YESHIVAT HAR ETZION VIRTUAL BEIT MIDRASH PROJECT(VBM)

**************************************************************

TALMUDIC METHODOLOGY BY RABBI MOSHE TARAGIN

**************************************************************

Special Chanuka Edition:

One of the salient but often neglected components of the Chanuka miracle was the repurification of the Beit Ha-mikdash - ve-tiharu et mikdashekha. This assumes, of course, that the Temple had been contaminated by the idolatrous worship of the Greeks. Although from a phenomenological/metaphysical standpoint the very entry into the mikdash and the vile actions committed therein constituted a pollution of its kedusha, the question still remains: Al pi halakha - was the kedusha actually compromised and were the stones and utensils prohibited for re-use? We are, after all, aware of the halakha "ein adam osser davar she-eino shelo", a person cannot impose a prohibition upon something which he does not own. For example, I cannot, through neder (a halakhic oath), confer an issur upon someone else's item. Similarly, by worshipping someone else's animal, a person cannot confer upon it the status of "avoda zara" and its concomitant issurim. This is the principal hurdle to overcome in terms of understanding how the Greeks defiled the Beit Ha-mikdash by imposing upon its utensils an issur of avoda zara.

The gemara itself implicitly asks the above question but its answer, rather than clarifying, stirs a large debate among the Rishonim. In Avoda Zara (52b) the gemara bases the decision of the Chashmona'im to "bury" the stones of the mizbei'ach after they returned upon a pasuk in Yechezkel 7. The prophet predicts (v. 12) the entry into the mikdash of the Babylonians during the destruction of the First Temple, writing "U-va'u bah peritzim ve-chileluha" - scoundrels will enter and profane the mikdash. The Chashmona'im extrapolated from this reference that when Gentile assailants enter the mikdash and avail themselves of its utensils for their ritual worship, the utensils become forbidden and the kedusha is halakhically compromised. What the pasuk does not address, however, is the halakhic mechanism by which the kedusha is affected. This task is left up to the Rishonim. After all, ein adam osser davar she-eino shelo!!!

Rashi in Avoda Zara provides the key toward solving this problem. He asserts that once the Gentiles entered the mikdash all its utensils LOST their kedusha; automatically, then, they became hefker - the property of no one. The Yevanim obtained ownership (by seizing the hefker), and then by worshipping avoda zara with these utensils they imposed the status and the issurim of "avoda zara". Rashi is alluding to an interesting condition regarding the monetary status of hekdesh. The ba'alut (proprietorship) upon hekdesh is a FUNCTION of the kedusha. Since we are not dealing with OWNERSHIP by a particular person but rather an ASSOCIATION with a particular institution, the ownership is atypical. Said otherwise, there exists no objective or intrinsic monetary ownership of hekdesh. Rather, there is a status of "hekdesh" which mandates certain halakhot and also associates the item with a particular entity which "possesses" that item - i.e. the institution of hekdesh. Once the item loses its kedusha and its status it is no longer owned by hekdesh, since its ownership in the first place was only a consequence of its halakhic status and the attendant kedusha. (See Afterword for parallels of this concept.) Rashi explains that the Gentiles were able to impose the issur of avoda zara because they were considered the halakhic owners of these items. What Rashi does not address is why exactly the kedusha disappeared immediately upon the entry of the Greeks. What mechanism dismantled the kedusha?

To skirt the issue of Rashi, the Tashbatz (Volume III Responsa 5) maintains that when the Greeks entered the mikdash the Jewish authorities actually were mafkir the utensils (renounced their ownership), actively creating a state of hefker and allowing the Gentiles to assume possession and prohibit these items through their pagan worship. This position is historically suspect and somewhat hard to imagine, but the very fact that the Tashbatz felt compelled to adopt it indicates his uneasiness with Rashi's principle of automatic loss of kedusha and consequent hefker.

To return to Rashi's position, how exactly did these items forfeit their kedusha? Remember, once they lost their kedusha, Rashi maintains, they were automatically hefker and at the disposal of the Greeks. We must now investigate the exact mechanism by which the halakhic kedusha of the utensils of the Beit Ha-mikdash was removed by the marauding Yevanim. The Mishna La-melekh (in his Sefer Parashat Derakhim) and the Maharit (at present I cannot find the exact teshuva), both posit a very interesting concept which has halakhic and even theological import. Any utensil of halakhic kedusha which lies in the possession of a Gentile automatically loses its kedusha. Once it is bereft of its kedusha, according to Rashi, its legal ownership fades and the Greeks may take possession.

The Shita Mekubetzet in Bava Metzia (24b) cites a teshuva of the Maharam Me-Rotenburg which applies a similar principle in a more limited scope. Mere possession of an item by a Gentile does not suffice to dispossess it of its kedusha. However, any time one of these items is plundered as part of a general despoliation, its kedusha is automatically surrendered. Possession alone does not inhibit kedusha, but the state of being pillaged is antithetical to the prospect of kedusha. A third solution to this problem is offered by the Tashbatz. He affirms that the state of ruin (even if prompted by natural causes) revokes the kedusha of an item or, interestingly enough, a site. This has critical ramifications for batei knesset and batei midrashot which have fallen into deterioration.

There are, however, two additional routes toward the resolution of this question. Each suggests that what removed the kedusha was the very usage of these utensils and the benefit thereby received - in short, the halakha of me'ila. Generally, if a Jew derives benefit from something of hekdesh he commits the sin of me'ila (see the masekhet named for it). Aside from the various punishments he receives, the object loses its kedusha and becomes chulin (without holiness). Quite possibly, the loss of kedusha alluded to by Rashi was a product of me'ila - the use of these utensils for profane purposes. This solution, however, raises an additional problem. Generally, the laws of me'ila do not apply to Gentiles; hence, a Gentile who derives benefit from an item of hekdesh does not perform an act of me'ila, does not receive the punishment for me'ila, nor does he divest the item of its kedusha. How, then, did the Greeks manage to compromise the kedusha?

Here we arrive at two possible approaches. We might succeed in locating Jewish violators who committed the sin of me'ila and caused the items to lose their kedusha. Alternatively, we might maintain that the Greeks themselves, despite the fact that they were Gentiles, succeeded in creating a scenario of me'ila.

The Ba'al Ha-ma'or in Avoda Zara presents a novel and somewhat radical position which captures the tragic circumstances prior to the nes (miracle) of Chanuka. The "peritzim" who entered the mikdash and defamed it were not the Greeks but the Hellenist Jews. These Jews - peritzei Yisrael - were capable of me'ila, and it was their act of me'ila which destroyed the kedusha. Without kedusha the very ownership of hekdesh faded, allowing the Greeks to acquire possession and impose the issur of avoda zara through their idolatrous stunts.

The Ramban strikes the Ba'al Ha-ma'or's position with the following question, based upon a Tosefta in the second perek of Megilla which asserts that a mizbei'ach can never be redeemed through the process known as pidyon. From this law he infers that the mizbei'ach has the status of a "kli sharet" - the actual utensils used in the mikdash. Klei sharet never lose their kedusha; neither me'ila nor pidyon - the process of redeeming an item of hekdesh by offering hekdesh money in exchange, succeeds in stripping them of their kedusha. Me'ila, even when perpetrated by Jews, would have no deleterious effect in removing the kedusha of a mizbei'ach, since it is considered a kli sharet.

To defend the Ba'al Ha-ma'or, we might scrutinize the various assumptions underlying the position of the Ramban. Firstly, he assumes that indeed a mizbei'ach has the status of kli sharet. This, the Tosefta does not clearly state - it only mentions that pidyon is impossible upon these stones. Does that necessarily imply that the mizbei'ach is a utensil and not simply part of the architecture of the mikdash? Secondly, he assumes that the same status which applies to the mizbei'ach as a distinct functional instrument of the mikdash would also apply to STONES which have been detached from that mizbei'ach. The Yevanim evidently removed stones which they used for their own heathen purposes. It was these stones, not the entire altar, which were buried by the Chashmona'im. Possibly the Ramban is correct in regarding the mizbei'ach as an entity which can never lose its kedusha because it is considered a kli sharet. The constituent stones, however, when disjoined, may lose their kedusha. Finally, the Ramban takes no notice of the special circumstances of this episode. A kli sharet might retain its kedusha eternally because of its utility - it always has a valuable use in terms of facilitating the service of the Beit Ha-mikdash. What happens when the Beit Ha-mikdash itself is dominated by invading pagans and the service is suspended? Do the utensils still retain their kedusha despite their current inactivity? Or might we maintain that me'ila in THIS context can potentially damage the kedusha?

Below is a brief list of sources regarding these three assumptions of the Ramban. A more detailed elaboration is beyond the scope (and the length) of this article.

I. General status of mizbei'ach:

Zevachim (27b); Rambam Sefer Ha-mitzvot positive commandment 20; Ra'avad in his Hasagot to the Rambam's short list of mitzvot (contained in the beginning of the Mishneh Torah) - in his comments on positive commandment 20; Minchat Chinukh to mitzva 95. Whether the presence of a mizbei'ach is me'akev, Rambam Beit Ha-bechira 1:1; 1:13; 2:1.

II. Possible distinction between the stones themselves and the mizbei'ach:

1) What money of hekdesh was used to pay for the stones? See Ketubot 110b, Yerushalmi Shekalim perek 4, and the Rambam Shekalim perek 4.

See also the Minchat Chinukh in his additions to mitzva 40 regarding the mizbei'ach of Ya'akov.

III. Status of kli sharet after the avoda in the mikdash has been suspended:

Me'ila (20a), Rashi and Rabbenu Gershom ad locum. See also Or Samei'ach Hilkhot Akum 8:1.

A final option which will be considered is suggested by the Ra'avad (in his commentary to Avoda Zara as well as in his commentary on the Rif known as "Katav Sham") who writes; "The Torah gave the Gentiles the ability to prohibit these utensils (stones) through me'ila, even though normally a Gentile is not a 'candidate' for me'ila." The pasuk in Yechezkel informs us of a special category of me'ila which was operative during the entry of these Gentiles to plunder the mikdash. Indeed, even a kli sharet which under normal circumstances cannot relinquish its kedusha, in our case fell prey to this me'ila cum destruction. By isolating this case the Ra'avad is able to solve two questions at once: How can a Gentile execute me'ila and how can me'ila wrest kedusha from a mizbei'ach which apparently is a kli sharet.

Methodological Points:

------------------------------

1. When confronted with a halakhic problem, one has two general options. First of all one might apply conventional categories (possibly in novel ways) to explain the current phenomenon. Alternatively, many times conventional models cannot properly explain the case and there is a need for the development of new halakhic constructs. For example the Ra'avad developed a new paradigm of me'ila which operates under completely different laws from the standard model. Alternatively, to explain the manner by which the ba'alut of hekdesh was removed several mefarshim developed overall concepts of what sustains the kedusha of hekdesh. In short: first try to solve a dilemma through something "old"; if that fails search for something "new".

Afterword:

-------------------

The classification of the legal ba'alut of hekdesh is a central question of halakha. For amplification, see Chidushei Ha-grach al Ha-Rambam, Hilkhot Me'ila 2:5.

Machshava:

--------------------

Several important issues were considered. The incompatibility between the Gentile world and the world of kedusha was reflected in the Maharit's statement that Gentile possession of a davar she-bikdusha suffices to dismantle that state. There are indeed several religious states of which a goy is capable: piety, morality, selflessness, justice, and even saintliness. Kedusha in the transcendent sense, in the manner in which we apply it to Ha-kadosh Baruch Hu - Kadosh Kadosh Kadosh - has little meaning to a Gentile world which has sacrificed the transcendence of G-d in order to humanize the Divine Principle. For a fuller exposition on this matter see the opening sections of Halakhic Man. (Reading Rudolph Otto's "The Idea of the Holy" would also be helpful.)

From the teshuva of the Maharam Mi-Rotenburg we can infer that kedusha comprises "sovereignty" and when the items in question are pillaged by others the kedusha automatically ceases to exist. From the Tashbatz, we may infer that for kedusha to be sustained (at least in terms of kedushat chefetz - holiness of object) there must be active involvement in the world of ritual performance. Kedusha cannot exist in a vacuum. once the site has become desolate and no longer active it forfeits its kedusha.

The Ba'al Ha-ma'or once again reminds us that so often we are our own worst enemies.

May we be zocheh to once again rededicate a mikdash and actualize the notion of kedusha in our lives.

Lighting Chanukah Candles

A Halakhic Overview

by: Rabbi Doniel Schreiber

I. Mekor Chanukah

The source for the holiday of Chanukah is not found in the Chumash, nor in Neviim or Ketubim; its origin, rather, is rooted in our mesorah. The Talmud in Mesechet Shabbat 21b details the story of Chanukah and the halakhic implications which followed in its wake. Interestingly, Rambam, codifier of halakhot par excellence, not only relates the halakhot of Chanukah, but also retells an expanded version of the story of Chanukah.[1] Noting Rambam's curious decision to include the Chanukah story in the Mishne Torah, the Rav, Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik zt"l[2], explains that according to Rambam the mizvah of lighting Chanukah candles is to praise and thank G-d by publicizing the miracle of Chanukah. Obviously, in order to properly praise Hashem, it is necessary that we be familiar with the details of the miracle of Chanukah. Thus, retelling the story of Chanukah is part of the halakhot of lighting Chanukah candles itself, and certainly necessitates mention in the Mishne Torah[3]. Perhaps, for this reason, when we light the chanukiah we say the tefillah of "ha'nerot hallalu", which articulates that we are praising G-d for the miracle of Chanukah.

II. Mizvat Hadlakah

What are the parameters of the obligation to light the chanukiah? The Talmud in Mesechet Shabbat 21b states:

ת"ר מצות חנוכה נר איש וביתו, והמהדרין נר לכל אחד ואחד, והמהדרין מן המהדרין: ב"ש אומרים יום ראשון מדליק שמונה, מכאן ואילך פוחת והולך; וב"ה אומרים יום ראשון מדליק אחת, מכאן ואילך מוסיף והולך".

According to the Gemara, there are three levels to the mizvah. The primary takanah is that at least one candle should be lit in each home. To perform the mizvah at a higher grade, mehadrin, there should be one candle lit per person in the home. There is a Tannaitic dispute, however, as to how one can perform the mizvah in its most eminent form - mehadrin min ha'mehadrin. According to Beit Shammai, one must light eight candles on the first night, and remove one candle each night thereafter. According to Beit Hillel[4], one must light one candle the first night, and add one additional candle[5] every night until there are eight candles on the eighth night.[6] Let us analyze these three levels individually.

III. Ner Ish U'Beito

1. Chovat Ha'Gavra or Chovat Ha'Cheftza

Generally, we find two categories of mizvot. One type is an obligation which relates to the person, a chovat ha'gavra, and the obligation stems from, and directly devolves upon the person. The mizvot of matzah, kiddush, tefillin, daled minim, and talmud torah are several examples of a chovat gavra. The second type of mizvah is an obligation which relates to an object, a chovat ha'cheftza. In this instance, the responsibility stems directly from the object, and the obligation which devolves upon the person is only a by-product of the object. Some possible examples of this category of mizvah are nedarim, hafrashat trumot u'maaserot, and hafrashat challah.

One of the most basic issues pertaining to the mizvah of lighting Chanukah candles is determining which of the above categories it belongs to. Is it a chovat ha'gavra to publicize the miracle of Chanukah on one's doorstep, or is this obligation a chovat ha'cheftza which emanates from the structure of the house? The implications of this question are numerous, and only some of them will be enumerated. Firstly, if the cheftza does not exist, as in the case of a homeless person, then assuming the mizvah emanates from the cheftza, i.e. the house, then clearly a homeless person should be patur, as he has no house to generate his chiyuv. On the other hand, if the mizvah stems from the person, a homeless individual is obligated in the mizvah. How he can fulfill his obligation is another matter, and two possibilities exist: either he must light Chanukah candles even though he does not have a house[7], or he cannot light the Chanukah candles without a house, and remains unable to fulfill his responsibility[8].

Another case which highlights these two possibilities is one who owns two homes. If the mizvah stems from the house, then each house requires a lit chanukiah. However, if the responsibility derives from the person, then he must light at only one house[9] to fulfill his obligation of publicizing the miracle from his doorstep. Indeed, the Shibalei Ha'Leket[10] cites a Geonic debate with regard to this question.

Finally, these two different approaches affect our understanding of the unusual requirement to light ner chanukah specifically on our front doorstep. Why was the front window, for example, not chosen as the makom of ner chanukah? If ner chanukah is a chovat ha'cheftza, i.e. a chovat ha'bayit, then it is possible to suggest that chazal specifically chose to place the ner chanukah at a spot which characterizes the bayit. Since the front doorstep is a high profile location, it is conceivable that it best personifies the bayit, and it is perhaps for this reason that chazal chose it for the site of the mizvah. If ner chanukah, however, is a chovat ha'gavra, a different explanation for the locale of the mizvah is required. One of the gezerot of the Greeks was that all Jewish households must leave their front doors open to prevent any surreptitious avodat Hashem[11]. Thus, it is possible chazal determined that precisely the front doorstep, the site of the Greek legislation to prevent avodat Hashem, be the location of the pirsum ha'nes.

The question as to which category of obligation the mizvah of lighting Chanukah candles belongs is complicated due to seemingly conflicting realities. On the one hand, the fact that a guest, an achsnai, is obligated in ner chanukah[12] despite the fact that he is not in his own house, suggests that ner chanukah is a chovat ha'gavra. Conversely, the halakha of "ner ish u'beito"[13], that when the ba'al ha'bayit lights, the rest of the household is patur from mizvat ner chanukah, implies that ner chanukah is a chovat ha'cheftza; the mizvah does not require that each person light, but rather that the house have a ner chanukah[14].

Presumably, due to this inner tension in ner chanukah, the Bach[15] assumes a middle position, absorbing both extreme perceptions into his definition of the mizvah. In his view, ner chanukah is both a chovat ha'cheftza, i.e. chovat ha'bayit, in which one's house must be made into a public spectacle, publicizing the miracle of Chanukah, and a chovat ha'gavra to make the miracle known to yourself. Thus, the Bach rules that a traveler must be m'varech "she'asah nissim" (and "she'hechiyanu" the first night of Chanukah) on seeing someone else's ner chanukah, despite the fact that his family lit for him at home. The reason is that his own family's lighting can only release him from his obligation to turn his house into a public spectacle of the miracle, but it cannot help him fulfill his personal obligation to make the miracle known to himself.

2. Hanachah Oseh Mizvah or Hadlakah Oseh Mizvah

Another major issue at the basic level of ner ish u'beito is whether the definition of the mizvah is to place the ner (hanachah oseh mizvah), or to light the ner (hadlakah oseh mizvah). The Talmud in Mesechet Shabbat 22b discusses both of these options[16], and concludes[17] that hadlakah oseh mizvah, and indeed this is how the Shulchan Arukh[18] rules.

The issue of whether hanachah oseh mizvah or hadlakah oseh mizvah has various implications. Some examples cited in the Gemara are:

1. Is it permissible to light from one ner chanukah to another ner chanukah? If hanachah oseh mizvah, then lighting from one ner to the other would be prohibited, as lighting is not a mizvah, and lighting from one ner chanukah to even another ner chanukah is a misuse of the ner chanukah - a bizuy mizvah. On the other hand, if hadlakah oseh mizvah, then lighting from one ner chanukah to another is permitted, and there is no belittlement of the ner chanukah, since the very lighting is the mizvah.

2. Is the formulation of the bracha "le'hadlik" or "le'haniach"? The Gemara proves that the ruling is hadlakah oseh mizvah, since the nusach ha'bracha is "le'hadlik".

3. Does a ner lit by a cheiresh, shoteh, v'katan shelo he'giah l'chinuch fulfill the mizvah of ner chanukah for the household? If hadlakah oseh mizvah, then this act does not fulfill the obligation of the household, since the actions of these individuals are not considered ma'aseh mizvot[19]. If, however, hanachah oseh mizvah, then another family member can fulfill the mizvah with it by taking the lit ner and placing it on the doorstep.

Rishonim also cite various nafka minot. The Rosh[20], for instance, explains that the issue of when one must put at least a half an hour's worth of oil into the ner is dependent on this question. If hadlakah oseh mizvah, then oil must be added before the hadlakah, since otherwise the hadlakah is insignificant, as it will not last the proper amount of time. If the ruling is, however, hanachah oseh mizvah, then one must add the oil only before the hanachah.

IV. Mehadrin, U'Mehadrin Min Ha'Mehadrin

The source for the general concept of hidur, i.e. beautification or glorification of mizvot is from the Talmud, Mesechet Shabbat 133a. The Gemara cites the pasuk[21] "Zeh keli v'anvehu", and establishes that mizvot should appear beautiful to a person, she'yehei adam mit'naeh b'mizvot. Thus, says the Gemara, everyone's sukkah, lulav, shofar, tzitzit, and sefer torah should be beautiful and appealing. This is what we refer to as hidur mizvah.

The question at hand, though, is whether the laws of mehadrin, and mehadrin min ha'mehadrin are really an outgrowth of the general principles of hidur mizvah, or a new category specific to ner chanukah, independent of hidur mizvah. The Rambam[22] rules that one is obligated to "mehader et ha'mizvah", implying that mehadrin and mehadrin min ha'mehadrin are based on the general laws of hidur mizvah. Rabbeinu Chananel[23] rules similarly: "The interpretation of 'Mehadrin': Beautifying (mehadrei) mizvot, as stated in Bava Kama 9b, to beautify (l'hadurei) a mizvah until a third of (the expenditure of) the (principal) mizvah". Yet, Rashi[24] apparently rules that mehadrin is unique to ner chanukah. He explains that mehadrin means to "mehader acharei mizvot", to run after additional mizvot, which is similar to the Aramaic "hadran alach" or "le'hadurei batryhu". Thus, there is a fundamental dispute whether mehadrin insists on glorifying ner chanukah just as one ought to glorify other mizvot, or if mehadrin connotes an entirely different concept unique to ner chanukah - the pursuit of additional mizvot.

What is at the crux of this dispute? One possible approach is that this debate hinges upon the nature of the miracle we are commemorating. Are we lighting nerot chanukah to publicize the miracle of the pach shemen, or our military victory over the Greeks? If the reason for ner chanukah is to commemorate our victory, then perhaps, since our motive in waging war was to enable our observance of mizvot, chazal determined that part of the very mizvah of commemorating the victory should be the pursuit of additional mizvot, i.e. the din of mehadrin. However, if we light nerot Chanukah to broadcast the miracle of the pach shemen, then there is no compelling reason to assume the mizvah of ner chanukah is different from any other mizvah, and one ought to beautify ner chanukah as one must any other mizvah.

Yet, we cannot rule out the possibility of a middle position. Perhaps mehadrin and mehadrin min ha'mehadrin are similar to hidur mizvah in that glorification of the mizvah is demanded, but not as an outgrowth of "zeh keli v'anvehu"; rather, chazal legislated a mizvah of glorification unique to Chanukah. Indeed, this is the interpretation of Rav Velvel, R' Yitzchak Zev ha'Levi Soloveitchik zt"l[25]. He is convinced of his position due to two facts: Firstly, there is no such concept of mehadrin min ha'mehadrin in all of halakha besides Chanukah; secondly, according to the Gemara[26], the general law of hidur mizvah is limited to an expenditure of no more that a third of the outlay for the principal mizvah, and yet the mehadrin and mehadrin min ha'mehadrin of Chanukah ignore this limitation[27].

Why would chazal legislate a special mizvah of hidur for ner chanukah? R' Yosef Dov ha'Levi Soloveitchik zt"l explains in his sefer Beis Ha'Levi al ha'Torah[28] that chazal instituted more hidurim in ner chanukah than exist in other mizvot because the miracle of the pach shemen was prompted by our desire to glorify the mizvah of lighting menorah in the Beit Ha'Mikdash. We could have lit the menorah with wicks an eighth of their normal width to assure that the menorah remain lit for the eight days necessary to acquire more shemen zayit zach. Nonetheless, in our zeal to light the menorah of the Mikdash in a superior manner, we employed wicks of normal length. Thus, because the very miracle transpired as a result of hidur mizvah, chazal instituted an additional level of hidur - mehadrin min ha'mehadrin. This reasoning, too, would justify a special category of hidur mizvah, as Rav Velvel understands, for ner chanukah.

A further rationale for ner chanukah's special category of hidur can be found in Rav Yoel Sirkus' glosses on the Tur[29]. He explains that chazal instituted hidur in ner chanukah to counterbalance B'nei Yisrael's previous negligence in avodat ha'Mikdash in the time of the Greeks. This explanation would also justify the legislation of a special category of hidur for ner chanukah.

What emerges from the above discussion is a spectrum of definitions concerning mehadrin and mehadrin min ha'mehadrin. On the one extreme, ner chanukah's "mehadrin" is, in reality, another term for zeh keli v'anvehu, i.e. the general concept of hidur mizvah. On the opposite pole, mehadrin has nothing to do with the concept of glorifying mizvot, but rather, denotes ner chanukah's unique urge to pursue additional mizvot. Finally, the middle position accepts both mehadrin's uniqueness to ner chanukah and its standard role of glorification. According to this definition, chazal instituted a unique dimension of hidur in ner chanukah, one unrelated to the general concept of zeh keli v'anvehu.

These three approaches to the understanding of ner chanukah's law of mehadrin can be used to explain various debates in the laws of Chanukah. For example, Rambam[30] and Shulchan Arukh[31] rule that mehadrin requires the head of the household to light all the nerot, whereas the custom of Sefard[32] and the ruling of the Rema[33] is that mehadrin requires each member of the household to light nerot chanukah. Rav Velvel explains that while all agree mehadrin means hidur mizvah, they argue whether one can recite a bracha on hidur mizvah only when one also performs the principal mizvah, or even when one does not also perform the principal mizvah. Rambam and Shulchan Arukh, who rule that mehadrin requires the head of the household to light all the nerot, are of the opinion that one can only recite a bracha on hidur mizvah when one also performs the principal mizvah. In their view, only the head of the household lights all the nerot since his lighting includes the principal mizvah of one candle per household. If, however, the rest of the household lit also, they could not recite a bracha on their act of lighting, in as much as they are not also performing the principal mizvah, but only the hidur mizvah. On the other hand, Sefard and Rema are of the opinion that one recites the bracha on hidur mizvah even when one does not also perform the principal mizvah. Thus, they rule that mehadrin requires each member of the household to light nerot chanukah even though they are not also performing the principal mizvah. Rav Velvel's approach utilizes mehadrin's glorification motif in clarifying a fundamental dispute.

In this vein, one might consider that the debate between Shulchan Arukh and Rema, as explained by Rav Velvel, hinges upon the issue of what type of hidur is ner chanukah. If it is the universal hidur of "zeh keli v'anvehu", then just as in general hidur mizvah does not necessitate an independent bracha, one should similarly not make an exception for ner chanukah. On the other hand, if mehadrin is a unique category of hidur indigenous to ner chanukah, then one can conceive reciting a distinct bracha on this hidur, even though the universal category of hidur would provide no similar justification. Indeed, this is the explanation of the Sefat Emet[34]. This proposal employs the two possible definitions of mehadrin's glorification motif - zeh keli v'anvehu and glorification of ner chanukah - to justify the contrary rulings of Shulchan Arukh and Rema.

The Rav zt"l[35] suggests a different approach to the above dispute. According to the Rav, Shulchan Arukh and Rema agree that one cannot recite a bracha on hidur mizvah alone. The debate hinges, rather, on whether mehadrin demands, as Rambam understands, that we beautify the mizvah of ner chanukah, or whether we must aspire to fulfill additional mizvot on Chanukah, in accordance with Rashi's position. Shulchan Arukh, who rules that mehadrin requires the head of the household to light all the nerot, assumes that the definition of mehadrin is to beautify ner chanukah, in accordance with Rambam. Since one cannot recite a bracha on hidur mizvah alone, it is impossible for anyone else besides the ba'al ha'bayit to light the mehadrin with a bracha. If anyone else were to attempt to glorify the principal mizvah by lighting the mehadrin, they would only be performing hidur mizvah and would be unable to recite a bracha.

Rema, on the other hand, who rules that mehadrin requires each member of the household to light nerot Chanukah, defines mehadrin as the pursuit of more mizvot. To accomplish Rema's mehadrin, explains the Rav, the household must intend, during the ba'al ha'bayit's hadlakah, to not fulfill their primary obligation of ner chanukah. This course of action will create a situation where the rest of the household must pursue more mizvot as they are still obligated to fulfill their primary obligation of ner chanukah[36]. Each of them can fulfill this obligation, in the framework of mehadrin, by lighting their own ner chanukah with a bracha. This approach invokes disparate descriptions of mehadrin - glorification as opposed to pursuit of mizvot[37] - to define the nature of Shulchan Arukh and Rema's dispute. The definition of mehadrin, then, has a central role in ner chanukah - a role upon which a variety of hilkhot chanukah hinge.

May the merit of our learning hilkhot chanukah re-establish the lighting of the menorah in the Beit Ha'Mikdash, quickly in our times!

Chanuka and Purim:

A Study of their differences

by Rabbi Nathaniel Helfgot[38]

I - Introduction

From a purely halakhic point of view, we generally regard Chanuka and Purim as equal in status. Both festivals are de-rabanan (rabbinically mandated), and the issue of "pirsum ha-nes" (publicizing the miracle) is central to both of them. This trend of thought finds expression in the Rambam's Mishneh Torah. As opposed to the other festivals, the halakhot of which are all dealt with individually - e.g. Hilkhot Shevitat He-asor (Yom Kippur), Hilkhot Chametz U-matza (Pesach) etc., the Rambam gives a joint heading to the laws of Chanuka and Purim: Hilkhot Megilla Ve-Chanuka. The first two chapters deal with the laws of Purim, and the third and fourth chapters deal with the laws of Chanuka.

In addition, the Rambam further emphasizes the connection between these two festivals in his laws of Chanuka. In 3:3 he writes:

And these days are called Chanuka, and eulogies and fasting are forbidden on them as on the days of Purim. And it is a mitzva to light candles on these days based on divrei soferim, as is the reading of the Megilla.

And further on, in halakha 4, the Rambam draws the following parallel:

All those obligated to hear the reading of the Megilla are also obligated to light candles on Chanuka.

II - Differences Based on "Divrei Kabbala"

Clearly, though, these quotations do not reflect the whole picture. The most obvious difference between Chanuka and Purim is that in contrast to Chanuka, on Purim we have a text - Megillat Ester, which is part of the kitvei kodesh. Purim was instituted by the nevi'im, and is included in the Written Torah. This fact is also emphasized by the Rambam at the beginning of his Hilkhot Megilla Ve-Chanuka:

In the same way we are commanded to read the Megilla based on divrei soferim, and it is well known that this was an institution of the prophets (mi-takanat ha-nevi'im).

Thus, Purim falls under the category of divrei kabbala rather than simply divrei soferim or a regular de-rabanan. This difference between Chanuka and Purim is expressed in several ways:

1. The Problem of 'Bal Tosif' ("you shall not add...")

The question of the definition of bal tosif is a fundamental debate among the posekim.[39] Does the Torah mean to forbid only an addition to the cheftza (an existing law), e.g. five instead of four parshiot in the tefillin, or does the institution of an entirely new mitzva also transgress the principle of bal tosif? The Minchat Chinukh holds that the prohibition of bal tosif does not include the institution of a new mitzva, since Chazal themselves introduced new mitzvot; e.g., netillat yadayim, Chanuka etc. He writes:

Bal tosif certainly does not apply, for the Torah gives permission to the Sages to institute laws, be they kum ve-aseh (positive commands) or shev ve-al ta'aseh (negative commands), according to their times. And I have found no indication in the Rishonim that such an action would be included in the prohibition of bal tosif, since this involves only adding some addition onto a mitzva of the Torah.[40]

On the other hand, the view of the Ramban (in his commentary on the Torah) is exactly the opposite:

And I believe that even the invention of a totally new mitzva, for instance the institution of a new festival which one invents oneself, like Yeravam, transgresses the prohibition (of bal tosif).[41]

As the source of his position, the Ramban quotes the Gemara in Masekhet Megilla, 14b:

Our Rabbis taught: the forty-eight male prophets and seven female prophets who prophesized for Israel did not diminish from nor add to what is written in the Torah except for [their institution of] the reading of the Megilla. What do we learn from this? Rabbi Hiya bar Abin said in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Karcha, kal vahomer - if when we were redeemed from slavery to freedom we recited praise, then should we not do so in celebration of being saved from death and granted life?!

Ramban also quotes the Talmud Yerushalmi (Megilla 1:7):

Eighty-five elders, among whom some were prophets, were greatly troubled over this matter [the institution of reading the Megilla. They said, 'the Torah says "These are the mitzvot which God commanded Moshe" - these are the mitzvot which Moshe commanded us, this is what Moshe told us, and no prophet is authorized to add anything. Now Mordekhai and Ester want to institute something new for us.' They would not move, and argued backward and forwards until the Holy One, Blessed be He, enlightened them and they found it written in the Torah, in the Nevi'im and Ketuvim, etc.

The Ramban comments: "This [institution of the] commandment was forbidden to them, thus it falls into the category of bal tosif alav." If no source or proof could be found to allow the institution of Purim, then apparently this represented a transgression of bal tosif.

What is particularly interesting about the gemara in Megilla is the emphasis on the problematic nature of the reading of the Megilla. What about the Chanuka candles? Why is no similar question raised regarding the establishment of Chanuka as a transgression of the principle of bal tosif? Rashi raises this question on the spot:

And what of the Chanuka candles? The nevi'im had already decided this, but in the days of Mordekhai, Chagai, Zekharia and Malakhi still lived.

What does Rashi mean? A simple understanding of his words would seem to indicate that he doesn't believe that Chanuka presents a problem, since its source is not a takanat nevi'im. Only a mitzva which is introduced as falling under the category of divrei kabbala has the potential of conflicting with the principle of bal tosif. A mitzva instituted with ruach ha-kodesh, and included in the kitvei ha-kodesh, can "compete" - if we may use such an expression - with the status of the 613 mitzvot as a complete and unalterable unit. A regular mitzva de-rabanan could not and cannot present any such competition, since it lacks the characteristics of a 'mitzva on the same level as a de-oraita'. Hence Chazal only felt the need to solve the 'problem' of the bal tosif of Purim, while seeing no reason to raise the problem at all with regard to Chanuka.

If this is the case, then the first difference which we have discovered between Chanuka and Purim involves solving the problem of bal tosif. Purim, which falls under the category of divrei kabbala, requires a solution while Chanuka, which is a regular de-rabanan, requires no special heter for its institution and mitzvot.

2. The Days Preceding the Two Chagim

A second difference between Purim as divrei kabbala and Chanuka as a regular de-rabanan concerns the problem of the days preceding the festival.

During the days of Megillat Ta'anit, it is prohibited to eulogize or to fast not only on the festivals but also on the days preceding and following them. Today we hold that Megillat Ta'anit is no longer binding - except for the days of Chanuka and Purim. If so, how can Ta'anit Ester be commemorated the day before Purim, a day on which fasting and eulogies are prohibited? There are some commentaries[42] who bring to our attention the fact that in the beraita quoted in Rosh Ha-shana 19a, a differentiation is made between the Torah-based institutions of shabbatot and Yom Tov - on which the prohibition of eulogy and fasting applies, but not on the days preceding them - and Megillat Ta'anit, whose source is only de-rabanan. What is the significance of this difference? The gemara explains:

These are words of Torah, and the words of Torah require no reinforcement. [The days of Megillat Ta'anit] are from divrei soferim, and divrei soferim require reinforcement.

If this is so, the Rishonim continue, then since Purim falls under the category of divrei kabbala and "divrei kabbala are compared to the words of Torah,"[43] therefore Purim requires no reinforcement. Chanuka, on the other hand, which is simply a regular de-rabanan, still retains the prohibition of eulogy and fasting.

In practice, we make no differentiation between Chanuka and Purim, since there are other Rishonim who hold that when the Gemara declares that the law of Megillat Ta'anit is not cancelled with regard to Chanuka and Purim, this referred only to eulogy and fasting on the festive days themselves, but as regards the days beforehand and afterwards the law was cancelled even with concerning Chanuka and Purim.[44] The halakha in Shulchan Arukh[45] is decided according to this understanding, but it is interesting that the Bach holds that fasting is forbidden on the days preceding Chanuka, out of consideration for the reasons discussed above.

3. An Onen on Purim

A third difference which arises from the sources with regard to the status of Purim as divrei kabbala is the halakha with regard to an onen (mourner - before the burial) on Purim. An onen, as we know, is forbidden to eat meat or to drink wine. This prohibition applies on Chanuka as well, as on any regular day. With regard to Purim, according to the Orchot Chayyim,[46] the commandment to have a seuda on Purim takes precendence over the law of aninut, since "this is an aseh which applies only to the individual and his mourning, and the other is an aseh de-oraita which applies to the many on Purim, since these are divrei kabbala - which are compared to words of Torah." This approach is even brought down in the Shulchan Arukh,[47] demonstrating to what degree divrei kabbala can impact the laws of Purim, as opposed to Chanuka, where such a possibility is not even considered. The halakha with regard to Chanuka is clear: an onen observes all the rules of aninut, including the prohibition of eating meat and drinking wine.

4. Women's Obligation in Megilla

The fourth difference involved in defining Purim as divrei kabbala concerns the issue of a woman's obligation to read (or hear) the Megilla. The Gemara, in Megilla 4a, determines that women are obligated to read the Megilla (even though it is a time-bound positive mitzva) because "they too were part of the miracle."

The Rishonim debate whether, based on this gemara, a man can fulfilll his obligation to read by hearing a woman read the Megilla. The approach of the Bahag (Ba'al Halachot Gedolot) is well known - that a woman cannot fulfill the obligation for a man since women are obligated to hear, whereas men are obligated to read. The Acharonim are divided in their commentaries[48] on the Bahag, but for our purposes we shall concentrate on the explanation of the Turei Even.[49]

The Turei Even rejects the Bahag's differentiation, but nevertheless maintains that women cannot fulfill the obligation for men since men are obligated because of divrei kabbala - an obligation originating with ruach ha-kodesh - whereas women are obligated only by virtue of a ruling by the Rabbis, who determined that "they too were part of the miracle." Therefore, hold the Turei Even, the level of obligation of men and women is not equal, and hence the problem exists of someone who is not obligated trying to fulfill the obligation for someone who is - the same problem as is presented by a minor wishing to fulfilll the obligation for an adult.

Since Chanuka is not based in divrei kabbala, the law of lighting candles is different from that of the Megilla. Here, the halakha is that women can fulfilll the obligation for men without any problem. In the words of the Be'er Hetev, "A woman can kindle the Chanuka lights and thereby even fulfill the obligation of a man, which is not so with regard to the Megilla."[50]

If this is so, an interesting situation is created with regard to Chanuka: Since the obligation is based on a regular de-rabanan ruling, men and women are equally bound - since both are obligated by a regular rabbinic ruling. On the other hand, where Purim is concerned (according to the Turei Even), the basic obligation is based on divrei kabbala, and the women's obligation is a regular de-rabanan.

In truth, there is great room for disagreement with the Turei Even, from several points of view.

His pesak is based on two assumptions:

1. Someone whose obligation is of a certain level cannot fulfill the obligation of someone who is obligated on a different level, and in this respect the difference between a de-oraita and a de-rabanan is comparable to the different levels of de-rabanan itself.

2. The obligation of women with regard to Megilla reading is on a different level from that of men.

The Turei Even's conclusion can be rejected on the basis of either one of his two assumptions. Even if we accept the second assumption, i.e. that different levels of obligation are involved, this does not lead us to the conclusion that women cannot fulfill the obligation of a man. First, there is a fundamental debate among the Rishonim as to whether the law concerning "someone who is not obligated" applies only to a person who is not obligated at all in the relevant matter and who comes to fulfill the obligation of someone who is obligated, or if this applies even to someone who is obligated but on a different level. Rashi (and those who follow his opinion) in Berakhot 48a explicitly states that a minor can fulfill the obligation of his father in reciting Birkat Ha-mazon, since he

too is obligated in Birkat Ha-mazon - based on the principle of chinukh. According to Rashi, a person only needs to be defined as being obligated, on whatever level, in order to be able to fulfill the obligation of someone else who is obligated in the same mitzva.

Second, even if we reject Rashi's approach (as we sometimes do in halakha), there is still room for argument. We may agree that perhaps the person obligated de-rabanan may not fulfill the obligation of someone obligated de-oraita, since the difference between them is too great - and therefore in relation to the latter, the former is really comparable to "someone who is not obligated." On the other hand, when we are speaking of internal differences in the category of de-rabanan, perhaps it is less simple to define someone obligated on level 'X' as "someone who is not obligated" in comparison with someone who is obligated on level Y. Here, the difference in obligation is not so great since Chazal is the source of both requirements, and hence perhaps someone whose requirement is based on "they too were part..." could indeed fulfill the duty of someone who is obligated based on divrei kabbala.

But even if we accept this argument of the Turei Even, we can disagree with the second assumption altogether and say that the obligation of women, based on "they too were part..." is not a secondary obligation. Rather, it is teaching us that even though in general women are exempted from the basic obligation because of the time-factor consideration, here we are returning women to within the confines of the regular obligation. According to this understanding, women are obligated based on divrei kabbala just as men are. This was the approach of the GRIZ zt"l on Rambam, who ruled that women are obligated to read the Megilla without any reservation. He says,

We need to define what the obligation (of "they too") actually is. Is it an attempt to obligate women be-ikar ha-din, (even though in general women are exempted from positive commandments bound by time) based on the idea that 'they too were part of the miracle' and therefore the ikar hadin and the obligation apply to them exactly as it does to men, and their obligation is equal? Or is the actual obligation of Megilla reading definitely a time-bound positive mitzva from which women are exempted, such that their obligation arises from a rabbinic chiyuv and such that the obligations of men and women in Megilla reading are actually different... the opinion of the Rambam is that their obligation is identical, and therefore women can fulfill the obligation for men.[51]

III - Differences Based on Mi-de'oraita Concerns

We may also point out some differences between Purim and Chanuka - not on the de-rabanan level but rather on the level of de-oraita, based on a different issue altogether.

There are several Acharonim - and in particular Maran Ha-Rav Soloveitchik zt"l, in his shiurim - who suggest that even where de-rabanan festivals are concerned, with their obligation rooted in a takanat chazal, there are still de-oraita commandments to be fulfilled.

This idea can be explained in one of four ways:

a) The gemara in Megilla quoted above, which discusses the source of the obligation to read the Megilla, raises the kal va-chomer, "if when we were redeemed from slavery to freedom we recited praise, then should we not do so in celebration of being saved from death and granted life?!" The Chatam Sofer maintains that on the basis of this gemara, Chanuka and Purim represent a kiyum de-oraita based on this kal va-chomer. He says,

On Purim and Chanuka... the remembering of the miracle - from death to life - is a real de-oraita, based on this kal va-chomer... to make some remembrance of the miracle. But the quality and quantity of the remembrance is de-rabanan, for instance the reading of the Megilla and mishloach manot and lighting candles on Chanuka - all this is de-rabanan, but the idea of making some remembrance, the very minimum of which is the prohibition of eulogy and fasting, is de-oraita, based on the above-mentioned kal va-chomer.[52]

What the Chatam Sofer is saying is quite clear, and served as an important source in the debates between the Posekim as to the institution of Yom Ha-atzma'ut.[53]

But we may also examine the difference between Chanuka and Purim based on the Chatam Sofer's principle. Indeed, on Purim, the kal va-chomer is easily understood - in the days of Mordekhai and Ester the nation of Israel was threatened with physical extinction, and was saved. Hence, kal va-chomer, in celebration of being saved from death and granted life, we offer praise. With regard to Chanuka, the threat was qualitatively different. Here the danger was the loss of independence and spiritual assimilation. The crucial delivery from this crisis is not equivalent to the delivery on Purim, as is emphasized by the Acharonim in several places. If so then we should specify that on Purim there is a kiyum de-oraita based on the kal va-chomer, but for Chanuka we still require another source in order to be able to relate to the celebration of the day as a kiyum based on the Torah.

b) A second source for regarding Purim as a fulfillment of a de-oraita arises from the discussion in Megilla 7a regarding the estabishment of Purim as a festival and Megillat Ester as part of the kitvei kodesh. The gemara relates an argument between Ester and the sages of the generation:

Ester sent to them, saying 'write it for all generations.' They sent back to her, saying 'does it not say "to the third" - third and not fourth.' Until they found a source: It is written in the Torah, "Write this as a remembrance in a book." "Write this" - that which is written here (in Shemot) and in the Mishneh Torah; "A remembrance" - that which is written in the nevi'im; "In a book" - that which is written in the Megilla.

This argument also appears in the Yerushalmi,[54] where it is presented in a sharper manner as a question regarding bal tosif: "Mordekhai and Ester now want to introduce something new..." and the answer: "They found it written in the Torah, in the Nevi'im and Ketuvim." Maran HaRav Soloveitchik ztz"l offered the following peshat explanation: The Gemara is determining here that there is a fulfillment of wiping out Amalek in the story of Purim, and a further kiyum of remembering Amalek in the reading of the Megilla. These are both positive commandments de-oraita, and thus we are assured that there is no danger of transgressing bal tosif since nothing is being added to what the Torah already tells us. We are merely relating incidents and events which are the realization of a de-oraita concept - that of wiping out Amalek.

However, it is clear that this kiyum can only serve as a source for the days of Purim - when there was conflict and war with the descendants of Amalek. With regard to Chanuka, the wiping out and remembering of Amalek cannot serve as a basis for any kiyum de-oraita.

c) A third possible source is derived from an excerpt from the end of the Rambam's list of mitzvot at the beginning of his Mishneh Torah. This section appears immediately prior to the presentation of the contents of the 14 books the Yad, and relates to the question of bal tosif with regard to mitzvot de-rabanan, such as the reading of the Megilla, Chanuka, eiruvin, and netillat yadayim. In his discussion, the Rambam writes as follows:

And what was the Torah warning against in the prohibition of lo tosif alav ve-lo tigra mimenu? That no prophet is authorized to introduce something new and to say that God commanded us to make an eiruv, or to read the Megilla at the proper time. If they were to say such a thing they would be 'adding onto the Torah.' Rather, we say that the prophets, together with the beit din, instituted and commanded that we read the Megilla at the proper time in order to recount the praises of God and the salvation which he brought to us... and in order to teach future generations that everything the Torah promises us is true, as it says, "For what nation is there so great, that has God so near to them."(Devarim 4:7)[55]

A new basis for argument arises from the Rambam's words. In our celebration of Purim and Chanuka, we are testifying to the hashgacha peratit of God over the nation of Israel, and the eternal promise of special closeness that God reveals towards Kenesset Yisrael throughout the generations. Chanuka and Purim realize the fulfillment of praise to God for saving Israel from various dangers. Thereby, we fulfill the kiyum de-oraita of praising God, and increase awareness of the principle of 'what nation is there so great, that has God so near to them....'

Clearly, from this point of view there is no difference between Purim and Chanuka. The special hashgacha of the Creator is revealed on Chanuka as well, and we acknowledge and offer thanks "al hanissim," for the miracles which He wrought for us.

d) The final kiyum which we shall discuss is related to the concept of simcha, "happiness" or "celebration," which appears in Torah and in halakha. One source for the mitzva of simcha is to be found in the parshat ha-regalim: "And you shall rejoice in your festival (ve-samachta be-chagekha), you and your son and your daughter..."[56] As explained in the Gemara[57] and codified by the Rambam:

On the seven days of Pesach and the eight days of Sukkot, as well as on the other Yamim Tovim, eulogies and fasting are prohibited, and one is obligated to be sameach and content on these days - he and his children and his wife and the members of his household, all those who are attached to him, as it is written: 'Ve-samachta be-chagekha.' Even though the simcha referred to here is the shelamim sacrifices, as we have explained in Hilkhot Chagigah, the concept also requires that he and all the members of his household are joyous, each in his own way.[58]

A second source for the concept of simcha appears in parshat ha-chatzotzrot in Bemidbar 10:10:

Also in the day of your gladness, and in your solemn days, and in the beginnings of your months, you shall blow with the trumpets over your burnt offerings and over the sacrifices of your peace offerings...[59]

Here the Torah speaks of 'days of gladness' as an existing concept, and we need to clarify exactly what this concept involves. I.e., is it the same as those days which are included in the mitzva of 've-samachta be-chagekha,' which seems to apply only to the regalim[60]? It is particularly interesting to note that R. Avraham Ibn Ezra, in his commentary on this verse, explains:

In the day of your gladness - when you return from the enemy's country, or you have vanquished the enemy who descended upon you, and you set down a day for joy like Purim, or the seven days of Chizkiyahu (or, there are those who hold 'or the days of Chanuka').

If we turn our attention to purely halakhic sources, we shall find sources along the same lines. In Megillat Ester we find:

Therefore the Jews of the villages, who dwell in the unwalled towns, make the fourteenth day of the month Adar a day of gladness and feasting and holiday... And Mordekhai wrote... to enjoin upon them that they should keep the fourteenth day of the month Adar, and the fifteenth day of the same... days of feasting and joy...[61]

The gemara in Megilla 5a comments that the Jews did not actually accept for all generations everything that was commemorated that first year:

[The prohibitions of] Eulogy and fasting they accepted upon themselves; [the prohibition of] melakha they did not accept upon themselves. That is why it says, 'gladness and feasting and holiday [yom tov],' and later on it says only 'make them days of feasting and joy,' but 'yom tov' is not mentioned.

R. Hillel Novetsky comments on this gemara in his article in Alon Shevut:

We need to ask exactly what it was that they did not accept upon themselves for future generations. Did they not accept Purim as a 'yom tov' at all, or did they accept it as a yom tov (in matters of simcha) but without the usual prohibition of melakha? For we learn further on in the Gemara (Megilla 16b): 'The Jews had light and gladness... and honor - Rav Yehuda said, gladness means 'yom tov,' as it says, 'and you shall be glad (ve-samachta) on your festival.'[62]

To this, we may add what the Rambam writes in Hilkhot Megilla: "The commandment of the fourteenth day for the villagers is to be a day of simcha and celebration, etc."[63] It seems, therefore, that the days of Purim are indeed to be regarded as days of simcha.

At the same time we should note the Rambam's words in Hilkhot Chanuka: "The Sages of that generation decreed that these eight days, commencing on the eve of the 25th of Kislev, should be days of simcha and Hallel."[64]

But we may differentiate between the simcha of Chanuka and that of Purim even on the de-rabanan level, based on the chiluk made by Maran HaRav zt"l with regard to the mitzvot involved in the simcha:

This commandment involves two aspects: 1) The simcha of a pilgrim festival based on the biblical injunction of 've-samachta be-chagekha.' This mitzva involved bringing shelamim sacrifices and eating them, during the time of the Beit Ha-mikdash, and in our times by the other characteristics of simcha, such as meat and wine and special clothing etc., as explained in Pesachim (109a)...

2) Simcha which is expressed by praising God, the kiyum of which is internal (in the heart), and this is carried out by singing praise and song according to the biblical injunction of 'also in the day of your gladness, and in your solemn days, and in the beginnings of your months, you shall blow with the trumpets over your burnt offerings, and over the sacrifices of your peace offerings' (Bemidbar 10:10), which refers to all the festivals, and it seems that the recitation of Hallel on the festivals is based upon this principle of simcha, i.e. that of song... In the same way, with regard to Chanuka, the Rambam used (Hilkhot Chanuka 3:3) the concept of 'days of simcha and Hallel,' instead of the wording of the beraita (Shabbat 21b): 'the following year they instituted a yom tov with Hallel and thanksgiving.' Obviously, the Rambam does not mean that Chanuka is similar to Purim as regards the obligations of celebration and simcha by means of eating and drinking. There was never any such suggestion. Our great teacher merely wished to explain the obligation of Hallel on Chanuka, and since every instance where Hallel was instituted there is also an obligation of simcha, it is impossible to fulfill the obligation of the recitatition of Hallel without any connection to the fulfillment of simcha which expresses itself in the recitation of song.[65]

A proof for the above position of the Rav zt"l can be brought from the Maharitz in his Sha'arei Simcha, with regard to Rosh Chodesh, Purim and Chanuka:

For these are days of simcha, as it says,'also in the day of your gladness, and in your solemn days...,' and on each of them we recite Hallel: 'This is the day which God has wrought, let us be joyful and glad on it.'[66]

Hence we see that there is a kiyum of simcha based on the principle of "also on the days of your gladness," which is expressed in the recitation of Hallel. This simcha, which is either an obligation de-rabanan or a kiyum de-oraita,[67] is also given expression on Chanuka and Purim.[68]

But this fulfillment of simcha is only half of the picture, since we may argue that it is only with regard to the kiyum of 'the days of your gladness' that Purim and Chanuka are equal. When it comes to the original kiyum of simcha, on the other hand, which is based on the concept of "ve-samachta be-chagekha," this applies only to Purim and not to the days of Chanuka.

Before we continue, we should define the scope of the mitzva of 've-samachta be-chagekha.' We generally assume that this pasuk applies only to the actual holidays, but we should consider the possibility that the scope of the mitzva - or at least its aspect of kiyum - extends further than that. As commented by R. Hillel Novetsky in the article quoted above, the Sefer Ha-Yir'im (siman 227) already extended the concept of 've-samachta be-chagekha' to include Rosh Chodesh:

And we also learn from here ("ve-samachta") that it is forbidden to mourn on Rosh Chodesh, and one is obligated to be happy on this day.[69]

R. Novetsky posits that we may also include other days, such as Purim, under the kiyum of 've-samachta be-chagekha,' since the concept of 'your festival' ('chagekha') is something which the Torah authorized the Sages to determine, i.e. which are the chagim and mo'adim.[70]

But it seems, once again, that this kiyum of 've-samachta be-chagekha' would apply to Purim but not to Chanuka. And we find in the gemara quoted above, "The Jews had light and simcha... 'simcha' refers to Yom Tov, as it says, 've-samachta be-chagekha.'"

The simcha of Purim is being compared with the principle of 've-samachta be-chagekha,' something which has no relationship to the institution of Chanuka. And it seems that this is the source of the difference between the obligation to have a seuda on Purim and the lack of such an obligation on Chanuka. The Rambam writes explicitly in his Hilkhot Yom Tov that part of the obligation of simcha based on 've-samachta be-chagekha' is the eating of Yom Tov meals, and it is interesting to note the Rambam's words:

And people eat meat and drink wine, for there is no simcha without meat and wine. And when he eats and drinks he is obligated to feed the stranger and the orphan and the widow, together with the other unfortunate poor.[71]

The Rambam uses almost exactly the same words to emphasize the obligation of the seuda and to list the hierarchy of priorities of the mitzvot of simcha on Purim:

But the simcha and the feast are only made on the fourteenth... What is the obligation of this seuda? He should eat meat and arrange a nice feast according to his means, and should drink wine to the point of drunkenness... and is obligated to distribute to the poor on the day of Purim.... It is preferable to give many presents to the poor rather than spending more on his feast or on mishloach manot. For there is no greater and grander simcha than to gladden the hearts of the poor and orphans and widows and strangers, for he who gladdens the heart of these unfortunates is compared to the Shekhinah.[72]

From the Rambam's language it is clear that for him, matanot la-evyonim is a part of the kiyum mitzva on Purim, and he presents that mitzva almost in the same light as he does the mitzva of simcha mi-de'oraita in chapter 6 of Hilkhot Yom Tov.

All this is applicable to Purim, but on Chanuka there is no obligation of a seuda or tzedakah, since these are based totally on "and you shall be glad on your festival, you and your son and your daughter and the stranger within your gates." On Chanuka there is only that aspect of simcha which expresses itself in the recitation of Hallel, and with no obligation of a seuda or tzedaka.

In addition to these points, we should note the position of the Sh'iltot[73] which holds that the laws of aveilut are nullified on Purim, and that Purim even cancels the seven days of aveilut. R. Meir of Rottenberg differs with this shita and holds that the seven days are not cancelled, and that the cancellation of aveilut applies only on Purim itself. This shita, which is brought down by the Rema,[74] emphasizes the difference in the concept of simcha on Chanuka as opposed to Purim. Such a concept has no source with regard to Chanuka, when the halakha - agreed upon unanimously - is that the laws of aveilut are observed on all of the eight days of the festival, whereas on Purim there are respected opinions which hold that aveilut is not observed, since it is a yom simcha. Particularly if we accept the assumption of the Rav zt"l,[75] that aveilut is not observed on Yom Tov - not for technical reasons but rather because of the conflict between the mitzva of simcha and the mitzva of sorrow and mourning which are two kiyumim shebalev - the fundamental difference between the simcha of Purim and that of Chanuka is clearly apparent.

IV - Conclusions

We have seen how although the institutions of Chanuka and Purim share many important similarities, they can also be seen as being based on fundamentally different issues. These conceptual differences are carried through by the Rishonim and Acharonim into practical consequences - nafka minot - into the realm of practical halakha, thereby illustrating a central tenent of the halakhic process: theoretical issues are not merely matters of intellectual curiosity. Rather, their consequences are of the utmost importance for our daily lives, even on the celebratory days of Chanuka and Purim. While we rejoice on these days, the halakha reminds us that we must always remember the exact basis for our celebrations.

Mitzvat Hallel:

A Halakhic Overview

by Rabbi Doniel Schreiber

A discussion on the topic of Hallel, it would seem, should not arise in the context of any one particular Yom Tov or chag. Rather, the recitation of Hallel, which is an obligation on many holidays, should be discussed only once in the general framework of tefilla, or should issue from an analysis of each relevant holiday. Nonetheless, Rambam[76] chose to couch his examination and definition of Hallel specifically in the framework of Chanuka. Why was this particular holiday chosen as the paradigm for the laws of Hallel? Moreover, Chanuka appears to be a poor choice for centering a presentation of hilkhot Hallel, as Chanuka is merely mi-divrei Soferim. Why not discuss Hallel in the context of a Biblical holiday?

The Rav zt"l, Maran Rabbi Joseph B. Ha-Levi Soloveitchik, addresses this question. He answers[77] that each Yom Tov has many aspects, but only one central motif. The central motif of Sukkot, for example, is not the arba minim, but the mitzva of living in the Sukka. Chanuka's central motif is the praise of God, and is synonymous with Hallel. Indeed, because Hallel is so basic to Chanuka, it acquires an added dimension and finds expression even within hadlakat ner Chanuka. It is not coincidental that the passage of "Ha-nerot ha-lalu," which explains the purpose of lighting ner Chanuka, states: "ke-dei le-hodot u-le'Hallel le-shimkha ha-gadol al nisecha...." It is for this reason that Masekhet Soferim[78] states that "Ha-nerot ha-la'lu" should be recited before lighting ner Chanuka. Thus, Hallel is not only expressed verbally, but also demonstratively in the form of hadlakat nerot. Therefore, explains the Rav, due to the centrality of Hallel to Chanuka, Rambam elected to discuss Hallel in its most appropriate location - Hilkhot Chanuka. With this in mind, as we gaze towards Chanuka, let us review some of the laws of Hallel.

I. Mekor Mitzvat Hallel

The Gemara states in Ta'anit:[79] "On eighteen days of the year the individual recites Hallel; and they are the eight days of Succot, the eight days of Chanuka, the first day of Pesach, and the Yom Tov of Shavuot."[80] According to the gemara,[81] this listing refers only to days on which we are obligated to recite the full Hallel, or Hallel shalem. The saying of half Hallel on Rosh Chodesh[82] and on the last day of Pesach,[83] however, are merely custom[84] - minhag avotey'hem be-yidey'hem[85] - and are thus excluded from the above listing.[86]

What is the nature of our obligation[87] to recite Hallel shalem on the specified eighteen days of the year? On the one hand, it would appear from the gemara in Ta'anit that Hallel is a mitzva min ha-Torah. This appears obvious from the gemara's differentiation between the listed days of Hallel and the Hallel of Rosh Chodesh - by declaring that Hallel on Rosh Chodesh is "lav mi-de'orayta," i.e. not min ha-Torah. Apparently, then, according to the gemara, Hallel on the enumerated days is min ha-Torah. On the other hand, the Gemara in Berakhot[88] explicitly says that Hallel is mi-derabanan. In the middle of the spectrum, Gemara Pesachim[89] states that it was the nevi'im who established the recitation of Hallel.

Indeed, due to this ambiguity, Geonim and Rishonim dispute whether Hallel is a mitzva min ha-Torah or merely rabbinic in nature. For example, Bahag[90] understands that the recitation of Hallel is min ha-Torah,[91] and therefore counts it in his minyan ha-mitzvot.[92] Rambam,[93] however, rules that Hallel is only a takanat chachamim.[94] A middle position may be attributed to Ra'avad, who understands that the recitation of Hallel is an obligation mi-divrei kabbala, i.e. ordained by the Prophets.[95] Another intermediary position is that of Ramban,[96] who only recognizes Hallel on the Mo'adim as min ha-Torah, whereas Hallel of Chanuka is only rabbinic.

Acharonim, as well, dispute the nature of the obligation to recite Hallel. Sha'agat Aryei[97] rules that Hallel is mi-derabanan, and therefore in cases of doubt we act leniently. Chatam Sofer,[98] however, opts for a middle position - one that is in direct contradistinction to the above Ramban - ruling that only Hallel established for physical salvation, such as for Chanuka, is min ha-Torah, whereas Hallel for Yom Tov is rabbinic. An alternative middle posture is taken by Netziv,[99] who rules that Hallel is Biblical only at the actual occurrence of the miracle, but is merely rabbinic in subsequent years. Another interesting intermediary position is taken by Maggid Mishneh,[100] who understands that according to Rambam, all Hallel is fundamentally mi-divrei Kabbala, in accord with the above gemara in Pesachim, but that saying Hallel at established times is rabbinic.[101]

II. Conditions for the Recitation of Hallel

The Gemara in Arachin[102] discusses why we are exempt from saying Hallel after the first day of Pesach, on Rosh Chodesh, Shabbat, Rosh Ha-shana, Yom Kippur, and Purim. In doing so, the gemara reveals the various conditions required for any day to obligate Hallel. According to the gemara, since the korbanot on Pesach are uniform and do not differ from day to day, as opposed to korbanot on Sukkot, only the first day of Pesach qualifies as a day for Hallel.[103] Shabbat, though distinguished by its korbanot, is not called a mo'ed, and thus it also does not warrant Hallel. Rosh Chodesh, which has korbanot and is called a mo'ed, does not prohibit melakha,[104]and thus it too does not qualify for an obligatory Hallel.[105] Rosh Ha'shana and Yom Kippur, which are characterized by korbanot, mo'ed, and isur melakha, do not require Hallel because Hallel is inappropriate on a day of judgment. Thus, in order for the obligation of Hallel to exist, the day must be one which is distinguished by its korbanot, is called a mo'ed, has isur melakha, and is not suffused with an atmosphere antithetical to Hallel - it must be a day of rejoicing.[106]

Three additional factors, which independently obligate the recital of Hallel, are raised in the context of Purim. Firstly, the gemara in Arachin[107] queries: "If Purim is distinguished by its miracles, like Chanuka, why does it not warrant Hallel?" Secondly, the Gemara in Megilla[108] justifies the obligation of mikra Megilla through a kal va-chomer: "If for being delivered from slavery to freedom (i.e. keriyat yam suf) we chant a hymn of praise (i.e. "az yashir Moshe"), should we not do so all the more for being delivered from death to life?" The gemara then asks: "If that is the reason, should we not also recite Hallel?"

In answer to the gemara's assertions, Amoraim in both Gemarot Arachin and Megilla explain that we do not recite Hallel on Purim either because the miracle occurred outside of Eretz Yisrael, or the reading of the Megilla is in place of Hallel,[109] or because we are still servants of Achashverosh. These Amoraim clearly accept in principle the gemara's assertions that either miracles, delivery from slavery to freedom, or physical salvation, obligate Hallel; it is only due to reasons unique to Purim that we do not recite Hallel. Moreover, these Amoraim embrace the idea that the obligation of Hallel does not differentiate between events - "miracles" or any form of salvation - which occur through supernatural or apparent and natural means. This equation is evident since the gemara in Arachin compares the supernatural miracle of ner Chanuka to the "natural" miracle of Purim, and the gemara in Megilla compares the supernatural salvation of keriyat yam suf to the "natural" salvation of Purim.[110]

What emerges from all these gemarot is that four different sets of conditions can trigger the obligation to recite Hallel. Either it must be a day which is:

1) distinguished by its korbanot, is called a mo'ed, and has isur melakha. Or, it must be a day that marks:

2) a miracle, such as Chanuka, or

3) delivery from freedom to slavery, or

4) the physical salvation of Bnei Yisrael.

In the first category, Hallel "flows from and further accents the kedushat ha-yom of the particular mo'ed as a special calendar day," but in the last three groups, Hallel relates specifically to a concrete event.[111]

III. The Scope of Mitzvat Hallel

Though we have identified four independent catalysts which obligate the recitation of Hallel, it remains unclear whether comparable events or similar occasions, subsequent to those listed in the gemara in Ta'anit, obligate us in Hallel today. A critical source in regard to this issue; which perhaps even expands and deepens the previous set of conditions, may be found in a gemara in Pesachim:[112]

Who originally recited Hallel?...The prophets among them ordained that Israel should recite it at every important epoch and at every misfortune - may it not come upon them - and when they are redeemed they recite it in gratitude for their redemption.

From this gemara, it would seem to follow that events involving salvation - even after the time of the gemara - should obligate the recitation of Hallel.[113] On the other hand, extreme caution must be exercised when applying this principle, for the Gemara states in Shabbat:[114] "He who reads Hallel every day blasphemes and reproaches the Divine Name." Although this warning does not prohibit additional days of Hallel, it certainly is cause for discretion when considering the various factors for an additional day of Hallel.

In conclusion, it is important to note the gemara in Sanhedrin[115] which severely criticizes Chizkiyahu ha-Melekh for not reciting Hallel in honor of God on the day marking the defeat of Sancheriv. According to the gemara, this failing lost him the crown of Melekh Ha-moshiach, and doomed us to an extended galut. Clearly, then, not only is failing to recognize chasdei Hashem a grave offense, but even neglecting to sing God's praises can have disastrous results.

May we merit not only the wisdom to identify God's kindness, both hidden and apparent, but also the basic trait of hakarat ha-tov, so that we may instinctively and spontaneously respond to chasdei Hashem, "ke-dei le-hodot u-le'Hallel le-shimkha ha-gadol, al nisecha, ve-al niflotekha, ve-al yeshu'otekha."

YESHIVAT HAR ETZION

ISRAEL KOSCHITZKY VIRTUAL BEIT MIDRASH (VBM)

*********************************************************

TALMUDIC METHODOLOGY

by Rav Moshe Taragin

The Function of the Temple Menora

The gemara in Shabbat (22a) recounts that the Chanuka candles may not be used during the time they are lit. The gemara cites the example of counting money by the light of the Chanuka candles as being prohibited. Several different explanations are provided for this prohibition. The Ba'al Hama'or asserts that our lit menorot correspond to the menora of the Beit Ha-Mikdash (Temple). Just as the oil in the Mikdash (which belonged to hekdesh, Temple property) was not to be used for non-hekdesh purposes, so our own oil, which is endowed with similar kedusha, may not be benefited from. This halakha is among several which indicate a halakhic (rather than merely conceptual) association between the menora we light and the one lit in the Mikdash. In light of this linkage, this article will analyze the menora of the Mikdash.

Three unique aspects of the menora immediately capture our attention:

1) The menora was built as "miksha" – fashioned from solid gold rather than from assembled parts.

2) The menora was decorated in a highly ornate fashion. The six arms of the menora which extended from the center were adorned with goblets, flowers and knobs.

3) The menora had to be built from a specified weight of gold. In general, vessels were manufactured from as much material as was practically necessary. In the case of the menora, a predefined weight of gold (one kikar's worth) was employed.

Why was the menora selected for these unique halakhot? A possible clarification might be provided by a gemara in Menachot (28a). The gemara maintains that these elements were necessary only if the menora was carved from gold – as was ideally envisioned. If gold was not available and the menora was made from other materials, then these three criteria (miksha, ornaments and specified weight) were no longer necessary. If, indeed, these elements constitute fundamental components/characteristics of the menora, why can they be waived if the menora is not made of gold?

If we comprehend the unique role filled by the menora, then perhaps the meaning of this gemara will be clearer. Rashi and the Ramban engaged in a famous debate about the purpose of building a Mishkan (Tabernacle). According to the latter, Moshe was informed about building a Mishkan AFTER the "egel" (Golden Calf) episode. According to this logic, had this tragedy not occurred, the Mishkan might not have been built. The primary purpose of the Mishkan was to facilitate the offering of sacrifices and the process of atonement. The Ramban disputes Rashi's position arguing that the command to build the Mishkan is recorded in Parashat Teruma BEFORE the egel occurred (Parashat Ki Tisa). Evidently, the notion of a house of God in which His Shekhina resides predates the egel. Similarly, the Mishkan's purpose transcends the specific needs of atonement. It is meant to house God's presence and incorporate the revelation at Har Sinai on a daily basis.

This question greatly impacts the role which the vessels of the Mikdash played. To Rashi, the vessels must primarily be seen as facilitating the various CEREMONIES of the Mishkan. To the Ramban, they should be seen in addition as the FURNITURE placed in this house to create the ambience of the House of God. To be sure, these roles do not have to be viewed as mutually exclusive. The Mikdash represents both the site for atonement ceremonies as well as a structure to house the Shekhina. Hence, the vessels served a dual function – to enable the Mikdash ceremonies as well as to adorn the House of God.

No vessel served this second function better than the menora. Unlike other vessels, the menora did not facilitate part of the formal Mikdash ceremony. According to some opinions, the lighting of the menora could even be performed by non-kohanim. The same cannot be said about placing the lechem ha-panim (showbread) on the shulchan (table), burning the spices, or sprinkling the blood upon the altar. If any vessel embellished and enhanced the Mikdash, it was clearly the menora. The Ramban himself (in his commentary to Beha'alotkha) writes that the menora served to beautify the house of God. To summarize: in general, the vessels of the Mikdash not only allowed ceremonies to be performed but also lent the Mikdash the ambience of a palatial residence. Particularly the menora, which was not primarily involved in formal 'Mikdash ceremony,' contributed to the beauty and majesty of the Mikdash.

We might return to the gemara in Menachot to better appreciate these dual roles. Indeed, the requirement of miksha, the addition of decorative enhancements to the arms of the menora and the stipulation of minimum weight all serve to heighten the menora's ornamental quality. These elements are only necessary, however, if the menora is made of gold. In this case, the menora indeed fulfills its role in enhancing the Mikdash. A menora fashioned from silver, however, is merely a utilitarian one - to enable lighting, and is stripped of its ornamental function. In such an instance, no minimum weight is required, no decorative additions are necessary and it can be assembled from different parts.

SUMMARY:

We have isolated two roles latent within the menora. Firstly, it functions as a candelabrum which facilitates the lighting ceremony. In addition, an ideal menora is the ornamental heart of the Mikdash. If the menora is made of less precious metals, it loses its second function and no longer demands 'decorative' requirements.

A second indication of the menora functioning as Mikdash furniture and not just the enabler of Mikdash ceremony can be seen in a gemara in Chagiga (26b). The gemara recounts that the kohanim were especially vigilant about impure people not touching the menora and the shulchan. If either of these vessels became impure, they would have to be removed from Mikdash for immersion. In such instance, the desired effect of 'tamid,' continuity, would be lost. The Torah (Shemot 25:30) employs the word 'tamid' to describe the functioning of the shulchan: the lechem ha-panim must ceaselessly rest on the shulchan. Interrupting this constancy to immerse an impure shulchan would nullify this condition. According to one position in the gemara, the same state is required of the menora (based on a comparison to shulchan). Tosafot question this application – after all, the menora was lit once a day and soon extinguished! How might we define the state of tamid in the case of the menora? Tosafot themselves attribute the potential tamid factor of menora to the "ner ma'aravi" which miraculously never extinguished. A different suggestion would view tamid of menora beyond the actual lighting ceremony. The menora constantly contributes to the ambience of the Mikdash even when not lit. Removing the menora to immerse it would cancel the continuous aesthetic value of the menora even if it would not cancel its practical lighting ceremony.

This perspective on the menora might assist in resolving a difficult halakha regarding the actual nerot. "Nerot" is the term the gemara employs to refer to the small receptacles in which the oil was contained and lit. Must these receptacles be fashioned as miksha as well, or can these bays be manufactured separately and affixed to the actual menora? These trays were an integral part of the menora! How might we understand the position that does not require their being miksha? More startling is the gemara's (Menachot 88b) association of this question with a seemingly unrelated one. The gemara contends that the question of miksha would depend on whether these bays were forged out of the kikar weight of gold for the menora. If they were also made from the kikar weight, then presumably miksha applied to them as well. If they were formed from additional gold beyond the kikar used for the actual menora, then the miksha rule would be suspended as well. How might we comprehend the debate of miksha and kikar-inclusion regarding these tarries of oil? More so, what is responsible for the linkage between these two seemingly unrelated factors?

We might respond as follows. The gemara is debating whether these trays – which facilitated lighting the menora - are also an integral part of the ornamental menora. One might imagine the menora serving as an aesthetic enhancer even without these small trays; their role was purely functional. If indeed these trays were not incorporated in the menora as an enhancer, then we would both suspend miksha and disassociate these parts from the kikar minimum. We have already proven that these requirements reflect the decorative menora and not the utilitarian one (a non-gold menora does not require miksha or kikar). We might draw similar conclusions about the trays of the menora.

A similar deconstruction of the menora can be suggested regarding the actual arms of the menora. In truth, these arms are not necessary from a utilitarian standpoint. One can imagine building 'shelves' radiating from the central stem and technically allowing the lighting of seven candles. Might we assume that these 'arms' were part of the ornamental menora and not the lighting menora? This question is raised by the gemara in Menachot (28a). The gemara suggests that just as flowers and goblets are only necessary if the menora is made from gold, similarly 'arms' should only be required if the menora was fashioned from gold. A menora made from other metals should not require arms. There could conceivably be other ways to create seven distinct 'lights.' The gemara rejects this notion and one might have expected the reasoning to be as follows: a menora without ornaments or without miksha is still a structurally valid menora for lighting. The absence of these elements eliminates the decorative effect. If the menora is not made from gold, a non-decorative menora is acceptable. By contrast, a menora without arms is not merely a non-decorative menora which may still facilitate lighting. It bears no resemblance to the basic structure of menora and cannot even be considered a lighting menora. Unlike miksha, kikar and arm ornaments, the arms themselves are a basic and elementary part of any menora.

Interestingly enough, the gemara's actual response seems to fall short of this expected answer. It responds that a menora without arms is a menora "pamut." Rashi interprets the word "pamut" as "menora ketana" – a small menora. Are to we infer from this interpretation that a menora without arms is still considered a halakhic menora, albeit a small one which is invalid for the Mikdash? Is a menora without arms still considered a menora? Why must we use a "menora gedola" (large menora) in the Mikdash? Especially when the menora is made of non-gold substances, why can't it be a miniature one?

May we merit the redemption of Yerushalayim, the rebuilding of the Mikdash, and the rekindling of the menorat zahav in the heikhal.

Publicizing the Miracle of Chanuka in Times of Danger

by Rav Yossi Slotnik

translated by Rav Eliezer Kwass

PIRSUM HA-NES

The main goal of lighting Chanuka candles is clearly publicizing the miracle of Chanuka, "pirsum ha-nes," and this theme dominates the laws of candle lighting. Candles are to be lit outside the house where passersby can see them, and at a time when there is traffic outside. Because of the importance of publicizing the miracle, Chanuka candles take precedence even over kiddush if a person is too poor to afford both. For the same reason, even one who is so poor that he does not have enough money to buy candles must borrow from others and light.

It is, therefore, natural that when the gemara tells us where to light candles in different situations, we assume that the rules are based on the same issue: how to maximize the publicity of the miracle.

"The Sages learn: The mitzva of Chanuka candles requires that they be placed on the outside of the door to one's house. One who lives above the ground floor should place them in a window facing the public thoroughfare. In times of danger it suffices to place them on the table." (Shabbat 21b)

Apparently, the beraita is presenting three levels of publicizing the miracle:

1. The ideal is to place them outside the door, where anyone passing by can see them;

2. if one has no door opening to the public thoroughfare, they should be placed in the window where, even though fewer people can see them, they are still visible to the public;

3. in times of danger, the mitzva should be publicized at least to the people inside the house.

We will focus on the specific situation of lighting indoors in times of danger. It would seem from the beraita that a person can fulfill the mitzva in its entirety by lighting indoors and publicizing it only to the people inside the house.

PROBLEMS

Though this is a plausible approach, certain comments made by Rishonim seem to indicate that the element of pirsumei nisa may be lacking when one lights inside the house:

1. The gemara (Shabbat 21b) rules: "The mitzva [of candle-lighting] is from sunset until the last people leave the marketplace." The gemara offers two possible explanations:

a. one can still light until this time; OR

b. one should light a quantity of oil that can last this long.

According to Tosafot (s.v. De-i), the first approach limits the time for candle lighting - one may light ONLY within this period but not afterwards. (However, this does not apply to those lighting in the house where it is not visible to outsiders. Since one is lighting only for his household, it follows that the time for lighting is determined by when they see the candles, not when the public does.) This is somewhat difficult to understand - if the goal is to MAXIMIZE publicizing the miracle, why should someone who missed the crucial time (in normal, non-dangerous circumstances) be completely exempt from the mitzva of neirot Chanuka? Surely he should be obligated to light later for his household! This seems to indicate that even the basic level of pirsumei nisa is lacking when one lights in the house.

[The Ritva quotes the Tosafot and adds that "after this time one should only light inside," since "not being able to publicize to outsiders does not absolve him from publicizing to himself and the people of his household." Our Tosafot, however, do not mention this and, apparently, argue.]

2. According to the second approach of the gemara, the statement "until the last people leave the marketplace" refers to the AMOUNT of oil (Rashi) one must kindle. There should be enough to last from sunset until the last people leave the marketplace. Should this apply to those lighting indoors in times of danger? Two possibilities present themselves:

a. this quantity is the standard amount for all candle lighting, even in times of danger; OR

b. the amount of required oil corresponds to those who will view the candles, and in times of danger this relates to the members of the household.

The Hagahot Maimoniot (Hilkhot Chanuka 4:2) takes the second approach and says that if the members of the household are to be up all night, one must put in enough oil for the chanukia to stay lit until morning. In contrast, the Mordekhai's opinion (Shabbat 266) is very striking and, ostensibly, problematic. He writes that the need for a minimum amount of oil applied only to earlier generations (who lit for passersby) and needed a great recognizable sign. However, we have no need to worry about this. In other words, those who light inside for the household need not light any particular amount of oil! [Since the publicity is only for the members of the household, a moment's lighting might be sufficient - after all, all those who must see the lights do.]

3. According to the approach we originally presented, there is always a need to publicize the miracle - in a way that is appropriate to the audience. Intuitively, though, the height at which the candles are placed should not be affected in times of danger.

The candles are to be placed within ten tefachim (handbreadths) of the ground (Shabbat 21b), apparently so it should be clear that they are Chanuka candles and not being used for some other purpose. Thus the prescribed height is a direct outcome of the need for pirsumei nisa. Once more, the Mordekhai (Shabbat 266) says something puzzling: "Now that people are accustomed to light inside, there is no problem with placing them any higher than ten tefachim because there is still publicity." If publicity is still attained above ten tefachim, why it so crucial to place the chanukia lower ten handbreadths when it is lit in public? Why should the height of the candles be connected to who the objects of publicity are - the members of the household or passersby on the street?

4. According to the gemara (Shabbat 22a), the candles are to be placed within a handbreadth of the door in order to indicate (as Rashi explains) that the owner of the house placed them there. Rav Meir Ha-ashkenazi (quoted by the Ritva) applies this halakha even to candles lit inside. However, the Ritva himself argues that now there is no need to light near the door. What is the Ritva's objection? Is there no longer any need to make it clear that the candles are Chanuka candles and, thereby, insure that the miracle will be publicized, if only to the members of the household?

I. PUBLICITY TO THE HOUSEHOLD

We might simply explain that in times of danger, when the sages shifted candle lighting to inside the home, the object of publicizing the miracle changed from the people on the street to the members of the household. All of the seeming lapses in publicizing the miracle are connected to the ease with which one can publicize the miracle to those in the home. There is no need to light the candles under ten handbreadths or within one handbreadth of the door, and the candles need not be lit a long time in order for those present to acknowledge the miracle. The Tosafot seem to indicate this also: "Nowadays we only have to show it to the people in the home because we light inside."

II. JUST LIGHTING

A slightly more radical approach, in line with a comment of the Rashba, would enable us to avoid speculating about subjective distinctions about how publicizing the miracle gets accomplished. Perhaps in times of danger the nature of the mitzva changes drastically. Maybe there is no longer a mitzva to publicize the miracle (just to a different audience, as we assumed earlier). Maybe the mitzva in times of danger is reduced to a bare requirement to LIGHT CANDLES, regardless of whether the miracle will be publicized or not.

The Rashba argues with the Tosafot (quoted earlier) about lighting candles in non-dangerous times after traffic on the street has stopped for the day. Tosafot say that after that point, there is no longer a mitzva to light candles. The Rashba (Shabbat 21a) argues:

"... It does not mean that after this time one should no longer light, for we learn that nocturnal mitzvot can be performed all night. Rather, he did not perform the mitzva in its proper fashion, for there is not so much publicity of the mitzva. However, afterwards, if he did not yet light he does not lose out on the mitzva; he just did not perform it in its entirety."

The Rashba seems to acknowledge that a level of the mitzva exists even when there is no publicity of the miracle. Mere lighting is a mitzva. Even if one might raise some doubts about whether the Rashba really goes that far, there is no other way to understand the Ra'avia (843). He holds that if one did not light at night, he should light during the day. During the day there is surely no publicity, because, "A candle accomplishes nothing in midday." There might be, then, a group of Rishonim who believe that there is a basic level of the mitzva that involves merely lighting. This would offer us a sweeping answer to all of our question - all requirements related to publicizing the miracle are waived in times of danger. Its placement, height, and proximity to the door are irrelevant, as is its duration - it may be lit and put out right away.

We have seen two basic approaches in understanding the role pirsumei nisa plays "in times of danger" when lighting is done indoors. The first approach understands that there is still an element of pirsumei nisa - but focused only on the household.

On the opposite extreme, the Rashba seems to hold that in times requiring indoor lighting, there is no aspect of pirsumei nisa at all.

In conclusion, we might offer a third understanding, a bit less radical than assuming that there is no pirsumei nisa at all.

III. PUBLICITY IN PRIVATE

The need to publicize a miracle also plays a central role in the mitzva of reading megillat Esther on Purim and drinking the four cups of wine on Pesach. Concerning both of them, the need to communicate the miracle to others is not emphasized as much as one might have imagined. Rav (Megilla 5a) rules that one does not need a minyan to read the megilla on Purim day itself (but he does need a minyan if he reads it earlier than Purim). Rashi explains that on the fourteenth, because all individuals are obligated on that day, it can be read without a minyan, for all are reading it and there is publicity. Mere reading itself publicizes the miracle, even if no one else hear, because it is known that all are reading the megilla on that day.

The same goes for drinking the four cups. The publicity of the miracle is accomplished simply through all those who are obligated individually drinking their cups of wine. There is no need to drink publicly.

Perhaps the mitzva of Chanuka candles is similar. In times of danger there is still a need to publicize the miracle, but it is a different type of publicity. In normal times, everyone publicizes the miracle to the people on the street. In times of danger, since all are obligated to light candles, the mere lighting publicizes the miracle, regardless of who sees the candles.

YESHIVAT HAR ETZION

ISRAEL KOSCHITZKY VIRTUAL BEIT MIDRASH (VBM)

**************************************************************

YHE-ABOUT: UPDATES AND SPECIAL MAILINGS

CHANUKA PACKAGE PART 2

She-assa Nissim La-avoteinu

by Rav Yair Kahn

I. One Who Sees Chanuka Candles

The gemara in Shabbat (23a) establishes that when lighting the Chanuka candles, one is required to recite two berakhot: "le-hadlik ner shel Chanuka" and "she-assa nissim la-avoteinu." However, if one merely sees candles which are lit, he is only obligated to recite one berakha - "she-assa nissim."

There is a debate among the commentaries regarding the exact circumstances under which one who sees Chanuka lights should recite "she-assa nissim." After all, it seems clear that if he has already recited the berakha during his own lighting, it would be unnecessary to repeat the berakha.

Rashi explains that the berakha is only recited by one who has not yet lit his own candles. The impression created by this position is that one should recite the berakha "she-assa nissim" upon seeing lit candles, even though he intends to eventually light himself (also see Rashi Sukka 46a and Or Zarua 325).

The Rashba argues, maintaining that one recites the berakha upon seeing lit candles only if he does not intend to light candles himself. However, if he does plan on eventually lighting, then he should not recite the berakha until his personal lighting.

The Ritva quotes two additional options. The first opinion is startling insofar as it requires that the berakha be recited when one sees lit candles, and later repeated when one lights his own. The second opinion claims that the individual has the option of reciting the berakha either upon seeing the candles, or later when he lights. In order to appreciate the rationale of this argument, let us first analyze the nature of the berakha "she-assa nissim la-avoteinu."

[Regarding the pesak, see OC 676:3, Mishna Berura 6.]

II. The Berakha "She-assa Nissim La-avoteinu"

The fact that we recite "she-assa nissim" when seeing the Chanuka candles and not only when lighting would seem to indicate that the berakha is not necessarily related to the act of the mitzva per se. In other words, we can seemingly conclude that we are not dealing with a birkat ha-mitzva. Rather, "she-assa nissim" appears to be a birkat ha-shevach - a berakha of praise. We are required to praise Hashem for the miracles which our fathers experienced. The object which generates this obligation, in our case, is the Chanuka candle, which commemorates the miracle. Therefore, the berakha is recited when we encounter the Chanuka candles, either while lighting or upon seeing them.

This understanding is consistent with the opinion that when lighting the berakha of "she-assa nissim" is recited following the act of the mitzva. However, both the Ritva and the Meiri cite opinions which require that "she-assa nissim" be recited before the lighting ("oveir la-asiyatan"). [See OC 676:2, Mishna Berura 4.] Apparently, these opinions view "she-assa nissim" as a birkat ha-mitzva, which therefore must be recited before the act of the mitzva. If, "she-assa nissim" were to be considered a birkat ha-shevach, it would constitute an illegitimate break (hefsek) between the birkat ha-mitzva (le-hadlik) and the mitzva of lighting.

To resolve the problem, we may suggest that "she-assa nissim" has a dual nature. When recited upon seeing the candles, it functions only as a birkat ha-shevach. However, when recited within the context of the act of the mitzva of lighting, it functions as a birkat mitzva as well, and must therefore be recited "oveir la-asiyatan" - before the performance of the mitzva.

An alternate approach is to maintain that "she-assa nissim" is indeed a birkat ha-mitzva, however, the mitzva at hand is not the lighting as such, but rather the mitzva of publicizing the miracle (pirsumei nissa), which is accomplished through the lighting. Even one who does not actually light, but sees the Chanuka candles, participates in the mitzva of pirsumei nissa.

At this juncture, we can return to the controversy regarding the berakha upon seeing the candles. If we categorize "she-assa nissim" as a birkat ha-shevach, which is generated by an encounter with the Chanuka candles, then there is no clear preference in lighting as opposed to viewing. Rashi's opinion that one can recite the blessing even before he has lit his own candles can therefore be understood. Likewise, we can thus explain the position quoted by the Ritva, that one has the option to recite the berakha immediately upon seeing the candles or to wait for the actual lighting. The second opinion quoted by the Ritva which maintains that one should recite the berakha immediately upon seeing the candles, and then repeat the berakha when lighting, apparently understood that "she-assa nissim" has a dual nature. In other words, it is both a birkat ha-mitzva as well as a birkat ha-shevach. Therefore, when one recites the berakha upon seeing the candles, he has only fulfilled the component of shevach. Consequently, when he lights his own candles, he repeats the berakha in order to fulfill the additional aspect of birkat ha-mitzva.

The Rashba, as cited above, argued that if one plans to light personally, one should not recite the berakha upon seeing the candles at all. We can explain this position in one of two ways. The Rashba may agree that the berakha is a birkat ha-shevach. However, it may be preferable, if possible, to recite this shevach in the primary way which was legislated by the Rabbis, i.e., within the context of lighting. Alternately, the Rashba may perceive "she-assa nissim" as a birkat ha-mitzva of pirsumei nissa. Although, through seeing the candles one may have some limited fulfillment of this mitzva, nevertheless, since the mitzva of pirsumei nissa actually obligates one to light one's own candles, it would thereby be preferable to recite this berakha within the context of one's own lighting.

III. Where there are no Chanuka candles to be seen

A person traveling on Chanuka may find himself in a situation where there are no Chanuka candles to be seen. In a case where the individual has fulfilled the mitzva of lighting (for instance his wife lit for him at home), what should he do regarding the berakha of "she-assa nissim?"

The Rashba maintains that there is no necessity to recite "she-assa nissim," since he already fulfilled his requirement. Apparently, the Rashba views "she-assa nissim" as a birkat ha-mitzva on the mitzva of pirsumei nissa. Since he already fulfilled the mitzva (through the lighting that was done for him), there is no added significance in subsequently seeing lit candles. Therefore, there is no reason to recite the berakha. If, on the other hand, "she-assa nissim" is to be viewed as a birkat ha-shevach, then one should be obligated to personally praise Hashem, even after he fulfilled the obligation of lighting.

There are those who argue that one should recite the berakha upon seeing lit candles, even if he already fulfilled his lighting requirement by proxy. However, in our case, where there are no candles to be seen, he may be exempt from the berakha of "she-assa nissim" due to the extenuating circumstances (there are no Chanuka candles to be found).

Nevertheless, some (see Riaz) actually rule that although he has already fulfilled his obligation of lighting, he is nonetheless obligated to light his own candles, thereby artificially creating Chanuka candles which he can then view. According to this opinion, which maintains that one must light candles for the sole purpose of seeing them, it is reasonable that he would not be obligated to recite the berakha "le-hadlik." After all, he already fulfilled his obligation to light the candles. Rather, he should light the candles without a berakha, and then upon seeing these candles recite "she-assa nissim." However, from the Mordechai (267) it would appear that he is required to recite "le-hadlik" as well. A quick look at a Ramban in Pesachim may help clarify this somewhat puzzling opinion.

There is a discussion at the beginning of Pesachim (7b) regarding the exact wording of birkot ha-mitzva. According to the Ramban, the gemara concludes that on mitzvot which can be fulfilled via a shaliach (agent), the term "al" should be used. Therefore, the berakha to be recited before the mitzva of circumcision is "al ha-mila," since the father can fulfill his obligation through the mohel. For mitzvot which must be fulfilled personally, such as tefillin, the prefix "le" ("le-haniach tefillin") is used. The Ramban therefore questions the use of the prefix "le" regarding the berakha of Chanuka candles. After all, one can fulfill the mitzva by proxy!

The Ramban suggests the following answer: Since one who merely sees Chanuka candles is also obligated to recite the berakha, and one has an obligation to see (the candles) because of pirsumei nissa, Chazal chose the format of "le."

At first glance this argument of the Ramban is nonsensical. The berakha one recites when seeing the candles is "she-assa nissim." Therefore, the obligation to see the candles should have no relevance with regard to the berakha recited when lighting, which can be accomplished by proxy (see the note of Rav Isser Zalman Melzer).

Apparently, the Ramban felt that the obligation to light candles is a complex one. It contains both the independent act of lighting, as well as the obligation to see the candles. This second aspect of lighting obligates one to light the candles purely for the purpose of seeing them. In other words, enabling the viewing of the candles is a component of the mitzva to light. Since this obligation to see the candles is a personal one which cannot be accomplished through a shaliach, therefore, the lighting itself contains a personal element. Consequently, Chazal chose the format "le" for the berakha of lighting.

In our case, one already fulfilled his independent obligation to light (via proxy). Nevertheless, according to our understanding of the Ramban, he is still obligated to "light" in order to see. This obligation to light generates the birkat ha-mitzva "le-hadlik."

IV. An Independent Berakha on the Day

Let us return to our case, where one fulfilled the mitzva of lighting but found no Chanuka candles to enable the berakha of "she-assa nissim." The Rashba maintains that there is no need to recite the berakha, since he has fulfilled his requirement through the lighting at home. The Mordechai and Ramban argue that there remains a personal requirement to see the candles. [See OC 677:3 which seems to contradict the halakha in 676:3, the Chafetz Chaim raises this issue, M.B. 14.]

The Meiri raises a third possibility. He rules that if no candles are to be seen, then the person should independently recite the berakha without seeing the candles. Apparently, he feels that a person is not obligated to see the candles, but rather to recite the berakha. Seeing the candles is merely the context within which the berakha is normally recited.

This notion is supported by the She'iltot. Rav Achai Gaon discusses the obligation to recite "she-assa nissim" within the context of the general obligation to praise Hashem (generally through Hallel) at points in time when the Jewish people were saved through miracles. He also discusses the obligation to recite a berakha when one encounters a place in which a miracle took place. Finally, he concludes that we are therefore required to recite "she-assa nissim" on Chanuka and Purim. The impression created by the Ba'al Ha-She'iltot, is that there is an independent obligation generated by the day, to praise Hashem by reciting the berakha of "she-assa nissim." True, this requirement is normally fulfilled within the context of the Chanuka candles, either while lighting or seeing. Nevertheless, it is essentially an independent obligation to praise Hashem, not to see the candles.

As for one who heard the berakha of "she-assa nissim" but did not actually see candles, the Ra'a maintains that he is still required to see the candles and recite she-assa nissim" (see Chidushei Ha-Ran). The Orchot Chaim, on the other hand, argues that since he heard the berakha, he has already fulfilled this requirement.

If we maintain that the obligation is the berakha itself, then the position of the Orchot Chaim can be understood. Since he heard the berakha, he has fulfilled his requirement. However, if one is required to actually see the candles in order to fulfill his personal obligation of pirsumei nissa, then it is reasonable to demand that one actually see the candles despite having already heard the berakha.

Summary:

The gemara rules that one who sees the Chanuka candles should recite the berakha "she-assa nissim." We offered three interpretations of this halakha:

1. "She-assa nissim" is a berakha on the mitzva of pirsum ha-nes. One who views the Chanuka candles participates in this mitzva, and therefore recites the berakha.

2. "She-assa nissim" is a birkat ha-shevach generated by involvement in the Chanuka candles (lighting or seeing), and the miracle they commemorate.

3. The days of Chanuka themselves demand shevach. The berakha "she-assa nissim" is a fulfillment of this obligation. Although normally recited within the context of the Chanuka candles, in the absence of the candles it should be recited nonetheless.

**************************************************************

BE SURE TO VISIT THE "VIRTUAL CITY OF JERUSALEM"

WWW.VIRTUAL.CO.IL

**************************************************************

VISIT YHE'S WEB SITE:

HTTP://WWW.VIRTUAL.CO.IL/EDUCATION/YHE

**************************************************************

To subscribe send e-mail to: listproc@virtual.co.il: subject:(leave blank or type word 'subscription'), on first line of text type: sub yhe-about <your full name> .

For a complete list of YHE Virtual Beit Midrash curriculum, send e-mail to: listproc@virtual.co.il:, on first line of text type: info yhe-about .

**************************************************************

Shiurim may be dedicated to various occasions - yahrzeits, semachot, birthdays, etc. Please e-mail yhe@virtual.co.il for an application.

YESHIVAT HAR ETZION

Israel koschitzky VIRTUAL BEIT MIDRASH

ALON SHEVUT, GUSH ETZION 90433

E-MAIL: YHE@virtual.CO.IL or office@etzion.org.il

"Regarding Matters of Sanctity, We Ascend"

by Rav Meir Spiegelman

Translated by David Silverberg

The Two Mitzvot of Chanuka

"Our Rabbis taught: The precept of Chanuka [demands] one light for each person and his household... as for the extremely zealous, Beit Shammai maintains: on the first day eight lights are lit and thereafter they are gradually reduced; but Beit Hillel maintains that on the first day one light is lit and thereafter they are progressively increased... One opinion maintains: the reason of Beit Shammai is that [the number of lights] shall correspond to the days still to come, and that of Beit Hillel is that it shall correspond to the days which have passed; but another maintains: Beit Shammai's reason is that it shall correspond to the bullocks of the festival; while Beit Hillel's reason is that regarding [matters of] sanctity we ascend but do not descend." (Shabbat 21b)

While the gemara provides the basis for the 'mehadrin' performance of the mitzva, it does not explain why the basic mitzva is fulfilled with only one candle, nor does it state the reason for adding an additional candle each day. Even if we assume that in this case the principle of "ma'alin ba-kodesh" (regarding holy matters we ascend) is applicable (which for some reason is not practiced with the bullocks of the festival), there is still no explanation as to why we may not light one or eight candles each day, and simply avoid "descending in holiness". One could suggest that a unique halakha was stated here that one must ascend in sanctity and not remain static, thereby deeming it unacceptable to light the same number of candles each day. However, this expansion of ma'alin ba-kodesh is difficult to accept.[116]

The Mitzva of Lighting in the Temple

When the Hasmoneans entered the Temple and found the decanter of oil, they had two options (we assume they were unaware of the impending miracle and assumed that within eight days there would be new oil):

A. Light all the candles on the first day thereby consuming all of the oil.

B. Divide the oil into eight parts and light one candle each day.

To determine whether this second option was indeed a legitimate possibility, two questions must be addressed:

1. Is it acceptable to fulfill the mitzva of lighting the menora in the Temple with only one candle?

2. Even if we assume that it is possible to fulfill the commandment with one candle, it is plausible that there may be an additional aspect (kiyum) of the mitzva which can only be fulfilled by lighting all seven candles of the Temple menora? This would have deemed it necessary to light all the candles on the first day, even though the mitzva of lighting may not have been fulfilled at all for the next seven days.

Let examine some of the verses in the Torah which relate to the lighting of the menora in the Temple:

A. "...and its lamps shall be lit so that they shine towards its center." (Shemot 25:35)

B. "...to bring you clear illuminating oil, made from hand-crushed olives, to keep the lamp constantly burning. Aaron and his sons shall arrange for [the lamps to burn] from evening until morning..." (Shemot 27:20-21)

C. "...instruct the Israelites to bring him clear illuminating oil from hand-crushed olives to keep the lamp burning constantly. Aaron shall light [the lamp] constantly with [this oil]. [It shall burn] before God, from evening to morning, outside the cloth partition in the Communion Tent ... He shall constantly kindle the lamps on the pure [gold] menora before God." (Vayikra 24:2-4)

D. "... When you light the lamps, the seven lamps shall illuminate the menora. Aaron did that ... The menora was made of a single piece of beaten gold..." (Bamidbar 8:2-4).

Almost instantly, one notices a sharp difference between the various imperatives. The second commandment (B) contains no reference whatsoever to the menora. Instead, there is a commandment to raise a "ner tamid" (eternal light) in the Temple. This point is especially apparent when compared to the third passage (C), where the passage is very similar in its presentation and vocabulary, yet an additional phrase is added at the end - "on the pure menora ...." The lighting of the ner tamid which was commanded earlier is specific to the menora. We can conclude from this that there is an imperative to light a ner tamid in the Temple. This ner tamid is not intrinsically connected to the menora upon which it is lit. Rather, a menora is simply the most appropriate place to light a ner tamid.

The commandment in A, however, is quite different. There is a commandment to make a menora as one of the Temple's vessels. Integral to the menora are the candles, because a menora by definition requires candles. Therefore, the obligation of the candles stems purely from the commandment of making the menora[117]. Based on this analysis, we may explain a number of halakhot which are related to the menora. We shall mention three of them:

"Ner Tamid" vs. "Menora"

1. In D, the process of making the menora is described. Here, we may suggest that the commandment to light the candles was placed among the general laws of the menora, because the general commandment is indeed to make the menora, and subsequently to light candles. This is the first time Aaron is commanded to perform this act of lighting[118].

2. There are places where the Torah employs a singular tense - "ner" (candle) and other places where the Torah uses the plural. When the Torah refers to the commandment of ner tamid, the reference is quoted in the singular, since the focus of ner tamid is the lighting of only one candle (sources B-C). When the reference is to the candles as a part of the menora, the reference is in the plural - each candle assumes an independent obligation.

3. One candle assumed a special status: the western candle. If there is a commandment to light seven candles, it is unclear as to how the western candle received a special status. Furthermore, what was the nature and significance of this status? According to what we discussed earlier, the issue is clear. The western candle represented the ner tamid. The halakha of the ner tamid, in its essence, is a halakha mandating that a candle remain lit through the night ("from dusk to dawn"). The candles lit fulfilling the mandate of "menora" are specific to the day[119]. Even those Rishonim who are of the opinion that some of the candles must burn all day and all night derive this from the commandment which is mentioned regarding ner tamid in conjunction with the menora (C); an idea which is not mentioned in the first commandment which only describes the general obligation of a ner tamid (B)[120].

If we now study the commandments in the Torah, we shall see that each commandment contributes an additional element to our understanding of the menora.

A. The menora requires candles.

B. There is a need for one candle in the Temple to burn through the night.

C. The candle which burns through the night must be on the menora. Some opinions maintain that it should burn through the day as well.

D. The lighting of the candles which is commanded in A must be performed by Aaron.

The Two Miracles of Chanuka = Two Mitzvot of Chanuka

The Hasmoneans who entered the Temple found enough oil to last one day. This oil was enough to burn for the equivalent of eight candles for one day. (Six candles were lit at night and one candle during the day as well. Generally, when the western candle is extinguished, it is necessary to relight it in the morning. The Rashba notes a subsequent need for a double portion of oil). The menora, as all vessels in the Temple, received its standing as a keli sharet (vessel of service) only after its initiation. This initiation is accomplished by lighting seven candles on the menora. The Hasmoneans preferred not to initiate the menora with all the candles, for then they would have no candles the second day, thereby causing them to fail in performing a positive commandment (mitzvat aseh).

In a case where the menora has not been initiated, the situation is different. In this instance, we are not required to light those candles whose obligation stems purely from the fulfillment of the commandment to have a menora. Subsequently, the Hasmoneans lit one candle at night which is the commandment of source B. Without an initiated menora there was also no requirement of day and night for the ner tamid, because this commandment was only applicable once the menora is designated as the location of lighting. Therefore, the core obligation was to light only one candle per day.

The essence of the miracle was that the candle burned for a full day (24 hours), which is the "standard miracle" in the Temple. This showed that the Almighty was pleased with their actions. The uniqueness of the miracle was the recognition that the status of the Temple had once again returned to its original pure state. The fact that the candle burns day and night reflects a divine recognition that the menora, although not initiated, is considered a complete menora, thereby denoting God's approval of the Hasmoneans' actions.

Perhaps the daily addition of candles was to commemorate an additional miracle. Being that this miracle was far less important than the other, it was not strictly mandated for all.

The oil at the end of each day did not run out. Subsequently, they could in fact have lit two candles on the second day and so on and so forth every day. The initiation of the menora was on the seventh day. The eighth day was the day when the Temple began to function in its normal routine, as we find on the eighth day of consecration (milu'im). This day was also characterized by the fact that all candles burnt by miracle. Therefore this day symbolized the synthesis in the Temple, for outwardly it appeared to function normally; however, its entire existence was based on a miracle.

Are These Candles Indeed Holy?

Chanuka Today and the Temple Menora

By Rav Binyamin Tabory

Translated and adapted by Rav Eliezer Kwass

After lighting the Chanuka candles, it is customary to say "Ha-neirot halalu" ("These candles"). (Some have the custom to recite this after lighting the first candle, while the rest are being lit.[1]) The text declares, "These candles are holy, and we are not permitted to use them, but only to look at them."

Is this actually the case? The gemara (Shabbat 22a) relates directly to this issue:

"Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav Assi: It is forbidden to count coins by the light of the Chanuka candles. When I cited this to Shmuel, he asked me, 'Is there holiness in these candles?' ...[Rather, the reason for the prohibition is] so that the commandments should not be denigrated in his eyes."

While the gemara does conclude that we are not permitted to use the Chanuka candles for a purpose other than the mitzva, for example, for counting coins, it explicitly states that it is NOT because of their holiness! In this shiur, we will attempt to explore the meaning of the expression, "These candles are holy," and discuss how it manifests itself in five matters relating to the mitzva of candle lighting.

1. The Lighting

In the beginning of parashat Beha'alotkha, the Ramban quotes the Midrash Tanchuma: "Why does the section in the Torah about the menora (candelabra) directly follow the description of the sacrifices brought by the heads of the tribes at the dedication of the Tabernacle?" He elaborates on this midrash, explaining that Aharon the High Priest was upset that all the heads of the tribes, except himself, merited participation in the dedication of the altar. God consoled Aharon by telling him that though they merited dedicating the altar, he will merit lighting the candles and tending to the menora daily. Furthermore, while the dedication of the altar remains in effect only as long as the Temple stands, the lighting of the candles of the menora lasts forever.

The obvious question is: didn't the lighting of the candles of the menora cease when the Temple was destroyed, just as the sacrifices were no longer brought? The Ramban responds that the candles referred to are the Chanuka candles, which we light as the result of the actions of Aaron's descendants, the Hasmonean priests.

It is evident from this Ramban that the entire institution of Chanuka candles is a continuation of the candle lighting in the Temple. In other words, the Sages decreed that every Jew should light a Temple-like candle in his home. This opens up the possibility that the holiness of the menora in the Temple lives on through the Chanuka candles.

2. The Berakha

The connection between the Temple menora and Chanuka candles arises again in the Raavad's approach to the blessing over the Chanuka lights. Attempting to establish rules for the different formulations of the blessings on commandments, the Raavad (Hilkhot Berakhot 11:15) suggests that while blessings for rabbinic commandments should be "al mitzvat..." (concerning the commandment of...), the blessing over the Chanuka candles should remain an exception. We should still say "lehadlik ner..." ("to light the candles..."), because this was the blessing recited over the candle lighting in the Temple. The Sages modeled this mitzva of rabbinic origin on a mitzva of Biblical origin. Once again, the Chanuka candles are viewed as a continuation of the candles lit in the Temple.

3. Placing vs. Lighting

A precise definition of the mitzva itself might be influenced by this issue. The gemara, sifting through a long list of proof texts, raises the question of whether the basic obligation of Chanuka candles involves lighting the candles, or placing them in their proper place. It is logical to say that the mitzva is fulfilled through the placing of the candles, for, by that means, the miracle is publicized. Why, then, might the lighting of the candles be considered the essential mitzva?

Rashi (Shabbat 22b) explains, "We light as we did in the Temple" (2). Here, too, we see that the Chanuka candles are modeled after the Temple's candles.

4. Use

The sugya with which we opened (Shabbat 21a) deals with legitimate uses of the Chanuka candles. While the gemara concludes that it is not permissible to use the candles for such activities as "counting coins," the Rishonim still dispute whether the candles can be used for purposes related to a mitzva. Other Amoraim apparently disagreed with Shmuel's understanding of the prohibition ("so that the commandments should not be denigrated in his eyes"). Two reasons to not use the candles are found in the Rishonim (3):

A. It must be made clear that the candles are candles of mitzva (see Rashi 21b). This is a normal caution to be taken with all objects used for a mitzva.

B. "Since the mitzva was instituted because of a miracle that happened through the menora in the Temple, they made the Chanuka candles to be like the menora, which could not be used at all" (see the Ran on the Rif 9a). A more precise explanation appears in the Ba'al Hamaor: "He who maintains that it is forbidden to use the light of the Chanuka candles ... because he believes that since they are in remembrance of the candles and the oil of the Temple..." The Meiri, who relates the ban on use of the candles to the Temple's menora, explores the possibility that use of the oil of the Chanuka lights is prohibited even after the time of the mitzva; there may be an "issur hana'a" (prohibition of benefit) and "kedusha gemura," a status of real holiness.(4)

From this sugya, one could say that not only was the mitzva instituted as an expansion of the candles of the Temple, but also that the prohibition of using the light of the candles is because of the fact that "These candles are holy." Rabbi Sperber (see note 1) even suggests that the reciting of "Ha-neirot Halalu" was instituted to demonstrate this relationship.

5. Synagogue

Although lighting in the synagogue is not mandated by law (because the obligation only applies to a private home), there is an ancient custom to do so.(5) Though some had reservations about reciting a berakha (blessing) on this lighting, it became the accepted practice to light in the synagogue with a berakha. "This custom arose because the miracle happened in the Temple (mikdash beit olamim), and we do likewise in the synagogue - the miniature Temple (Mikdash me'at) - in the Diaspora" (Sefer Ha-manhig, p. 105).

The question of where to place the Synagogue's menora, therefore, is also connected to a dispute between Tannaim regarding how the candles were lit in the Temple. Even the custom of lighting in the synagogue in the morning is based, according to Rabbi Shlomo of Vilna (in his Binyan Shlomo, section 53), on the Rambam's opinion that the candles were lit every morning in the Temple.

SUMMARY

The mitzva of lighting Chanuka candles can be seen as a continuation of the mitzva of lighting the menora in the Temple in Jerusalem. This manifests itself in the text of the berakha, the nature of the mitzva, the prohibition of using the candles for a purpose other than the mitzva, and the custom of lighting in the synagogue.

The halakha tells every Jew to take the candles of the Temple (Mikdash) and light them in his private house. Not only is the synagogue a "miniature Temple" (a Mikdash me'at), but the goal of this mitzva is to transform every home into a Mikdash me'at. In truth, these candles are holy - "ha-neirot halalu kodesh hem."

NOTES

(1) See Shulchan Arukh OC 676 and Mishna Berura note 8. For the source of this custom and for a clarification of the text, see Rabbi Prof. Daniel Sperber's Minhagei Yisrael Mekorot Ve-toldot vol. 1, pp. 162-164. This has been updated in Vol. 5.

(2) See the Minchat Chinukh, Mitzva 98, which deals with the Rambam's approach to the concept "Lighting is the essential mitzva" with regard to the menora in the Temple.

(3) See the Ba'al Ha-maor and the Ramban (9a in the Rif), where differences between the two reasons are discussed. See also Shulchan Arukh and commentaries OC 673:1.

(4) See Minhagei Yisrael ibid., p. 165, where he cites the discussion among the poskim about this point.

(5) Rav Zevin, in his Ha-mo'adim Ba-halakha, p. 170. All the sources regarding this question are found there.

Jewish Monarchy

By Rav Moshe Taragin

Part I: Kingship and Dynasty

One of the often overlooked motifs of Chanuka is the concept of malkhut - monarchy. The Rambam (Hilkhot Chanuka 3:1) points out that aside from the military victory, the miracle of the oil, and the re-purification of the Temple, Chanuka marked the miracle of restoration of Jewish monarchy (if only briefly). This article will explore a central question regarding Jewish malkhut.

The Rambam (Sefer Ha-mitzvot 173) and many other list the mitzva of appointing a king as a positive commandment. (This in itself is subject to dispute - see Afterword.) The Chinukh (mitzva 497) agrees with the Rambam, and adds a startling comment. He believes that minui ha-melekh (appointing a king) is a mitzva which applies in all generations - a position which elicits wonderment from the later commentators. Indeed, the Rambam himself cites the Sifri teaching that monarchy is automatically passed from father to son! Certainly, then, since David was already anointed and his line of succession has been interrupted, there can be no future scenario wherein the fulfillment of this mitzva could arise. Thus, appointing a king cannot be considered an eternal mitzva!

The Chinukh himself recognizes this question and solves the problem by radically broadening the scope of the mitzva of minui melekh. Though his position is fascinating, it is not our focus here. Instead, we will assume a more narrow understanding of minui melekh in our attempt to deal with the aforementioned question: how can we classify the mitzva of appointing a king as eternal if the dynasty automatically passes from father to son?

What is the necessary methodology in order to approach this question? First, we must make a closer inspection of the issue of malkhut. Moreover, we will isolate TWO dimensions to malkhut - one which indeed is hereditary and one which requires a formal act of appointment.

This multi-faceted nature of malkhut can be glimpsed by examining two disparate passages in the Talmud Yerushalmi.

The Yerushalmi in Rosh Hashana (1:1) asserts that David did not retain the status of king during the six months he was on the run from Avshalom and his mutinous crew. Hence, had he sinned during that period, David would have offered the standard "chatat" sacrifice of an ordinary man rather than the special "chatat" which a king is obligated to bring. This implies that, lacking a national consensus, David temporarily lost his status as king (see Afterword).

If so, we might expect that the status automatically transferred to his rival - Avshalom. Yet, the Yerushalmi in Sanhedrin (2:1) does not concur. It maintains that since Avshalom captured David's concubines, David was not allowed to return to them after reassuming the throne. The Yerushalmi explains: a utensil which was exploited by a common man (hedyot) is now considered unfit for royal use. Hence, Avshalom was not considered a king during these six months despite the popular support he enjoyed. If Avshalom wasn't king and David wasn't king - who was the king?

The answer to this question lies in differentiating between two aspects of malkhut. There is clearly a concept of royalty as it relates to an individual. In classical "lomdish" language, this would correspond to the "gavra" of a king. He has certain laws which relate to him, and to us: if he sins he brings a special sacrifice; he has a special prohibition against taking too many wives and acquiring too many horses in his entourage; he must write a second Sefer Torah; we must fear him. Basically, all the laws enumerated in parashat Shoftim apply to someone who is considered as an individual to be king.

There is, however, a second dimension. Another concept of malkhut exists: a dynasty which passes through the generations as a political institution which continues independently of any particular monarch who may come from that dynasty. For example, the Tudor dynasty was an independent political entity which happened to be represented by various kings in particular eras. Thus, the king and the dynasty he represents are NOT the same. When Yaakov, in parashat Vayechi, awards dynasty to Yehuda, he is referring to malkhut - the chain of royalty, and not to any particular king.

So with regard to David and Avshalom, during those six months there might not have been any individual occupying the office of king. As such, neither David nor Avshalom would bring a special chatat sacrifice. However, though there was no king, there certainly was an enduring "malkhut Beit David" (Davidic dynasty) which lasted through the mutiny and through the suspension of David's particular status as king. Thus, malkhut can exist independently of the melekh and even when there is no melekh.

Returning to our original question regarding appointment, the same division applies. When the Rishonim discuss the inherited nature of kingship, they are clearly referring to malkhut: royal dynasty passes from father to son. However, a PERSON does not actually become a KING until he is officially appointed. In fact, the source for the hereditary nature of monarchy - the Sifri - reads as follows: "If the father dies, APPOINT his son in his place." The very source for the hereditary nature of malkhut demands a formal appointment process. Even though the child inherits the dynasty and the institution of malkhut, he isn't personally considered a KING until he has an official appointment. Until then, he is merely the king-designate.

We find two halakhic confirmations of this principle that even an individual who is designated to be king through the laws of inheritance is not officially considered the king until he is formally appointed. First, the gemara in Rosh Hashana (2b) discusses the manner in which contracts are dated based upon the year of the king's reign. The gemara deliberately informs us that if the king is only appointed after Nissan, even though he was already selected during the previous year, we can only date our document as "in the first year of so-and-so's reign." Evidently, though he had already wrapped up the nomination, he cannot be officially considered king, and the era of his reign does not commence until he is formally appointed.

Similarly, we notice a parallel situation in Horayot (10a) where the mishna outlines the special chatat sacrifice which a king brings if he sins. The mishna compares this with the special sacrifice a kohen gadol (high priest) brings if he sins. In either case, the mishna determines, if they had sinned before they were appointed and then were appointed - they bring a "commoner's" sacrifice; they bring the special sacrifice only if they sinned after their official appointments. This mishna bears witness, as well, that the official status as a GAVRA of melekh is only conferred by official appointment.

INTERIM SUMMARY: Indeed, malkhut (in the sense of dynasty) passes through inheritance, but that doesn't obviate the need for a formal appointment process to confer the personal status of a particular king and the various halakhot which are dependent upon that status. We were able to detect these dual strata by carefully reading two passages in the Yerushalmi.

If indeed there are two distinct planes to monarchy - the personal status of king and the institutional entity of royal dynasty - we might expect differences in the way each is generated. In other words, their different essences might be reflected in the differing manner in which they are each originated. Indeed, a process of minui (appointment) is necessary both to generate malkhut, as well as to designate a melekh. But as the processes are triggering dissimilar entities, there should be incongruities between them. A careful inspection provides three such discrepancies.

1. Who performs the appointment?

The Rambam (Hilkhot Melakhim 1:3) requires that anointing a king for the first time requires both the High Court as well as a prophet. However, when the Rambam lists the appointment of subsequent kings (Hilkhot Sanhedrin 5:1), he describes a procedure requiring only the High Court - implying that a prophet is unnecessary. Apparently, the Rambam distinguished between the appointment of a melekh and creation of the concept of malkhut; that latter not only requires the High Court to represent the entire nation, but also a prophet. This verifies that true monarchy is only in God's hands (as we say on Rosh Hashana, "He coronates kings, but the Kingship is His") and He, through his prophet, is the one who must confer kingship upon humans. Once malkhut is a reality and we must only designate an individual as the representative of that dynasty, the High Court suffices.

2. Does the process include anointment or merely appointment?

The Yerushalmi in Shekalim (6:1) as well as the Bavli in Horayot (11b) determine that the initial appointment of a king must be performed by anointment with shemen ha-mishcha (anointing oil). The appointment of a "melekh ben melekh," a son succeeding his father, however, does not require oil. The discrepancy in terms of the technique of minui might indicate the difference between generating malkhut (which requires actual anointment) and merely naming a king (which doesn't).

Interestingly enough, there are two possible sources for this distinction. The Bavli in Horayot first derives it from a verse in Shemuel where God told Shemuel to anoint David "for he is the one." From this, Chazal infer: THIS ONE requires anointment, but not future kings who inherit the throne. Alternatively, the Bavli lists a second source (which the Rambam in Hilkhot Klei Ha-mikdash 1:11 draws from). The verse in parashat Shoftim, "so that the monarchy should endure," is an allusion to the fact that the throne is inherited. From this, Chazal learn that only the first king requires anointment and not those who inherit the throne. Again, the very verse which establishes the inheritance of malkhut excludes "melekh ben melekh" from anointment. This suggests that the lack of anointment isn't merely a formal issue but reflects the fact that the appointment itself is less dynamic; malkhut already exists - we are only selecting a melekh.

3. When a melekh ben melekh is anointed, what oil is used?

The gemara in Horayot posits that when there is a dispute over the throne, even a melekh ben melekh requires anointment. Here we have a disagreement among the commentators about the meaning of this exception. Rashi (Keritut 5b) maintains that the dispute actually suspends the MALKHUT, requiring a new genesis of malkhut. This further demonstrates that the endurance of MALKHUT is dependent upon national consensus. According to Rashi, there is little difference between the original anoinment of David and the anointment of a melekh ben melekh during times of dispute. In each case we anoint with the special "anointing oil" of the Temple, for in each case we are generating malkhut afresh.

The Rambam, however, distinguishes between these cases. In both Hilkhot Melakhim (1:12) and Hilkhot Klei Ha-mikdash (1:11) he explains that this exceptional anointment of melekh ben melekh in times of dispute is merely presentational. It is intended to create a public spectacle to generate support for the king and to rebuff his competitors. It isn't a substantive anointment but a political one. If so, we would expect that the anointing oil of the Temple not be used for this "show." Check the Rambam carefully in his statements in Hilkhot Klei Ha-mikdash - his formulation might confirm this distinction.

Part II: Separating the Strands

In Part I, we established the distinction between the categories of "melekh" and of "malkhut" - the former represents an individual occupying an office, and the latter represents the institution or dynasty itself. Whenever one distinguishes between two categories, which generally overlap but theoretically are distinct, one must conduct a test to determine that they can exist independently of each other. If they cannot, then it is possible that they aren't actually different but represent slightly different terms for the same concept. To verify that an authentic distinction exists rather than merely a semantic one, ideally some independence between the two categories should be sought. Sometimes they will not both be independent - only one aspect can exist independently. For logical purposes this is sufficient, since they are necessarily distinct.

To a degree we already witnessed the independence of malkhut from melekh. We considered two instances in which malkhut existed though there was no melekh. One case was the period prior to the actual appointment of a king during which, according to the gemarot in Rosh Ha-shana and Horayot, the king doesn't actually have a halakhic status of melekh. In addition, we noticed that according to the Yerushalmi, during the six-month political upheaval of Avshalom, neither David nor Avshalom was considered king, although the malkhut continued uninterrupted. Can we discover additional examples of malkhut without a melekh?

One such example readily presents itself from another gemara in Horayot (10a). According to this gemara, when a king is afflicted with tzara'at (which according to Chazal is equivalent to death) he loses his status of a king (reflected by the fact that he brings a commoner's chatat rather than the special offering of the king). The gemara cites the proof from Yotam, whose father Azarya was struck with tzara'at. During this period, since Azarya's status as king was suspended, his son Yotam handled his judicial duties. Here we notice again that a melekh's status is suspended without his successor actually ascending the throne as the next king. The verse relates that Yotam assumed only his father's judicial chores - he did not become the king until his father actually passed away. Here is another instance of malkhut which endures even during a period where there is no person representing that malkhut as melekh.

The Rambam provides another blatant case of malkhut independent of melekh. In Hilkhot Melakhim (1:7) he concludes that if the deserving primary inheritor is still a minor at the moment of the previous monarch's death, we reserve the throne for him until he matures. Until that point in time there is no one sitting on the throne occupying the office of king; despite this absence, the malkhut itself endures - no new anointment is necessary to jump-start the malkhut once the boy matures. The malkhut was abiding even without a melekh representing it and doesn't have to be regenerated.

The Minchat Chinukh provides a fascinating scenario which might comprise another case of malkhut without melekh. The Sifri determines from the verse, "You shall place upon yourself a king," that a woman cannot become king - "melekh ve-lo malka." What happens, the Minchat Chinukh asks, if there are no male inheritors to the throne and the only remaining relative is a woman? Would she inherit the throne? The Minchat Chinukh raises this question despite the specific verse which prevents a woman from becoming melekh. Evidently, if this case would ensue, she would not be considered a melekh - as the verse underlines. She would, however, inherit the malkhut - and pass it on to her children. We then would arrive at a scenario of an existing malkhut without a specific melekh.

This statement of the Minchat Chinukh opens an interesting Pandora's box. The Sifri lists several criteria for the person who would be king. For example, his mother must be Jewish - i.e. he cannot be a convert, nor the son of a convert. What would happen if a convert would be appointed king in violation of this rule? (According to many commentators, such an event actually occurred: Rechavam the son of Shlomo was the child of Na'ama Ha-amonit.) Would we maintain along the lines of the Minchat Chinukh that while he doesn't occupy the official office of melekh because he doesn't meet the full criteria, he nonetheless possesses malkhut - in terms of transferring the dynasty to his children? The Minchat Chinukh, who partially validates female representatives of malkhut, invites us to consider other exclusions and whether they are excluded entirely or merely precluded from acting as official melekh but capable of passing the office to their inheritor.

INTERIM SUMMARY: We have managed to isolate cases where malkhut continues even though there is no melekh. In some instances the melekh is suspended, in others he has yet to be appointed, in still others the person occupying the throne does not acquire the halakhic status of melekh. In all these cases the independent entity of malkhut endures.

What about the reverse case? Can there be a melekh even though there is no malkhut? At first glance such a case seems not to be feasible. If there is no political institution of malkhut, there is certainly no representative melekh! A closer consideration yields one notable example. Let us turn our attention to the concept of malkhut Yisrael.

Throughout the gemara we pick up hints that monarchs from the greater Jewish nation, though they were not part of the House of David which was guaranteed malkhut, were still considered halakhically legitimate kings. Take, for example, the gemara in Horayot (13a) which declares, "The entire nation of Israel is suitable to be king." In Horayot (11a) the gemara declares that both "Davidic Kings" as well as "Kings of Yisrael" (the Northern Empire which split from the Southern, Davidic kingdom in the days of the first Temple) bring special chatat sacrifices if they sin. This indicates that each of them enjoyed the status of king.

In general, we find all the laws of kings applied to kings of Yisrael as well. The gemara in Ketubot (17a) discusses the priority a king has to cross an intersection or use a road before a funeral procession or a wedding procession. The gemara seeks to disprove this by citing the example of Agrippas (a non-Davidic king) who allowed a funeral procession to precede him. Tosafot (Sanhedrin 20b) extend royal authorities to Achav who also hailed from non-Davidic roots. The Rambam in particular confers upon the king of Yisrael all the rules of a Davidic sovereign - "all the mitzvot of kingship apply to him." Evidently, non-Davidic rulers have the status of king. Yet there are conflicting signals as well.

The Mekhilta (parashat Bo) informs us, "Until David was chosen, all Jews were worthy for royalty; once he was chosen, all the rest of the nation was excluded." Even more startling are the statements of the Rambam himself (Sefer Ha-mitzvot, prohibition 362): "Anyone who comes from a family other than the house of Shlomo ... in terms of malkhut is considered a foreigner (nokhri) just as anyone who isn't a kohen is considered a stranger (zar) in terms of service in the Temple." With this, the Rambam extends the prohibition of "You may not appoint upon yourself a foreign man (ish nokhri)," which conventionally is taken to mean that you may not appoint a Gentile or a convert as king, to include non-Davidic appointments. He equates non-Davidic kings with non-kohanim - in each case underscoring their utter incompatibility or incongruity with the particular office. Similar sentiments and similar exclusion of non-Davidic kings can be found in the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishna (Sanhedrin 2:3). This apparently contradicts what was stated earlier that "kings of Yisrael" have the status of king and that all the laws of royalty apply to them!

Possibly, the solution to this famous contradiction lies in the distinction between malkhut and melekh. Clearly, the personal status of melekh, which determines a range of halakhot, can apply even to a non-Davidic individual. There is no question that he can serve as a halakhic melekh. Melekh, however, but not malkhut. The concept of malkhut was promised to David, and once he was chosen all other families were excluded from dynastic ownership of the throne (see especially Rambam, Hil. Melakhim 1:7,9). There is no background malkhut outside of the House of David even though the personal status of melekh applies.

When the Rambam describes the status of non-Davidic kings as "nokhri," he clearly stresses their exclusion from the concept of malkhut. The same language can be found in Hilkhot Melakhim (1:8-9) when he says that even though a monarch of the Northern Kingdom has legitimacy, nevertheless "MALKHUT primarily belongs to the House of David." There can be a melekh from other tribes, but no family dynasty which sees the throne pass eternally through the family. Indeed, throughout Tanakh we notice that children of malkhei Yisrael inherited their father's throne. This does not reflect the presence of malkhut - a dynastic political entity which automatically passes through the generations. Instead, it reflects another halakha - any public position is inherited by a son (known as the law of serara). The office of king is no worse than any other position and is hereditary. This does not, however, constitute malkhut, which is a familial reality independent of any particular individual. Malkhei Yisrael seem to present an instance of melekh without malkhut.

A second example of melekh without malkhut might relate to the Nasi, the Jewish "prince" - the reigning Jewish leader at times when Jewish sovereignty was absent. He was afforded the status of king regarding several laws - among them he is required to offer the special chatat sacrifice of a melekh. This suggests a partial status of melekh. Yet once the malkhut had been suspended, as it was at the time of destruction of the Temple, it would be very difficult to conceive of an enduring concept of malkhut. The Nasi might reflect an additional instance of melekh without a malkhut.

We have thus proven that malkhut and melekh are mutually independent categories, each capable of existing in the absence of the other.

METHODOLOGICAL POINTS:

I. A common solution to an apparent contradiction is the splitting of a concept into two components. This is a very elegant way of resolving any contradiction. It is commonly known as "two laws" ("tzvei dinim" in yeshiva jargon).

II. Inspect the generative process to detect dissimilarities which mirror the essential differences. If malkhut and melekh are truly different, they should be triggered in different manners.

III. Once you establish your two dinim, test whether they are truly independent of each other. Can one exist without the other and vice versa?

AFTERWORD:

There is understandably much to discuss in terms of the role of a melekh and most importantly whether the very appointment of a monarch is beneficial or undesirable. In terms of an issue raised in the article - the role of public consensus for monarchy to be valid - see Tosafot, Sanhedrin 20b, and Rashi on Bereishit 49:8.

[1]. Hilkhot Chanukah 3/1-2.

[2]. "Mesorah" Torah Journal, No. 4, Kislev 5751, p. 5.

[3]. See ibid. that Rambam did not also relate the story of Purim in his Mishne Torah since the story is already written in Torah She'bektav i.e. Megillat Esther, and the Mishne Torah was meant to be learnt together with Torah She'bektav.

[4]. The normative ruling is according to Beit Hillel, (Orach Chaim 671/2).

[5]. There are two interpretations of mehadrin min ha'mehadrin in Rishonim, and one of the interpretations subdivides into two. The first approach is that only the ba'al ha'bayit lights: Tosefot (Shabbat 21b beginning ve'ha'mehadrin min ha'mehadrin) rule that he lights only one chanukiah in order that the pirsumei nisa be recognizable; Rambam (Chanukah 4/1) rules that he lights each ner ke'neged b'nei beito. The second approach is that each family member lights (Minhag Sefard, cited in Rambam, Chanukah 4/3). Shulchan Arukh (Orach Chaim 671/2) rules in accordance with Tosefot, whereas the Rema (ibid.) rules like the Minhag Sefard.

[6]. The Gemara Shabbat 21b cites two Amoraic explanations of this dispute. One explanation is that Beit Shammai considers the yamim ha'nichnasin, or the amount of days left in Chanukah, whereas Beit Hillel considers the yamim ha'yotzin, or the number of the day in Chanukah. The second explanation is that Beit Shammai lights k'neged parei ha'chag which diminished in number every day of Sukkot, whereas Beit Hillel lights with consideration to ma'alin ba'kodesh v'ein moridin. These explanations do not seem to sufficiently explain the machloket between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. The Rav zt"l ("Mesorah" Torah Journal, No. 4, Kislev 5751, p. 3) clarifies the Gemara as follows: According to the first Amora, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel dispute whether one ought to consider the extent of the salvation from distress or the magnitude of the miracle. According to Beit Shammai, the distress of not having enough oil lessened every day, whereas according to Beit Hillel, the miracle took on greater proportion with each passing day. With regard to the second Amora, the Rav zt"l explains that Beit Shammai used parei ha'chag to prove that ma'alin ba'kodesh v'ein moridin refers only to a cheftza and not to a minyan, i.e. an amount.

[7]. This is the ruling of Arukh Ha'Shulchan (Orach Chaim 677/5).

[8]. See Tosefot Sukkah 46a (beginning Ha'roeh) who write that with regard to mizvat mezuzah and ner chanukah one who does not have a house, "ein b'yadam l'kayeim ha'mizvah". This implies that the individual is obligated, yet unable to fulfill the mizvah. However, see the Ran (on the Rif, Shabbat 23b, beginning Amar Rav Sheshet) and Kol Bo (Chanukah siman 44) who distinguish between the two mizvot. They are of the opinion that mezuzah is a chovat ha'cheftza, and thus if one does not have a house he is patur, as opposed to ner chanukah which is a chovat ha'gavra, and even a guest is obligated in the mizvah. Their proof that the two mizvot are different is that one is obligated to put a mezuzah on each doorway, as opposed to ner chanukah where the mizvah is to light merely at your front door step. The Rambam (Chanukah 4/1), however, formulates the mizvah as follows: "The mizvah of ner chanukah is that kol bayit v'bayit (every house) should light one ner...". This implies that ner chanukah is a chovat ha'cheftza.

[9]. One might argue that just as one must light at both entrances to his courtyard because of ma'arit ayin (Orach Chaim 671/8) similarly an owner of two homes must light at both residences due to ma'arit ayin. Even if this were true, a bracha would only be recited at the current residence since it is only there that he is truly obligated in ner chanukah. Moreover, the very application of ma'arit ayin to an owner of multiple residences is questionable since it is clear to the neighbors and passersby when a home is uninhabited.

[10]. Beginning of the Laws of Chanukah.

[11]. Rambam's Iggeret Ha'Shemad or Ma'amar Kiddush Hashem, p. 43, Rabinowitz Edition, Mossad Ha'Rav Kook. See also Midrash Ma'aseh Chanukah, first printed in Otzar Tov, vol. 1.

[12]. Shabbat 23a.

[13]. Shabbat 21b.

[14]. See, however, the Netziv, She'iltot D'Rav Achai Gaon, She'ilta 54, Ha'Amek She'eila, ot 4, who explains that this Halakha is comparable to kiddush Shabbat morning where the mizvah is a chovat gavra to drink the wine, and the ba'al ha'bayit is nonetheless motzi the household when he drinks the wine for them even though no one else has drunk from the wine. Rav Chaim Brisker dissents, and requires everyone to actually drink the wine on Shabbat morning.

[15]. Tur Orach Chaim, end of siman 676, beginning U'Mah'Shekatav Ein Madlikin.

[16]. This dispute may be viewed in a variety of ways, highlighted by three versions of the definition of hanachah oseh mizvah: 1. Set it down, then light it (Gemara Shabbat 23a and Tosefot ibid.); 2. Light it, then place it down (Ramban on Gemara Shabbat 22b, beginning l'man d'amar hanachah oseh mizvah, and rov rishonim); 3. Set down a pre-existing ner (Or Zaruah, Chanukah 324). One possibility is that it is a polarized debate with one side contending the mizvah is just the hadlakah, and the other side contending the mizvah is just the hanachah. This seems to work well with the Or Zaruah's version of hanachah oseh mizvah. It also works well with the Ramban's and rov rishonim's version, since they hold that the hadlakah is only necessary to remove the possibility of people thinking that you put down the ner for you own use. However, while hanachah certainly has precedent in Halakha min ha'Torah, as in hanachat mezuzah and hanachat tefillin, it is difficult to understand why hanachah should be the mizvah on Chanukah when the miracle was in the hadlakah.

Perhaps hanachah oseh mizvah can be better understood by analyzing the relationship between the hadlakah/hanachah with pirsumei nisa. The following are two viable approaches: 1. Pirsumei nisa is not the mizvah, but it is needed rather to define the hadlakah/hanachah as a mizvah, and hadlakah/hanachah are both the maaseh mizvah and kiyum ha'mizvah; or 2. Hadlakah/hanachah are not the mizvah, but are needed rather to create a ner which is distinctly for Chanukah, a ner chanukah, enabling the mizvah of pirsumei nisa to transpire.

If the mizvah is solely pirsumei nisa, then one of two options becomes available. Either pirsumei nisa is just a kiyum ha'mizvah which demands a result - the establishment of a situation of pirsumei nisa; or it is a ma'aseh mizvah which requires an act of pirsumei nisa. In either case, hanachah oseh mizvah is eminently sensible, as placing the ner down essentially creates a situation of pirsumei nisa and is at the same time an act of pirsumei nisa. Lighting the ner, on the other hand, is basically an act of zecher l'nes, a reenactment of the miracle. If so, it would seem that hadlakah oseh mizvah assumes that the hadlakah, zecher l'nes, is the actual mizvah. In this view, pirsumei nisa would only be required to establish a proper zecher l'nes.

A different approach in the debate of hadlakah or hanachah oseh mizvah is that the dispute is not polarized, and hanachah oseh mizvah recognizes at some level the significance of hadlakah oseh mizvah in ner chanukah. Accordingly, hanachah oseh mizvah assumes that primarily hanachah is the mizvah, and while the hadlakah is part of the mizvah, it is only secondary. This seems to be Rashi's position (Shabbat 22b, beginning V'ei hanachah oseh mizvah): "V'Ikar mizvatah taliah be'hanachah". It also works well with the Gemara's and Tosefot's version of hanachah oseh mizvah, that one first sets the ner down, and then lights it. We see this idea, moreover, in the Ran's position that according to hanachah oseh mizvah the bracha is le'hadlik u'le'haniach.

According to this approach, perhaps both opinions agree that the nature of the mizvah is zecher l'nes, not pirsumei nisa, and the whole debate is whether this obligation is a chovat ha'gavra or chovat ha'cheftza. Hadlakah oseh mizvah assumes that zecher l'nes is a chovat ha'gavra, whereas hanachah oseh mizvah assumes that zecher l'nes is a chovat ha'cheftza. The result of this explanation is that hadlakah oseh mizvah is a ma'aseh mizvah, whereas hanachah oseh mizvah is a kiyum ha'mizvah, interested in results - having zecher l'nes on your house.

[17]. Shabbat 23a.

[18]. Orach Chaim 675/1.

[19]. Rosh Hashanah 28a.

[20]. Shabbat 2/7.

[21]. Shemot 15/2.

[22]. Chanukah 4/1.

[23]. Shabbat 21b.

[24]. Shabbat 21b, beginning Ve'Hamehadrin.

[25]. See Griz al ha'Rambam, Laws of Chanukah 4/3.

[26]. Bava Kama 9a.

[27]. For example, one who fulfills mehadrin min ha'mehadrin on the second day of Chanukah has already expended twice the value of the principal mizvah.

[28]. Beis Ha'Levi al ha'Torah, page 29.

[29]. See the Bach, Orach Chaim, siman 670.

[30]. Laws of Chanukah, 4/1.

[31]. Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chaim, 671/1-2.

[32]. Cited by Rambam ibid, 4/3.

[33]. Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chaim ibid.

[34]. Shabbat 21b. Moreover, this approach might explain why the Beit Yosef (Orach Chaim, Siman 676) rules that in mehadrin min ha'mehadrin one should light from left to right, whereas the Gra (ibid, beginning Va'yevarech al ha'nosaf) rules that one should light from right to left. If one understands that ner chanukah has a unique din of hidur, it is possible that this hidur is m'guf ha'mizvah, part of the very mizvah. This would justify the position which subscribes to lighting the new candle - the left candle - first, since it too is m'guf ha'mizvah. However, if only the universal din of hidur is applicable to ner chanukah, then one could not reach the conclusion of the Beit Yosef, since it is unacceptable that one light the ner of hidur before one lights the ner that is m'guf ha'mizvah - the ner on the farthest right.

[35]. "Mesorah" Torah Journal, No. 4, Kislev 5751, p. 9, "B'minyan Ha'mizvot".

[36]. Of course, this assumes that ner chanukah is a chovat ha'gavra, for if it were a chovat ha'cheftza (a chovat ha'bayit), the ba'al ha'bayit's hadlakah would, in any scenario, discharge the primary obligation emanating from the house. Indeed, perhaps Shulchan Arukh considers ner chanuka a chovat ha'cheftza, and thus could not identify with the Rema's position.

[37]. One must consider how this debate influences our understanding of mehadrin min ha'mehadrin; is it a din of universal hidur beyond mehadrin, or is it a special din of hidur in ner chanukah, over and above the din of mehadrin, or is it some other combination?

[38]. Translated by Kaeren Fish, from a longer article that will be printed in the forthcoming "Sefer Ha-yovel" from Yeshivat Har Etzion. An untranslated addendum to this article was originally printed in the Purim 5755 issue (6) of Alon Shevut La-bogrim, pp. 67-70.

[39]. See further under "bal tosif" in the Talmudic Encyclopedia, vol. 3, pp. 426-430.

[40]. Mitzva 454.

[41]. Devarim 4:1-2.

[42]. See the Rosh on Masekhet Ta'anit, siman 24; Ran in Rosh Ha-shana 19a (d.h. "lo kashia") and others.

[43]. Rosh Hashana 19a.

[44]. See Tosafot in Ta'anit 18a, d.h. "Rav..."; Ritva in Megilla 2a, d.h. "Peshita..."

[45]. Orach Chayyim 686:1.

[46]. As quoted in the Tur, Orach Chayyim 686.

[47]. 696:7.

[48]. See article by R. Mordekhai Willig, shlita, in Zikhron Yaakov (a Sefer Zikaron for Maran HaRav Soloveitchik zt"l) pp. 58-82.

[49]. Megilla 4a, d.h. "Nashim Chayavot..."

[50]. 665:3.

[51]. Introduction by the GRIZ to Kuntres Chanuka U-megilla by R. Chaim Aharon Tordin z"l, Kuntres Megilla p. 55.

[52]. Responsa of the Chatam Sofer, Orach Chayyim 208. It should be noted that according to the opinion of the Netziv this fulfillment was only a kiyum in the first year of the festival's institution, as is apparent from the words of the Sheiltot: "Reish sh'ilta" etc., and see further the Ha-amek Shela, ad locum.

[53]. See further in Hilkhot Yom Ha-atzma'ut and Yom Yerushalayim (ed. by R. Nahum Rakover, Jerusalem, 5733), pp. 25-122.

[54]. Megilla, chapter 1.

[55]. I believe that I heard the same idea from HaRav Lichtenstein, shlita, many years ago in his explanation of the Rambam. We may also raise the possibility that this kiyum is similar in some respects to the idea of Kiddush Ha-Shem in the world, but the scope of this article does not allow for elaboration.

[56]. Devarim 16:14.

[57]. Pesachim 109b.

[58]. Hilkhot Yom Tov, 6:7.

[59]. See Dr. Avraham Marcus' article in this issue: "The Mitzva of Tekiat Chatzotzrot: Pageantry with a Holy Message."

[60]. See Mishnat Ya'avetz, Orach Chayyim 50, and Moadim U-zmanim, 1:4.

[61]. 9:19-22.

[62]. Volume 120 - "Purim and Chanuka as Yamim Tovim," p. 56.

[63]. 2:14.

[64]. 3:3.

[65]. Shiurim le-zecher Avi Mori, z"l, part 1, pp. 120-121.

[66]. Hilkhot Avel, p.59.

[67]. See Ramban's notations to the Sefer Ha-mitzvot of the Rambam, (Chavel edition,) p. 22.

[68]. There is also a recitation of Hallel on Purim as determined by the Rambam in Hilkhot Chanuka 3:6, that "the reading of the Megilla is the Hallel." See the sugya in Megilla 14a and the Meiri there.

[69]. Chapter 227 in Sefer Ha-Yir'im.

[70]. p.62, and see there the quotation of my esteemed friend, R. Yair Kahn, that "even Yamim Tovim de-oraita depend on the declaration and determination of the Beit Din in order to attain their status as a festival ("mekadesh Yisrael ve-ha'zemanim" - Rosh Ha-shana 25a.) If this is so, then perhaps the determination by the Beit Din is what bestows the de-oraita character of the day - even to festivals which have a Rabbinic basis.

[71]. 6:18.

[72]. Hilkhot Megilla, 2:15,17.

[73]. Sh'ilta 67.

[74]. Orach Chayyim 696:4.

[75]. See further in Shiurim le-zecher Avi Mori z"l, vol. 2, "Regarding Mourning," pp. 182-196.

[76]. Rambam, Hilkhot Chanuka, Chapter 3.

[77]. See "Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik's Thoughts On Chanuka," by Kenneth Brander, in Bein Kotlei Ha-Yeshiva, vol. 3, Kislev 1986, pp. 1-7.

[78]. Masekhet Soferim 20:6.

[79]. Ta'anit 28b.

[80]. The gemara ibid. continues that, in the diaspora, Hallel is actually recited on twenty-one days of the year - because Succot, Pesach, and Shavuot each have an extra day of Yom Tov ("Yom Tov sheni shel galuyot"), which require the recitation of Hallel.

[81]. Ibid.

[82]. However, see Rambam (Sefer ha-Mitzvot, Shoresh Alef), who holds that on Rosh Chodesh, the recitation of Hallel in the Beit ha-Mikdash is mi-de'oraita, based on the verse in Bemidbar 10:10. ("And on your days of rejoicing, your festivals, and your New Moons...")

[83]. See Rambam, Hilkhot Chanuka 3:7, Tur and Shulchan Arukh, 490:4.

[84]. Rambam, Hilkhot Berakhot 11:16. This is the opinion of most meforshim. However, Ramban distinguishes between Rosh Chodesh and chol ha-mo'ed Pesach, and rules that it is a special takanat chachamim to say half-Hallel on Pesach. See Maggid Mishneh on Rambam, Hilkhot Chanuka 3:7.

[85]. There is a dispute in the Rishonim as to whether or not half Hallel requires a birkhat ha-mitzva. Rambam (Hilkhot Berakhot 11:16) writes it does not, and Rabbeinu Tam (Sukka 44b, d"h "Kan be-Mikdash") rules it does. This issue is dependent upon the role of minhag in halakha, and the multiple dimensions of that issue. This a much discussed topic, and is beyond the scope of this article. Briefly, however, one may view certain minhagim as having taken on certain characteristics of mitzvot, and they thus might require birkhat ha-mitzvot. See Griz on the Rambam, Hilkhot Berakhot 11:16.

[86]. Oddly, this listing also excludes Hallel on Pesach night, even though the mishna in Pesachim 95a records Hallel on Pesach night as an obligation. Masekhet Soferim 20:9, however, records the above list of days on which we must recite Hallel with the addition that on one night we must also recite Hallel, i.e. Pesach night. It is entirely possible that the discrepancy between these two lists may be due to the fact that they relate to different kinds of obligations, i.e. standard Hallel and a Hallel unique to Pesach night. See "Hallel on Pesach Night," by m"v Rabbi Michael Rosensweig, shlita, published in Yeshivat Har Etzion's Silver Anniversary Dinner Journal, 1993, pp. 71-87.

[87]. Women, however, are exempt from reciting Hallel on Yom Tov (and Rosh Chodesh) because Hallel is a time-bound mitzva. See the Gemara in Sukka 38a, Magen Avraham 422:5, and Biur Halakha, chap. 422, d"h "Hallel." (See, however, Ra'avya on Sukka [ibid], who understands that women are obligated in Hallel.) Nonetheless, women are required to recite Hallel at the Pesach Seder since they were included in the miracle of yetziat mitzrayim. See Tosafot in Sukka 38a, d"h "Mi she-haya," and Biur Halakha, ibid. Based on Tosafot Sukka, it should follow that women are obligated to recite Hallel on Chanuka, since "af hen hayu be-oto ha-nes." Rambam (Hilkhot Chanuka, chap. 3), however, appears to exempt women from Hallel on Chanuka as well. See Marcheshet, vol. 1, no. 22.

[88]. Berakhot 14a.

[89]. Pesachim 117a.

[90]. Rambam, Sefer Ha-mitzvot, Shoresh Alef.

[91]. See also Ramban, Hasagot le-Sefer Ha-mitzvot, ibid, and R' Avraham Ibn Ezra, (Yesod Moreh, sha'ar 6, in the name of Rabbenu Bachaya). Nonetheless, it is still possible that the text of Hallel is merely rabbinic in nature, similar to the laws of mourning and of isur melakha on chol ha-mo'ed which may be fundamentally biblical, and yet rabbinic in their detail. This question might be dependent, in part, on the Tannaitic debate in Pesachim 117a as to whether Moshe Rabbeinu and Benei Yisrael or Dovid Ha-melekh were the first to coin the text of Hallel. See Ramban, ibid., and Ra'ah, Masekhet Berakhot, ch. 1. The obvious advantage in embracing the idea of a rabbinic text is that it can be used to reconcile the seemingly contradictory gemarot. Any stress on Hallel's biblical characteristics can be attributed to the obligation to recite Hallel, whereas Hallel's rabbinic tendencies can be ascribed to the nature of its text.

[92]. See also Sefer Yere'im, chap. 242, and Semak 146.

[93]. Rambam, Sefer Ha-mitzvot, ibid., and Hilkhot Chanuka 3:6.

[94]. The Rambam can reconcile the other gemarot with his view by interpreting takanat nevi'im to be on par with rabbinic law, and by explaining that "lav de-oraita" actually means "not prophetically ordained." See also Rashi, Ta'anit 28b, d"h "Minhag avoteihem."

[95]. See also Rashi, ibid. The degree to which divrei kabbala expresses biblical and rabbinic qualities is the subject of another discussion. See the gemara in Rosh Ha-shana 19a.

[96]. Ramban, Sefer Ha-mitzvot, ibid. According to Ramban, the source for Hallel min ha-Torah is either halakha le-Moshe mi-Sinai, or that it is included in the mitzva of simchat Yom Tov.

[97]. Siman 69.

[98]. Teshuvot Chatam Sofer, Yorah Deah, chap. 233, and Orach Chayyim, chaps. 191 and 208.

[99]. Ha-amek Shela, Sheilta 26, note 1, in an explanation of Sheiltot de-Rav Achai Gaon.

[100]. Hilkhot Chanuka 3:6.

[101]. See Griz al ha-Rambam, ibid.

[102]. Arachin 10a-b.

[103]. The gemara's emphasis on the correlation between korbanot and Hallel is striking. After all, what does one have to do with the other? Indeed, the Midrash (cited in Beit Yosef, Orach Chayyim 490, d"h "kol ha-yomim") understands that the reason why we recite Hallel only on the first day of Pesach, as opposed to Sukkot, has nothing to do with korbanot. Rather, in principle, we should really recite Hallel every day of Pesach, just like Sukkot, but since on the seventh day of Pesach, i.e. Yom Tov acharon, the mitzrim were drowned in the Yam Suf, it is inappropriate to recite full Hallel on that day. Moreover, since we do not recite full Hallel on Yom Tov acharon of Pesach, we also refrain from reciting it on chol ha-mo'ed Pesach, since otherwise chol ha-mo'ed will appear more significant than Yom Tov. It is for this reason, according to the Midrash, that we recite Hallel only on the first day of Pesach. See Taz, Orach Chayyim, 490:3.

The Rav zt"l, Maran Rabbi Joseph B. Halevi Soloveitchik, has suggested that based on our gemara's emphasis on korbanot's relationship with Hallel, one may adduce that part of Yom Tov's kedushat ha-yom is rooted in korbanot, as given expression by the shira said over the korbanot. Thus, since there are different korbanot brought each day of Sukkot, we see that each day of Sukkot has a unique kedushat ha-yom, and are considered like seven different Yom Tovim. We therefore understand why Hallel is recited each day of Sukkot, as opposed to Pesach.

[104]. Turei Even (Megilla 22b, d"h "ve-she'in bo") understands that in the times of the Mikdash, there was indeed an isur melakha on Rosh Chodesh as well, due to the Korban Musaf. Nonetheless, he explains that this isur melakha is not as stringent as that of chol ha-mo'ed, which stems from the day itself.

[105]. An intriguing question, raised by the Avnei Nezer, is why do we not say Hallel on Shabbat Rosh Chodesh, as that day now has isur melakha, korbanot, and mo'ed? Avnei Nezer answers that Shabbat and Rosh Chodesh are two separate kedushot which do not unite, and each kedushat ha-yom by itself does not warrant Hallel shalem. See, however, Gemara Zevachim 91a which seems to suggest that Shabbat Rosh Chodesh is a unified kedusha.

[106]. Even if only some of these factors exist, it is possible that they would create a special Rabbinic obligation to recite Hallel. See Meiri on Ta'anit (perek 4, mishna 5), and Shita Mekubetzet on Berakhot 14a.

[107]. Ibid.

[108]. Megilla 14a.

[109]. Some Rishonim, like Rambam (Hilkhot Chanuka 3:6), understand that there is an obligation to recite Hallel on Purim, and keriat Megilla actually serves as Hallel. Meiri (Megilla 14a) writes that according to this reasoning, one must recite Hallel on Purim in the event one does not have a megilla, and indeed this is Meiri's final ruling. Le-halakha, Posekim rule against Meiri, and in the event one does not have a megilla, there is no obligation to recite Hallel (Chatam Sofer, Orach Chayyim, chap. 192), or at best, one should recite Hallel without a berakha (Ketav Sofer, Orach Chayyim, chap. 140).

[110]. Of interest is the opinion of Maharitz Chayes who understands these gemarot to imply just the opposite, and only supernatural events can activate a chiyuv Hallel.

[111]. It is possible that there is no distinction between the Hallels obligated by any of these four categories, and all Hallels are either min ha-Torah or mi-derabanan. Yet, perhaps one can distinguish, as does Ramban, between Hallel of mo'ed, which is min ha-Torah, and Hallel in response to events, which is mi-derabanan. One may also distinguish, based on these categories, between Hallel shel shira, and Hallel shel korin. See "Hallel on Pesach Night," pp. 77, where this distinction is applied to Hallel of leil Pesach.

[112]. Pesachim 117a.

[113]. Nonetheless, as is well known, the recitation of Hallel on Yom Ha-atzmaut or Yom Yerushalayim has long been the subject of heated controversy. It is not the intention of this article, however, to explore the propriety of saying Hallel on Yom Ha'atzmaut or Yom Yerushalayim. For a review of the material related to this issue, see Journal of Halakha and Contemporary Society, No. VII, Spring 1984.

[114]. Shabbat 118b.

[115]. Sanhedrin 94a.

[116] Compare to Megilla 21b where the gemara is not concerned with maintaining an equal number of verses for each person called to the Torah.

[117] It should be noted that this situation is similar to that of the show bread.

[118] For in the previous accounts, the topic is limited to discussing the mitzva of lighting the ner tamid by Aaron, and not the lighting of the menora's candles. Therefore in this instance Chazal said (Tanchuma, Beha'alotkha 8. see carefully Ramban ad loc.), that Aaron received a unique commandment here regarding lighting candles to appease his conscience, even though he was ostensibly commanded to light them already and in this there is no appeasement whatsoever.

[119] See Mishneh Torah, Temidin U-musafin ch. 3; Rashba, Responsa sec. 1:309.

[120] It is plausible that even according to the opinion of the Sifri who derived this from "lifnei Hashem tamid," "constantly before the lord," his intent is for Vayikra 24:4 and not 24:3.

Menú

domingo, 22 de diciembre de 2024

HALAJOT DE JANUKA PORIMERA PARTE

Lighting Chanukah Candles

A Halakhic Overview

by: Rabbi Doniel Schreiber

I. Mekor Chanukah

II. Mizvat Hadlakah

III. Ner Ish U'Beito

1. Chovat Ha'Gavra or Chovat Ha'Cheftza

2. Hanachah Oseh Mizvah or Hadlakah Oseh Mizvah

IV. Mehadrin, U'Mehadrin Min Ha'Mehadrin

Chanuka and Purim:

A Study of their differences

by Rabbi Nathaniel Helfgot[38]

I - Introduction

II - Differences Based on "Divrei Kabbala"

III - Differences Based on Mi-de'oraita Concerns

IV - Conclusions

Mitzvat Hallel:

A Halakhic Overview

by Rabbi Doniel Schreiber

I. Mekor Mitzvat Hallel

II. Conditions for the Recitation of Hallel

III. The Scope of Mitzvat Hallel

No hay comentarios.:

Publicar un comentario