service. We could also approach this expression from the point of view expressed in the Tossephta Bikkurim chapter 4, according to which the word is needed to exclude the father's right to sell her if there are doubts about her sex. If there are indications that she is a hermaphrodite or a Tumtum (having hidden genitals preventing determination of what sex she is), the father or the court could not exercise the right to sell her/him into service. The word לאמה is not superfluous then.

לא תצא כצאת העבדים, she will not leave the service according to the conditions applying to male slaves. Our sages in Kidushin 16 understand this as a comparison with a Gentile slave who obtains his freedom if the master (or his agent) caused any of 24 specified injuries. The justification for this interpretation is the Torah's use of the word עבדים without specifying the addition עבריים, "Jewish ones." When the Torah applies the term עבד to a Jew it is always accompanied by the adjective עברי. A Jew is not just a "slave." I believe that the plain meaning of the verse is that whereas male Jewish slaves do not leave the employ of the master before their six years of service have expired, even if the master to whom they have been sold has died before the completion of the six years, this rule does not apply to a female Jewish maidservant. As soon as her master dies she is free to leave.

The words: "she does not leave like the male slaves," refer to the seventh year. If the master marries the maidservant her status is changed automatically, i.e. she will never leave her master unless he dies or divorces her. This is why the Torah discusses what happens if her master fails to marry her (verse 8). The sequence of the wording there is difficult; we could not have understood the first half of the verse, "if she does not please her master," unless we had been informed that it refers to her master displaying his displeasure by not marrying her.. Why did the Torah not write: "if the master does not marry her for she was displeasing in his eyes?" According to our approach the wording in the verse is fully justified, however, seeing the words לא תצא refer to a possible marriage, i.e. a permanent relationship. Concerning such a relationship the Torah adds that if for some reason the master finds this relationship no longer acceptable because she displeases him, אם רעה בעיני אדוניה, then the restrictions to granting freedom that apply to a male slave do not apply to a maidservant. The wording also precludes the possible errors we referred to earlier of the male slave not leaving because of the Shmittah year or even the Jubilee year unless his six years service have been completed. The moment the Torah wrote: "if she displeases her master, etc.," it becomes clear that the nature of the displeasure concerns only the master's willingness to marry this maidservant. In Deut. 15,12 the Torah commences by comparing the law of the male Jewish servant to that of the maidservant. This comparison extends only to certain entitlements the Torah legislated for the male Jewish slave. Nowhere in that whole paragraph is there a word which would contradict the interpretation of our sages regarding the distinctions between the laws applying to a maidservant.

We are free to interpret the wording of the various verses as long as our interpretation does not conflict with the halachah, seeing these rulings are all of Sinaitic origin. It is clear from the wording in our verse that the ruling about a slave being freed because of certain injuries his master caused him, such as the loss of a tooth or an eye, applies only to Gentile slaves. The reason seems to be that a Jewish slave has the option to get financial compensation from his master for such injuries. The combined value of the various compensation payments may amount to more than the price he puts on obtaining his freedom early, depending on whether such an injury was suffered near the beginning of his term of service or near the end of the six years. A Gentile slave is not entitled to such compensation seeing his very body is owned by his master. The only way his master can compensate him for the injury caused is by foregoing his services henceforth.

21:8

אשר לא (ו) יעדה והפדה, who has espoused her to himself, then he shall let her be redeemed. The reason the word lo is written with the letter א while it is read as if it were spelled with the letter ו, is explained in Kidushin 19 to mean that her espousal must meet with her approval. The master cannot marry her against her wishes. The Talmud derives it from the word יעדה. The Torah therefore begins the verse with "if she is displeasing in the eyes of her master" as describing a hindrance to the marriage which originates with the master. Concerning a hindrance due to the girl, the Torah writes אשר לא יעדה, to indicate that she was the party who did not agree. As a result, i.e. if either party declines to marry the other, והפדה, the legislation of facilitating her release by deducting time not served becomes applicable. If the parties agree to marry, there is no cause for the girl's prior release.

לעם נכרי, to another party, etc. The Torah has to legislate this in order to inform us that though the father has a right to sell his daughter, he does not have the right to sell her לעם נכרי. The words לא ימשול למכרה "he has no auhority to sell her," indicate that if the father sold her without a view to eventual marriage by her master or his son, such a sale is invalid because he has betrayed the girl's trust. The moment the father or the master has betrayed his trust he has forfeited every right to buy or sell this girl.

Another aspect discussed in Kidushin 19 is the right of the father to sell his daughter to a master who is forbidden to marry her by Jewish law, such as a widow to a High Priest or a divorcee to an ordinary priest. By precluding the father's right to sell his daughter to עם נכרי, a member of an alien people, the Torah implies that a sale to the above-mentioned categories is legally valid seeing the buyer is a Jew.

21:9

ואם לבנו ייעדנה, And if he espouse her to his son, etc. This means that the master never espoused her to himself, but intended her as a wife for his son when he bought her. The Torah informs us that this is perfectly in order, i.e. the money the father had paid to the girl's father for her is acceptable as the money for the betrothal to his son.

The words כמשפט הבנות יעשה לה, he shall deal with her after the manner of daughters, apply to both the father (master) and to his son. The verse following will spell out exactly what these obligations are that the master/son assumes when purchasing such a maidservant.

21:11

ואם שלש אלה לא יעשה לה, If he fails to do these three things for her, etc. The three are 1) marrying her, שארה; 2) providing her with a clothing allowance, etc., כסותה; 3) maintaining marital relations with her at designated intervals, עונתה; the Torah stresses the word אלה, these, so as to exclude previous conditions such as the need to betrothe her. ויצאה חנם אין כסף, she may leave for nothing without money. Both master and son have lost their authority over this girl; they cannot force her to serve the balance of the six years her father contracted for, or until she displays signs of puberty. Rather the master has to give the girl a document releasing her if he does not decide to consummate the betrothal. The words "without money," mean that there is no need for money to change hands whereas there is a need for a divorce document releasing her as the Torah considered the girl as betrothed to her master ever since her father had sold her. Our sages in the Mechilta add that the words אין כסף also mean that whereas the maidservant does not have to compensate her master financially if he failed to meet the conditions mentioned, she can also gain her freedom by merely attaining the age/or signs of puberty. All of these rulings are of Sinaitic origin, independent of any allusions in the text.

Seeing that the rulings are not dependent on allusions in the text, we are free to see in the text allusions to moral/ethical values, i.e. רמזים. We are basing ourselves on Sotah 42 that when the word איש appears by itself, i.e. without a name, the subject is G'd Himself, such as in Exodus 15,3. Our sages in Shir Hashirim Rabbah chapter 3 have said further that G'd insisted on expressing His fondness of the community of Israel by referring to it as His daughter. We also find that Scripture defines exile of the Jewish people as G'd having sold the Jewish people (compare Kings I 12,9). Inasmuch as the Torah legislated that if one acquires a male Jew as a slave he has to serve six years and no more, the Torah i.e. the Jewish people, is portrayed here as complaining to G'd why if the male Jewish slave should have to serve only six years, a Jewish girl, אמה, may have to serve longer; the Torah says that such a maid-servant will not automatically leave her master's employ after six years as does her male counterpart. In other words: "why has the Jewish people (the daughter) been sold into this long and bitter exile? Why are they not entitled to be treated in accordance with the male Jewish servant described in our chapter?"

The Torah (Israel) repeats the argument by saying: "assuming that the girl is רעה, still guilty of the sins that caused her to be exiled in the first place (compare Isaiah 50,1: 'you have been sold on account of your iniquities') in the eyes of her master to whom she has been betrothed," after all she was also G'd's betrothed," as has been spelled out in Song of Songs 4,8? To this question the Torah (G'd) replies that the word לו in אשר לו יעדה, has also been spelled with the letter א, i.e. meaning that there are times when Israel does not qualify as G'd's betrothed. Israel is portrayed as countering that as long as it is in exile under the dominance of alien masters והפדה, she is deserving of release, seeing that her shortcomings are not even recognisable while she languishes under alien masters, בעיני אדוניה. Israel argues that her inadeqacies could come to light only if she would be redeemed and still fail to demonstrate her true repentance. As long as her erstwhile master has not redeemed her she could not do proper repentance. G'd replies that Israel was sold because it did not remain true to her master (G'd) while it lived in peace and unmolested, at a time when no alien ruler dominated her.

Israel tries again by saying that if G'd did not want her as His bride, at least He ought to treat her as His son, seeing that there are numerous occasions in the Bible when the Jewish people are described as G'd's sons when compared to the other nations. Those nations are fully aware that the Jewish people enjoy a special relationship with G'd, even their very name reflecting this. If Israel still enjoyed a special relationship with G'd, at least it should not be treated worse than any other nation, something that unfortunately is evident to everyone following the history of the fate of the Jews. It should be enough punishment that the Jewish people are no longer superior to the other nations. G'd replies to this argument by saying Israel will be treated according to משפט הבנות, the laws applying to daughters. They are called daughters even if they do not qualify as being called G'd's daughter. To this Israel replies אם אחרת יקח לו, "if He takes another in her place," the daughter in question must still not be denied her statutory rights, i.e. שארה, כסותה, עונתה. The Zohar volume 2 page 152 writes that when the destruction of the Temple occurred all the sources which normally supplied Israel with G'd's bounty were turned in a different direction so that this bounty was directed at the other nations. Whereas previously the sacred sites were recipients of this bounty, now the situation was reversed and all this Divine bounty was poured out in unholy places. Israel is depicted as requesting that G'd at least not direct all His bounty to other nations. Even if G'd were to grant most of His bounty to the other nations because He still considers Israel's sins as unexpiated, at least He should not deny her her statutory rights such as שארה, etc. In this instance the meaning of שארה would be her sustenance as per the opinion of Rabbi Aushiyah in the Mechilta. כסותה would refer to her clothing requirements, and עונתה in this instance would refer to G'd answering Israel's prayers when it is in difficulties. [from the word עונה answer, Ed.]

Israel asks how could it possibly continue to exist without these necessities? Israel adds, ואם שלש אלה לא יעשה לה, "If G'd were unwilling to grant her even those three necessities," at least He should let her go free, ויצאה חנם, without having to make a payment for such freedom, i.e. it should be released from the undertaking to perform G'd's commandments. The words אין כסף mean that Israel claims that her payment in terms of afflictions is adequate already.

Since we are already indulging moral allusions contained in this passage, here is another possible approach. When the Torah speaks of "a man selling his daughter," the subject is G'd; He is selling His holy nation, Israel, to be a maidservant; seeing that various exiles the Jewish people have found themselves in, such as the exile in Egypt and the exile in Babylon, have not produced the desired rehabilitation of the people, the reason may have been due to Israel having been enslaved to a single nation in each instance. As long as we were a single unit, even while in exile, we never became reduced to the status of אמה, a lowly maidservant. In this present exile when we are scattered amongst all the nations wherever Jews are to be found they are looked down upn, are in disgrace, so much so that even if the redemption would occur tomorrow we have already acquired the title אמה, maidservant. This is why G'd has given us the assurance that the redemption of this nation will not be similar to what it has been in the past, i.e. the word העבדים is a reference to Exodus 20,2 where the Torah spoke about Egypt being בית העבדים, a house of bondage. The difference between the redemption then and the redemption to come is that at that time G'd only had to orchestrate the redemption of a people from one single country as distinct from what will happen in the future. The miracles which will be performed at that future redemption will eclipse the ones performed when the Israelites left Egypt. When the final redemption will occur the rulers of all the nations will prostrate themselves before Israel as predicted in Isaiah 49,23.

The Torah goes on to say אם רעה בעיני אדוניה, which we have to understand in light of a statement in the Zohar that if the redemption would occur as a result of Israel's good deeds as compared to the redemption which will occur because G'd's timetable has run out. If the redemption ocurs because of the former situation, an angel of G'd whose feet are planted on earth and whose head is in Heaven will become visible. If, however, the redemption will occur only because G'd cannot defer it any longer, the redeemer will arrive as a poor man riding on the lowly ass as described in Zachariah 9,9. G'd assures Israel that even if it is still unworthy when the time comes for redemption, רעה בעיני אדויה, in the eyes of her Master, ולא יעדה, and not deserving of redemption (לא spelled with an א), He will release her, והפדה. He will not continue to let her languish amidst עם נכרי, an alien people, although the nature of that redemption would not match the type of redemption which would occur if the people were worthy of it. At any rate, the "sale" of Israel is not something permanent and irreversible. Job 28,3 expresses this redemption as "He has set an end to darkness."

The Torah continues and describes a redemption as the result of Israel's having returned to G'd as a penitent sinner; אם לבנו ייעדנה, if they are deserving to be called בנים, "sons," a state attained when they observe G'd's commandments (compare Baba Batra 22), then כמשפט הבנות יעשה לה, G'd will deal with them according to the laws of the daughters. Their holy souls, also known as בנות ירושלים, will be the recipients of all the promises we find spelled out concerning that period throughout the Books of the Prophets. Those Jews still alive at that time will experience the brilliant light with which G'd will then illuminate the universe. They will all be able to point to G'd by saying זה אלי ואנוהו, "This is my G'd, let me glorify Him."

The words אם אחרת יקח לו in verse 10 describe G'd's promise that regardless of whether Israel is evil so that G'd has sold it in favour of someone else receiving His bounty, or whether it is good so that it qualifies for the status of "son," it will not forfeit the three basics, שאר כסות ועונה. Should it not receive these either, i.e. that the afflictions during exile will be too great, then ויצאה חנם אין כסף. G'd will consider these afflictions as payment for the redemption and Israel will experience the coming of the Messiah even before the final date G'd has set aside in His timetable for that event.

21:12

מכה איש ומת, He who strikes a man and he dies as result, etc. This means that death need not occur immediately, such as when one slaughters or chokes someone to death. The striker is culpable even if death is delayed but occurs directly as a result of his blow. The only exception to this rule is if the stricken person had recovered sufficiently to be able to stand on his feet and leave his home unassisted (verse 19). The new element in this legislation is that if the striker had struck the victim unintentionally he is not obliged to flee to a city of refuge unless death occurred as an immediate result of the blow (compare Gittin 70). The Talmud states there specifically that if the victim had vital parts such as most of the windpipe and the gullet severed the killer is not consigned to the city of refuge as we consider the possibility that his victim did not die immediately, or contributed to his accelerated death by making a wrong move. Tossaphot comment that this rule applies only in the case of an involuntary killing. They derive this from Numbers 35,23: ויפל עליו וימות, "he cast it upon him whereupon he died." This means that death did not follow immediately. Although a person who has done this intentionally will be considered guilty of murder even if the victim did not die immediately, we distinguish between the laws of confinement to a city of refuge and the laws dealing with murder. This corresponds precisely to what we wrote that our verse deals with someone who attacked someone else intentionally. If the Torah wanted to include unintentional killing it would have had to write הורג איש instead of מכה איש. As it is, even if the attacker set out to kill now but death occurred only several days later, the death penalty applies. Concerning unintentional killing, the Torah speaks of והאלוקים אנה לידו, "and G'd caused it to happen by his hand;" this means that death occurred by means of the hand of the killer himself, not a delayed effect. You will find this confirmed by Maimonides' ruling in chapter five of his Hilchot Rotzeach. Rabbi Shlomo Aderet, who frequently disagrees with Maimonides, disagrees in this instance also. I find his reasoning quite unacceptable. This is not the place to evaluate the finer points of their dispute, however.

מות יומת, he shall surely be put to death. The reason the Torah repeats this word as well as in such instances as someone either cursing or killing his father or mother, and someone guilty of kidnapping, needs to be analysed. Remember that it is the prerogative of G'd, the judge of the whole universe, to kill perpetrators of evil. However, instead of doing so personally, G'd has assigned judges of flesh and blood to judge part of the crimes for which people deserve to be killed. These judges are to hand down death sentences for crimes/sins listed in the Torah as carrying the death penalty. In some instances G'd has revealed why certain crimes carry the death penalty, i.e. one to be administered here on earth, while in other instances He has reserved the right to execute the guilty party Himself in His own good time. In all instances where the Torah speaks about the penalty being כרת, such as a husband who has marital relations with his wife while the latter is menstruating, G'd himself is the executioner. Ketuvot 30 informs us that the fact that nowadays we do not have a court authorised to impose and carry out the death penalty, does not mean that the party guilty of a sin for which the Torah legislates the death penalty will go unpunished. In the case of an ox which has gored a human being (the owner having been negligent), the Torah states that the owner should be executed in addition to his ox although such a law is not enforced by a human tribunal (Mechilta) but only by Heaven. Our sages in Baba Metzia 31 elaborated further on this subject.

21:13

ואשר לא צדה והאלוקים אנה לידו, If a man did not lie in wait but G'd caused it to happen to him, etc. Why did the Torah say the same thing in different words, i.e. "he did not plan it," and: "G'd caused it to happen?" Besides, why would G'd deliberately cause a person to become an involuntary murderer? Makkot 10 as well as the Mechilta dealing with the laws of the city of refuge and who has to go there, explain that the Torah speaks about wicked people who will become the instrument of performing evil deeds (compare Samuel I 24,14). They illustrate their meaning by the following example. Two people, one an intentional murderer, the other an unintentional killer, meet. There had not been any witnesses to either killing. The unintentional killer was in the process of descending from a ladder; he fell and hit the murderer who sat under the ladder with fatal consequences. The person descending the ladder has to go to a city of refuge. (If the same accident occurred while the unintentional killer was ascending the ladder, he would not have to go to the city of refuge). The intentional sinner was killed by the unintentional sinner. Thus far the Mechilta. This does not seem very satisfactory. True, the intentional murderer winds up getting his just deserts, the unintentional killer, however, has by now committed two killings and has to atone for only one killing while he is in the city of refuge. If we were to argue that he is altogether innocent concerning the instance when G'd made him fall off the ladder, then we must assume that the falling off the ladder was not an act of G'd and as a result the death of the person under the ladder was not the punishment due him as he was not guilty. Had he really been guilty then the fall off the ladder would have to be considered under the heading of "a deliberate act of G'd." This seems a very forced explanation as the Torah describes the example of an unintentional killing as unrelated to Divine interference (Numbers 35,15). The Torah did not distinguish between different categories of such unintentional killings as did the Mechilta.

The correct explanation is that the person who was originally killed by the unintentional killer had been a deliberate murderer also. G'd could have caused some weight to fall upon such a murderer without involving the unintentional killer at all. He used the unintentional killer as His tool in order to "kill two birds with one stone." The unintentional killer who has now become G'd's tool i.e. ואנה לידו, is guilty of exile in the city of refuge only for the first time he killed unintentionally. Even if he had killed ten people as a result of his fall from the ladder, he would only be liable for exile for the original killing. The penalty of exile is related to the cause, not to the number of killings committed by the person. G'd will not arrange for this unintentional killer to become involved in a second killing in order to be exiled again. As a result of this consideration you will observe that not all unintentional killers are measured by the same yardstick. [This is nothing new since all the killers in the city of refuge go free at the same time, at the time the High Priest dies, regardless of when the people exiled there committed the killing. Ed.] We now understand the Talmud who attributed the fall off the ladder to a previous undetected and unintentional killing by the person suffering the fall. The sages simply selected an example in which both parties were equally guilt-ridden. The true scholar will understand the mystical aspect behind all this.

It is also possible that the Torah felt that the person who was guilty of involuntary manslaughter and should have volunteered for exile in the city of refuge but had neglected to do so is now being punished for this by becoming the cause of another death. As a result he ought to spend two periods of exile in such a city of refuge. In order to enable him to expiate his guilt the Torah legislated that his stay in the city of refuge is limited; once the High Priest dies, his first exile has been completed. G'd reserves the right to determine when the High Priest should die and thereby to determine how many years such a person guilty of two unintentional killings must spend in exile altogether. While this explanation covers the words: "if G'd made it happen, etc," it still does not explain the conjunctive letter ו before the word אלוקים.

I believe the Torah was being very specific in legislating the rules pertaining to exile in the city of refuge as related by Maimonides chapter 6 of Hilchot Rotzeach. He states that the only person who has to go to the city of refuge is one who has committed involuntary manslaughter which resulted from lack of precautions plus public knowledge that the killer did not harbour malevolent thoughts against the victim. If, however, a fatal accident could not have been foreseen and the killer had no reason to hate the victim, it is an accident and the killer does not have to go to the city of refuge. These two aspects are covered by 1) והאלוקים אנה לידו, "it was an act of G'd," or 2) אשר לא צדה, "he did not ambush the victim," (but also took no precautions to preclude an accident). If the killer had either entertained hateful thoughts against the victim or had taken precautions against any accidents there is no case for exile. In the latter case the killer is totally exonerated, in the former case there is an assumption of evil intent and taking refuge in a city of refuge is not the answer.

21:14

וכי יזיד איש.. להרגו בערמה, If someone plans devious murder, etc. Mechilta concentrates on the word למות at the end of the verse and understands it as excluding "bringing him to trial, inflicting corporal punishment, or exile." This is the reason that Yoav (David's general) who had taken refuge in the Temple holding on to the altar was dragged away and executed. While it is true that Yoav was executed, this was because he was rebellious and not because he had murdered Avner or Amassa (compare Sanhedrin 49). He had fled before he could be brought to trial. The Talmud in Makkot 12 claims that Yoav's error in thinking that the altar could save his life was that at that time the altar was still a temporary structure, Solomon's Temple not having been built yet.

I have noted that Maimonides writes in chapter 5,12-14 of his Hilchot Rotzeach that the altar serves as a refuge for unintentional killers as far as protection against an avenger who is a member of the victim's family is concerned. It does not act as an alternative to such a killer having to go into exile. Clearly, Maimonides had not seen the Baraitha which we quoted above according to which the word למות excludes exile, etc. The Baraitha's whole point is that if someone tries to save himself in the Holy Temple by holding on to the altar he can be dragged out only in order to be executed and not in order to be confined in a city of refuge. While it is true that one could offer a forced explanation that the words in the Baraitha ולא לגלות mean that that if someone is guilty of confinement in the city of refuge the family's avenger has no right to kill such a person, this is extremely forced seeing it contains no new element. We know this already. Besides, the words in the Baraitha which appear immediately before this comment about לא לגלות contradict such an explanation. The Baraitha had said: "not to have corporal punishment administered to him nor to be brought to trial." I have an even greater difficulty with the words of the author of Mishneh Lamelech who wonders why Maimonides makes a distinction between intentional and unintentional killers seeking refuge at the altar, whereas he makes no such difference at all. The latter statement is incomprehensible even if we did not have a Baraitha at all. We have no authority to rule that the altar fails to act as refuge except in a situation specifically excluded by the Torah.

21:18

וכי יריבון אנשים, And if men quarrel (fight physically), etc. Why did the Torah have to add the words: "and he does not die?" Surely any reader would have concluded that the situation described is one where the victim did not die!

The intent of the Torah is to inform us that payments of compensation such as loss of income, medical expenses, etc., are all applicable only if the victim does not die as a result of this fight. This is the reason the Torah only mentions compensation for loss of income after it had described the victim as having recovered sufficiently so that he could get about without help.

I am not sure that if the victim had been expected to die but recovered instead whether this is to be considered an act of G'd (miracle) or not. We have learned in Chulin 42 that an animal which suffers from certain categories of injuries dies within 12 months. In the event it did not die within this period we consider this as something supernatural, and we do not allow such occurrences to change the status of the animal. Similarly in our case. Do we say that the victim's recovery was miraculous and he therefore does not qualify for the various compensations listed in the Torah just as he would not have qualified for such payments if he had died? Or do we consider the fact that he has recovered as the only criterion in determining the compensation due him? According to Maimonides Hilchot Rotzeach chapter 4,3 anyone who did not die is entitled to compensation even if his recovery was a miracle, medically speaking.

Subsequently I found the following statement in the Mechilta. "If he does not die but becomes bed-ridden; if, however, the aggressor inflicted the kind of injury which normally results in death, the attacker is free of the obligation to pay compensation." It appears that the author of the Mechilta makes the payment of compensation dependent exclusively on what the attacker had done and how he had done it.

It appears that the author of this Mechilta holds that the attacker is to be freed from the need to pay for loss of income only if the victim died because the injury he received was lethal. If the victim had succumbed to a non-lethal blow, a situation in which the attacker would not be guilty of the death penalty, he would have to pay the various payments an injured person would have been entitled to. If the attacker did not pay the victim before he died, he would have to make these payments to the estate of the victim.

21:19

רק שבתו יתן ורפא ירפא, he shall only pay for loss of income and cause him to be cured completely. This means that even if the victim has regained the ability to get around unassisted but he cannot yet pursue his occupation, the attacker has to continue payments for loss of income. The same applies to continued medical supervision of the victim if the latter deems same as necessary.

We may understand the word רק as referring to something mentioned by Maimonides in Hilchot Chovel Umazzik. We estimate the cost of medical care as well as the loss of income as soon as the fight is over and the attacker makes these payments immediately. If the estimate proves wrong and the victim takes longer to recover, the attacker is not assessed additional damages. This ruling applies only if the attacker is willing to pay the whole amount of damages immediately. If the attacker preferred to compensate the victim on a day to day basis this limitation on the amount of total damages assessed by the judges does not apply. Maimonides appears to have derived this rule from the word רק in our verse.

ורפא ירפא. and he will provide full medical services. This too can best be explained by what Maimonides wrote in the above-mentioned chapter of Hilchot Chovel Umazzik. "If the victim said to the attacker: 'pay me cash and I will look for my own doctor, etc.,' one does not take any notice of this." The ruling is derived from the wording in our verse which strongly suggests that the onus of providing medical care is on the attacker personally. This is in contrast to the payment for loss of income where the Torah spoke of the attacker "giving" the payment directly to the victim. There are many other interesting rules which have been derived from the repetition of the words ורפא ירפא.

21:20

בשבט, with a rod, etc. Maimonides writes in chapter 2,14 of Hilchot Rotzeach: "I believe that the word "rod" is to be taken literally. If the master hit the slave with a knife, a sword, a stone or a fist, or something similar, and the court judged that the slave would die from the result of such an attack even after a full year, the master is subject to execution." I do not understand why the master should be executed if he used an instrument which is normally not lethal if the victim did not survive for 24 hours. In such a situation the assailant is not guilty of the death penalty even if he struck a person who is not his slave, i.e. not his personal property. I believe that the reason the Torah writes בשבט with a rod, is that if the master's actions prove that all he wanted to do was to discipline his slave, something normally done with a rod, G'd allowed him a 24 hour period before he would be considered guilty of murder seeing that the slave is his personal property and one does not destroy one's personal property on purpose. If the instrument used to inflict fatal injuries on the slave was one that is not normally employed when one wants to discipline someone but a weapon used when one is about to kill a person, such as stabbing the slave in his belly with a sword, the Torah does not grant the master a reprieve of 24 hours during which survival of his slave may save him from a murder charge. He will be guilty of murder even if death occurs a year after the stabbing, for instance.

21:21

לא יקם כי בספו הוא, he will not be avenged for it was his own money. If he killed the slave unintentionally (in the accepted sense of the word), the master will have to be confined in a city of refuge on account of this. In this ruling there is no difference between putting to death of one's slave or some other human being. Exile is applicable only if one killed directly, in accordance with the definitions we outlined in verse 12. The Torah only needed to write in which respect the law of a master killing a slave is different from someone who kills a person who is not his slave.

21:22

וכי ינצו אנשים, And if men strive together, etc. In this case each one is presumed to have murderous intent. It happpened that instead of killing his adversary the potential killer struck the woman (either fatally or otherwise).

ונגפו אשה הרה, and they hurt a pregnant woman; the reason that the Torah uses the plural, i.e. "they hurt," is to inform us that if they both fell upon the woman thus causing her to lose the fetus they divide the compensation the woman has to be paid between them (compare Maimonides Hilchot Chovel Umazzik).

אשה הרה, a pregnant woman, etc., the scenario is one where the woman had been present and both parties were aware of this. If the woman's presence was unknown to the parties involved in the fight, they are not guilty of any compensation. This is based on the Talmud Yerushalmi and stated explicitly in Maimonides chapter 1 of Hilchot Chovel Umazzik. Here is his wording: "If one of the parties was asleep and the other party lies down beside him, the sleeping party is free of any guilt [if his motions cause the death of the second person, Ed.] seeing that whatever harm he caused was totally accidental."

כאשר ישית עליו בעל האשה, in accordance with what the woman's husband will impose upon him. The reason for this ruling is that the husband has the prerogative to receive compensation for the monetary value of his wife's children (such as when he sells his daughter). As a result, he is considered the litigant against the guilty party and not the mother of the unborn child.

21:23

ונתתה נפש תחת נפש, "you shall give life for life." The meaning of these words is disputed. The Mechilta quotes opinions according to which the Torah speaks of an actual death penalty even though the killer had intended to kill another party, whereas other sages hold that the Torah speaks of monetary compensation for such a life (unborn child). According to the latter opinion the words ונתתה, "you shall give," are most appropriate seeing that monetary compensation is something that is given from one hand to another. According to the opinion that the Torah speaks of an actual death penalty, we must understand the word ונתתה as contrast to the situation described in verse 22 when no fatality occurred; instead of monetary compensation for the injury described in verse 22, something involving several types of payments such as for pain, shame, etc; in this instance there is only one exchange, i.e. the life of the guilty party for the harm done. We have learned previously that whenever a party is guilty of the death penalty no additional fines are imposed. The exception is a situation we have described in verse 18 when death did not occur promptly.

21:26

וכי יכה איש את עין עבדו, If a man smite the eye of his slave, etc. In Kidushin 24 Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel and the other rabbis disagree on the meaning of this verse. Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel holds that the legislation contained in this verse applies only when the master has destroyed the eye of his slave deliberately; the other rabbis hold that even if he had not done so deliberately but had merely aimed his blow at the eye, the slave goes free. According to the rabbis, why did the Torah not begin the verse by writing: "whenever a master destroys the eye of his slave," instead of writing "when he strikes the eye of his slave and he destroys it?" Perhaps the Torah did not use this expression as I would have interpreted it as applying to the eye regardless of the intent which has to accompany such a destruction of the eye.

The Torah may also have intended to convey that though the eye was not destroyed immediately and totally at the time the master struck the slave but only some time later, the legislation that the slave goes free still applies. This situation is different from the one described earlier when death as a result of an unintentional killing had to occur immediately in order for the killer to be guilty of murder. The opinion of the rabbis is supported by the Torah using the word ושחתה, "he has destroyed it," i.e. even if he had not intended to.

21:27

ואם שן עבדו….יפיל, And if he smite a tooth of his slave…. so that it falls out, etc. Kidushin 24 explains why the laws concerning destroying a slave's eye or tooth are not lumped together by the Torah in one verse but have been divided into two separate laws. Rabbi Sheshet says if the eye of a slave was already blind but the master gouged it out, the slave has to be freed. Accordingly, we have two separate laws concerning how to free a slave. One applies when the eyesight of the slave has been impaired as a result of the master hitting him, the other if even a blind eye has been scratched out by his master. Had the Torah lumped these two kinds of injuries together in a single verse, we would have concluded that the same yardstick is applied in either kind of injury. Just as the tooth becomes useless only when it is knocked out, so we would have thought that an eye becomes useless only when it is gouged out. We would not have assumed that destroying merely the sense of sight in an eye was sufficient reason to let the slave go free seeing the slave did not lose a limb.

21:28

וכי יגח שור את איש, If an ox gore a man, etc. The apparently superfluous word את is explained in Sanhedrin 79. If Shimon intended to kill Reuven but killed Levi instead he is guilty of murder since he intended to murder someone. The words את איש mean any man, even one other than the target. This applies only if the original target had been a human being; if one intended to kill an animal and killed a human being instead, the killer is not culpable for murder (compare Sanhedrin 78).

ומת, and he dies, this includes delayed death. As long as the death is attributable to the goring, the ox, i.e. his master, is liable. It is worthwhile to compare Rashi in Baba Kama 41 where the Talmud discusses the law of an ox goring and endangering the lives of three people none of whom died from the goring.

ולא יאכל את בשרו, and its meat may not be consumed. If the owner ate the meat he will receive 39 lashes. He is, however, not punished for enjoying the remains of the animal in other ways, such as the skin, etc., although any use of the remains of the animal is forbidden. This is the reason the Torah has not lumped all these various examples of injuries and fatal injuries together under a single heading.